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ABSTRACT
ESCALATION AND RADICALIZATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:
A MICRO-COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GENOCIDE
Damir Kovačević, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Michael Clark, Director
Why does genocide occur in some locations and at some times but not in other locations
or at other times? My project seeks to analyze the complex, dynamic, and extraordinary
phenomenon of genocide by applying the micro-comparative method. I argue that genocide
should not be studied as a two-stage process of policy and implementation, but rather as part of a
multi-dimensional framework that is subject to various conditions. By framing the research this
way, we can answer two important shortcomings in current studies of genocide: Why is genocide
the outcome in some cases of political violence, but not in other cases? And, what explains
leaders’ decisions to escalate violence over time? I am proposing that genocide is not a singular
act, but rather a radical and cumulative process dependent on events, interactions, ideologies, and
actors. My study adopts a nuanced theory that accounts for the necessary structural and agency
factors to better explain the process of genocide. I situate my micro-comparative study within the
case of the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995), by examining how and why genocide occurred
across different municipalities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
Each year on July 24, survivors, relatives of victims, and fellow Bosnians, gather to
commemorate the killings at the Keraterm concentration camp. Camp Keraterm, in addition to
Omarska and Trnopolje, was regarded as one of the most notorious concentration camps in the
Prijedor region during the Bosnian civil war. On the days of July 20 and 21, 1992, Room 3 at the
Keraterm camp was filled with new detainees cleansed from the Brdo area. The newly arrived
detainees were denied food and subjected to physical abuse for the first couple of days.1 But on
the night of July 24, armed guards dressed in military uniforms and red berets entered the camp
and placed a machine-gun in front of Room 3. On that day, nearly 200 Bosnian Muslims were
massacred. The event exemplified the atrocious group-targeted violence that would sweep the
Balkans, and especially the multiethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Eastern Europe was
embarking on the democratization process, the republics of Former Yugoslavia spiraled into a
dark and hyper-nationalistic path of violence akin to that of Holocaust during World War II.
The Keraterm massacre occurred at the onset of the Bosnian civil war, but it was only
one instance of the type of violence that developed throughout the country during the three-year
period. Prior to 1991, Yugoslavia was composed of six republics, including Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Fighting and hostility
1

Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić (Judgement) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003).
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ensued with the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia, but it was Bosnia’s declaration of
independence in March 1992 that escalated the violence to a new level. The term Etničko
čišćenje, as used by Serbian military groups, gained international prominence as a euphemism
for a final solution. Ethnic cleansing – or the systematic removal of ethnic or religious groups
from a given territory to create a purely homogeneous society – quickly became the narrative
used for far more haunting acts when described in detail. The severity of ethnic cleansing
included but was not limited to: quotas restricting Muslim workers in factories, arbitrary arrest
and detention, rape and sexual assaults, forcible placement of Muslim civilians in ghetto areas,
destruction and seizing of property, and the forced expulsion of Muslim civilians from their
homes.2 But the civil war’s central feature was the systematic killing of a group of people for
ethnic and/or religious reasons. This violence was genocide. Genocide not only occurred in the
town of Prijedor, but rather it was a coordinated campaign that stretched across numerous
municipalities in Bosnia, varying in time of execution and severity. After the United Nations
Genocide Convention of 1948, the phrase “Never again” was the rhetoric the international
community used to emphasize the importance of preventing similar atrocities in the future. But
in the half century since, the men, women, and children of Srebrenica, Prijedor, Zvornik, Foča,
etc., fell victim to the very crime the world condemned and ensured to prevent.
Puzzle
I had the opportunity to take part in the Keraterm Camp memorial service in 2015. As I
listened to the accounts of survivors and victims, I asked myself one central question: why does
genocide occur in some locations and at some times but not in other locations or at other times?

2

Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 250251; United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security
Council S/1994/674 (27 May 1994), 18-27.
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Why were municipalities – primarily Prijedor and Zvornik – the sites of numerous concentration
camps and genocidal violence? Why was the same type of violence not perpetrated in
municipalities like Bratunac?3 Simply accounting for ethnicity and religion does not explain the
variation. Being a Bosnian Muslim was a necessary criterion in deciding who belonged to the
victim group, but violence varied per timing, location, and intensity. When the academic
community, the media, or policy experts discuss the Bosnian Genocide, what are they referring
to? The answer is the presence of genocide at the macro-level. In other words, genocide has been
most commonly studied with a top-down approach, whereby the unit of analysis is the state. But
this approach ignores the differences in outcomes within the state. My visit to Bosnia illustrates
the dynamic nature of genocide that cannot be captured using the state-level as the unit of
analysis. Instead – with my preliminary inquiries – I discovered that the patterns of location,
duration, and escalation that led to the onset of genocide varied from municipality to
municipality.
Thus, I argue that to understand genocide as one possible outcome of political violence,
scholars must reframe their research questions to account for variation. This can include
comparing similar country cases with different outcomes to investigate the explanatory variables
necessary for genocide to emerge. For instance, looking at cases where the potential for mass
violence was present – Mali or Kenya – but did not materialize along the same lines as it did in

3

For an account on the concentration camps in each municipality, see: United Nations Security Council, Report of
the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674 (27 May
1994).
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Armenia, Bosnia, or Rwanda. But if scholars want to venture into undeveloped territory, the
next step is exploring variation at the local or regional level.
To address my research question, it is vital to examine how the violence began and
extended in local municipalities across the country. The Bosnian civil war resulted in nearly
100,000 lost lives during the three-year period – of which nearly 64,000 were Muslim – yet the
implementation of genocide as a form of political violence varied across regions. Understanding
how and why genocide occurred in Bosnia requires analyzing the underdeveloped within-case
dynamics. As reported by the Bosnian Book of the Dead, the municipalities of Bratunac,
Prijedor, and Zvornik accounted for a considerable amount of deaths during the Bosnian civil
war, but the type of violence committed varied.5 Prijedor and Zvornik accounted for 28 and 23
concentration camps, respectively, whereas Bratunac totaled three altogether. Moreover, Prijedor
and Zvornik were the sites of numerous war crimes committed during the conflict. In Prijedor
alone, war criminals have been subjected to 13 trials before the Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Those indicted included high-ranking officials of the Serbian Democratic
Party such as Milomir Stakić, Milan Kovačević, and Radislav Brdanin, as well as General Ratko
Mladić, Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić, and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević.
The accused faced charges of genocide, murder, forced transfers, unlawful confinement, torture,
and various other systematic attacks against civilian populations.6 On the other hand, the case of

4

Gregory H. Stanton, “Genocides, Politicides, and Other Mass Murder since 1945, With Stages in 2008, Genocide
Watch (2008), available at: http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/genocidespoliticides.html (accessed 17
October 2016).
5
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Mirsad Tokača, The Bosnian Book of the Dead (Sarajevo: Research and Documentation Center, 2013).

Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (Judgement) IT-95-5/18 (24 March 2016); Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić
(Judgement) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003); Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro Judgement), ICJ Reports
2007: 43; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin (Judgement) IT-99-36 (3 April 2007).
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Bratunac demonstrated an effective counter resistance by the Bosnian Muslims, along with
Bosnian Muslim attacks on Bosnian Serb villages.
This local variation is puzzling for a few reasons: Prijedor and Bratunac are both
multiethnic cities (composed primarily of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs) within Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the violence erupted early on in both cities and lasted throughout the threeyear period, and both cities experienced a high-death count. However, in Prijedor, the violence
was one-sided mass murder against Bosnian Muslims, whereas Bratunac saw both sides
effectively pursue violence against one another. This leads me to investigate why perpetrators are
able to effectively escalate their strategies to genocidal violence in certain cases, but not others.
What factors allow individuals – whether military, civilian elites, or ordinary people – to commit
such dehumanizing, atrocious, and deadly acts that cut against the very core of humanity?
Compared to other forms of political violence, genocide is puzzling for three reasons:
First, genocide is an incomparable phenomenon, and one in which ordinary people perpetrate
extraordinary violence.7 The type of violence that leads neighbors, friends, and community
members to view each other as enemies who must be killed. Second, genocide is a complex
phenomenon, and one in which violence is multidirectional. The actors involved include the
state, local elites, the military, paramilitary groups, and everyday citizens. Third, genocide is a
dynamic phenomenon that is a product of a “process or spiral of escalation in which alternative
strategies of violence might have been previously tried or exercised.”8 In other words, genocide

7

For instance, the common 20th century genocides discussed in the literature are the Armenian genocide, the
Holocaust, Cambodian genocide, Rwandan genocide, and the Bosnian genocide.
8

Scott Straus, “Destroy Them to Save Us: Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence,” Terrorism
and Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012): 554.
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is often not the initial or only strategy of the perpetrators, but rather, part of the greater array of
political violence strategies available in conflict settings.
Nevertheless, most existing research on genocide – Bosnia included – has been
descriptive and historical, or approached comparatively from the top-down where cases of
positive outcomes are analyzed to understand the phenomenon of interest.9 Significantly less
research has been done on the regional or local level. On top of this, little is known about the
onset, duration, and severity of genocide due to an overemphasis on the national level. By simply
looking at the national level, local and regional factors have been largely neglected. Cases that
have very little in common other than the dependent variable (occurrence of genocide) have
brought up the issue of selection bias. Researchers have tended to favor positive cases – i.e.
comparing the Rwandan, Armenian, and Bosnian genocides – rather than focusing on a variation
in outcomes.10 This selection bias has led to the comparison of greatly different cases based
largely on a shared outcome, rather than considering the explanatory or antecedent variables in
similar cases that may have had led to different outcomes.
My contribution seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature by studying genocide using
the micro-comparative method.11 I argue that genocide should not be studied as a two-stage

9

For a historical overview of the history of Bosnia and the civil war and genocide of the 1990s see: Misha Glenny,
The Balkans, 1804-2011: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); Ed
Vulliamy, The War is Dead, Long Live the War: Bosnia, The Reckoning (London: Vintage Books, 2013). For
comparative work that compares Bosnia to other major genocides see: Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide:
Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Michael Mann, The Dark Side of
Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jacques Semelin, Purify
and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (London: Hurst & Company, 2005).
10

Evgeny Finkel and Scott Straus, “Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide: Gains, Shortcomings, and
Future Areas of Inquiry,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 7, no. 1 (2012): 56-57.
11

Other classic works that employ the micro-comparative method include: Lee Ann Fujii, Killing Neighbors: Webs
of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War
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process of policy and implementation. Rather, genocide is part of the greater multi-dimensional
framework of studying political violence. Political violence varies in the level of intensity
ranging from peace to full-scale war, but also on the level of systematic targeting of civilian
groups. Thus, genocide occupies one possible quadrant in the political violence framework. I am
proposing that genocide is not a singular act, but rather a radical and cumulative process
dependent on events, interactions, ideologies, and actors. We cannot push scholarly endeavor
forward by simply comparing and/or explaining genocides as outcomes. Instead, we must
investigate what leads people to commit such horrific acts in certain cases, while not in others.
There are varying degrees of political violence that groups engage in, and I am principally
concerned with what pushes people to the absolute extreme – genocide.
Implications
There are several implications my project offers. For readers seeking to understand the
specific case of the Bosnian genocide in greater depth, my project offers a new perspective on
the local and regional dynamics. Readers interested in civil war, ethnic conflict, genocide, or the
Former Yugoslavia region, will gain a fresh new perspective on how and why genocide occurs,
why people commit genocide, and why genocide should be studied as a process of cumulative
escalation. Beyond this, my project offers empirical, methodological, and theoretical
contributions.
Empirically, previous work on Bosnia has dealt primarily with civil war literature, crosscase comparisons to other 20th century genocides, and historical analysis.12 Additionally, when

in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life:
Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
12

For prominent civil war literature on the case of Bosnia see: V.P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and
Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars
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the academic community, the media, policymakers, or everyday people discuss the Bosnian
genocide, it tends to be synonymous with the Srebrenica massacre. This is understandable due to
extremity of the case. Between the days of July 11 and July 13, Muslim men and boys were
separated from the women and girls. Some of the women and girls were raped or sexually
assaulted, while close to 8,000 Muslim men and boys were systematically massacred, signifying
the largest massacre on the European continent since the Holocaust. Today, Srebrenica
represents one of the quintessential atrocities committed against civilians, and except for the
Russian position on the behalf of Republika Srpska, the international community has widely
reaffirmed the massacre as a crime of genocide. Both the European Parliament and the United
States Congress commemorated the massacre on its 20th anniversary as an act of genocide.13
Notwithstanding, genocidal violence was rampant throughout the three-year period during the
Bosnian civil war. Massacres occurred in Foča, Višegrad, Prijedor, and Zvornik to name a few. I
consider these important cases because they can help us understand why genocide occurs, why
violence escalates and radicalizes, and why leaders choose to implement genocidal policies in
certain cases and not others. For this reason, I seek to advance the empirical understanding of
genocide by investigating underdeveloped cases.
Methodologically, I seek to conduct a micro-comparative study by focusing on
municipalities to offer greater and richer analysis. Finkel notes that subnational variation is still
largely unexplored in comparative genocide studies when accounting for the forms and rates of

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For a historical overview on the widespread ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia see: Edina Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014). For an
outline of U.S. responses to 20th century genocides including Bosnia see: Power, A Problem from Hell.
13

United States. Congress. House of Representatives. Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House of
Representatives Regarding Srebrenica. 114th Congress. H. Res. 310 (2015); European Union. European Parliament.
“20 Years After the Srebrenica Genocide: Parliament Says ‘Never Again.’” Press Release. (2015).
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violence during the same genocide. Thus, my study offers variation on the dependent variable
within a country-case and argues that interactive dynamics are present between elites at different
levels.15 If we only think about the Bosnian genocide as being synonymous with the Srebrenica
massacre, we miss crucial avenues of research that vary across the country in terms of onset,
duration, and intensity of violence. By adopting the micro-comparative study, I control for
national-level factors and investigate the local variation, leading to a more complete explanation
of genocide.
My theoretical implication situates genocide within the greater literature on political
violence. I argue that genocide is one possible outcome in the political violence framework
rather than a static occurrence. Firstly, political violence varies in intensity and duration from a
state of peace or absence of violence to episodic/limited violence to sustained/large-scale
violence. Low-level combatant-targeted violence is present between warring militaries, but never
escalates into a full-scale civil war. On the other hand, combatant-targeted, large-scale violence
indicates the presence of civil war, but the war never escalates or radicalizes into genocidal
violence. Secondly, political violence varies in the level of systematic targeting against civilian
groups. In some cases, there is no evidence of systematic mass killings against an ethnical,
national, racial, or religious groups, but forced displacement may be present or some form of de
facto discrimination. On the other hand, some cases exemplify instances of genocide, mass
expulsion, and mass rape, torture, and enslavement. In other words, genocide must be understood
as one possible outcome in the political violence framework, and political violence must be
understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. I also adopt a nuanced theory stressing the

14

Evgeny Finkel, “Mass Killings and Local Context,” Comparative Politics 45, no. 1 (2012): 117.

15

Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 7-9.
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importance of structure and agency as necessary in explaining how and why genocide occurs. I
illustrate this by accounting for the explanatory variables – territorial control and elite
collaboration – that emphasize the structural environment and agency factors involved in the
genocide process.
Lastly, the policy implications can offer officials and state elites with insight into the
dynamics that propel individuals to commit such immoral and dehumanizing atrocities. Around
75 years ago, the global community vowed that the crimes of the Holocaust would never be
repeated. “Never again” became the international consensus, but time and time again, genocide
was perpetrated in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur, and most recently Syria and Myanmar.
As a world community, we must have better solutions for crimes against humanity, and I seek to
offer a systematic analysis that can bring us closer to understanding the complexity of genocide
in hopes of preventing future incidences.
Organization
The rest of my project is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses my theory of
genocide – the Opportunity Model – and explains the significance of both structure and agency
in accounting for the occurrence and escalation of genocide. Chapter 2 also outlines my research
design and methods, as I seek to situate my study within the bourgeoning micro-comparative
approach on political violence. After discussion of my methodological and theoretical
contributions, I devote Chapter 3 to the discussion of the national level factors that caused the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism. The chapter serves as a necessary
overview of the critical events that shaped Bosnia spanning from the creation of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia to the beginning of the Bosnian war. The rest of the project – Chapters 3 through 6 –
includes my empirical findings on why genocide occurred in certain municipalities but not

11
others. I choose two positive cases – Prijedor and Zvornik – to examine the escalation and
radicalization of violence that ultimately led to genocide. Next, I investigate one negative case –
Bratunac – to explain why the presence of political violence never escalated and radicalized to
genocide. I select cases that are most-similar in design, but that differ ultimately on the intensity
and targeting of the violence. My most-similar case design is then complemented by within-case
process tracing. In Chapter 7, I conclude my findings by arguing how my project contributes to
the comparative study of genocide from an empirical, methodological and theoretical
perspective. I also address avenues for future research that can be applied to the micro-level
study of genocide in other cases.

CHAPTER 2
MICRO-COMPARATIVE THEORY OF GENOCIDE
Definitions
Genocide has attracted considerable scholarly attention across a span of social science
disciplines. The study of genocide is rooted in international legal studies, sociology,
anthropology, philosophy, and political science.16 For purposes of this project, I will narrow my
definitional usage of genocide within the realm of political science. Additionally, I will need to
clarify the meaning of civil war to differentiate it from other forms of violence – interstate
violence, revolution, rebellion, and rioting – and to narrow the definitional usage from a wideranging field of study covering onset, outcomes, resolution, and peacekeeping.
Raphael Lemkin coined the term Genocide in 1943 as “a coordinated plan of different
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the
aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”17 A few years later, the United Nations Genocide
Convention of 1948 reached a consensus over the status of genocide. Genocide was no longer a
descriptive term, instead it was formally recognized as a war crime with legal standing in the
international community. The official United Nations definition defines genocide as “acts

16

Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
17

Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1944), 79.
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committed with intent to destroy, in whole, or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group.” Such acts include killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm,
imposing measures to prevent births within the groups, and forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.18 The definition mentioned above addresses the core of my project, but
the emphasis on intentionality has led previous scholars to highlight pre-mediation, resulting in
an overemphasis on static models of genocide.19 In some cases it is evident that genocide is
preplanned. Leaders may have the intention to execute mass exterminations of a certain group
for ethnic or religious reasons. In other cases, general declarations of violence by leaders against
certain groups may be present, but an intention of mass extermination is not indicated.20 And in
other cases, leaders may pursue lesser forms of political violence against target groups before
deciding to escalate the severity to genocide.
For my project, I use Scott Straus’ definition of genocide defined as, “large-scale,
organized, group-destructive violence that targets a specific social group in a territory.”21
Compared to other forms of political violence, genocide is unique for being group-selective
(rather than individual or combatant selective) and group-destructive (rather than merely
oppressive). Although the distinction between genocide and other forms of political violence
exists, Straus mentions that genocide overlaps with aggregate outcomes such as civil war, which

18

United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, (9 December 1948),
available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx (accessed 8 August 2016).
19

Straus, “Destroy Them to Save Us,” 550.

20

Ernesto Verdeja, “The Political Science of Genocide: Outlines of an Emerging Research Agenda,” Perspectives
on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 310.
21

Scott Straus, “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint,” Perspectives
on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 345.
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are composed of violence that is perpetrated over time and territory. For Straus, “genocide is one
level of abstraction greater than violence measured at hourly or daily intervals, such as rape,
murder, arson, poisoning, torture, and even riots and massacres.”22 Thus, genocide includes each
of the mentioned forms of political violence, but it also distinguishes itself due to target selection
and level of severity.
Moreover, to account for variation in the outcome, I conceptualize genocide as part of the
multi-dimensional political violence framework where different tiers of intensity and target
selection are possible, and perpetrators may escalate, deescalate, or keep a consistent level of
violence (Figure 1 and Figure 2). A similar visual representation is the ladder of violence as
proposed by Straus.23 The ladder of violence suggests that political violence is a process of
escalation. In some cases, the outcome may lead to the extreme of genocide, while in others it
may fall short of such an act, or even deescalate to a lesser form of violence.
I agree that political violence must be studied as a process, but this process is multidimensional rather than linear. One dimension of the political violence framework includes
levels of intensity. For instance, peace represents the lowest-level and/or absence of political
violence, while a full-scale war represents the highest level of political violence. The second
dimension of the political violence framework includes levels of systematic targeting against
civilian groups. In cases where civilian groups are not targeted, we should either see combatanttargeted violence or a case of peaceful relations if violence is absent. In cases where civilian
groups are targeted, we should either see discriminatory and exclusionary policies against certain
groups, or the “large-scale, organized, group-destructive violence that targets a specific social
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group in a territory;” genocide. The former includes cases where physical violence is absent, but
groups are discriminated against. The latter represents the most extreme form of civilian
targeting because physical violence is present, and this violence is a mass killing directed against
ethnic, national, racial, and/or religious groups.
My proposed framework establishes four quadrants applicable to the universe of political
violence cases. I find this multi-dimensional conceptualization of political violence important for
two reasons: First, it accounts for variation along the level of intensity and the level of systematic
targeting of civilian groups. This allows researchers to situate cases in the different quadrants
and compare across the quadrants. Second, it also allows researchers to investigate cases within
quadrants for a more complete understanding of the phenomenon. For this project, I am
specifically interested in cases that fall into Quadrant C and Quadrant D. By controlling for the
Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995), I can investigate why there was a higher-level of systematic
targeting against civilians in Prijedor and Zvornik, but not in Bratunac. Additionally, I can
compare Prijedor to Zvornik to capture variation between genocides when it comes to onset,
duration, and execution. By applying a multi-dimensional framework, a richer understanding of
variation can be captured that previous scholars missed by relying on purely “positive cases” or
treating political violence as a single-dimension process.
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Figure 1: Political Violence Framework
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Figure 2: Political Violence Framework (continued)
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As for civil war, my project focuses on the universe of the Bosnian civil war from 1992
to 1995. Although I am primarily concerned with what pushes political authorities to commit
genocide, civil war is still situated within the political science framework. Additionally, my
study can only address the relationship between internal armed conflict and genocide, and
interstate wars are beyond the scope of my study. I use Kalyvas’ conceptualization of civil war
as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject
to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.”24 I choose a broad conceptualization of
civil war because I am primarily concerned by conflict within the self-governing state, and not so
much the causes – ideological, ethnic, or religious.25 The civil war was present in the Bosnian
state for the three-year period mentioned above, and I seek to understand what led elites to
pursue policies of genocide extending beyond civil war in some municipalities but not others.
Factors addressing the causes, onset, duration, and resolution of civil war are beyond this study.26
Second-Generation Literature on Genocide
Prior to the second-generation literature, the dominant explanations for why genocide
occurs centered on ancient hatreds, authoritarian regimes, and scapegoating. These themes fit
into the first-generation research on comparative genocide.27 The first-generation research on
genocide focused extensively on the Holocaust, and found that in-group and out-group divisions,
24
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the presence of powerful authoritarian regimes, and scapegoating due to prejudice in periods of
crises, were common analytical themes explaining the occurrence of genocide.28 Since the early
research on genocide, scholars have moved beyond the themes of prejudice, tyrannical regimes,
and social stress in explaining genocide. What has emerged instead is the strategic paradigm and
the ideological paradigm. These two schools of thought make up the second-generation research
on comparative genocide.
Strategic Paradigm
The strategic paradigm or rationalist approach argues that strategies of genocide and mass
violence are developed in response to real or perceived threats, and that genocide generally
occurs in the context of armed conflict.29 Both Benjamin Valentino and Manus Midlarsky
conclude that genocide is more likely during war because of the uncertainty and threats
perceived by elites.30 Valentino’s approach is top-down, and the outcome of a small group of
elites. He argues that civilians or society are largely insignificant to the outcome. Further,
Valentino considers a wide range of cases because he focuses on both genocides and mass
killings. He divides his study among communist mass killings, which includes the cases of the
Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia; ethnic mass killings, which includes Armenia, the
Holocaust, and Rwanda; and counterguerilla mass killings, which includes Guatemala and
28
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Afghanistan. Valentino makes three central conclusions about the causes of mass killings. First, a
small group of political or military leaders conceive and organize mass killings for their own
interests, beliefs, hatreds, or fears. Second, because the policy of genocide and mass killing is
carried out by a small group of elites, the preexisting cleavages, ancient hatreds, and ongoing
discriminations and prejudices between groups do not explain which cases are at a higher risk for
mass killing and which are not. Lastly, he concludes that mass killing is driven by instrumental,
strategic calculations by perpetrators who use violence to achieve certain goals.31
Similarly, Manus Midlarsky argues that genocide occurs when leaders attempt to manage
threats and defend their states. Using the basis of prospect theory, Midlarsky suggests that
genocide will often occur in the context of loss for elites – territorial, lives during war, and
various socioeconomic factors. The core concept is something Midlarsky calls realpolitik, which
he breaks down into three forms. The three types of realpolitik include brute force, which is “not
based on reasoned scrutiny”, prudent realpolitik, “based on reasoned scrutiny understood as the
application of reason to the empirical world, and cynical realpolitik, or the dislike by most of the
people for a distinct minority.32 Midlarsky concludes that brute force and cynical realpolitik were
present in all three of his genocide cases – Armenia, the Holocaust, and Rwanda.
Although genocide is a rare event, the empirical reality highlights the prominent cases of
Armenia, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia as instances where genocide occurred
during wartime. Additionally, Barbara Harff’s quantitative analysis finds that out of 37 cases of
genocide between 1955 to 1998, “all but one occurred during or immediately after political
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upheaval.” Scholars utilizing the rationalist approach have found three common causal
mechanisms connecting the two phenomena. First, war creates threat and uncertainty, which
increases the likelihood that violence will be used to counter the threat. Second, war increases
the likelihood that opponents will be labeled as enemies. Third, war prompts the use of
militarized violence against perceived enemies.34 In all, if there is one common environment that
gives rise to genocide – regardless of timing and location – it is the presence of armed conflict.
Populations often live under conditions of fear and insecurity; in-groups will often target outgroups due to discrimination based on ethnical, religious, or national identity; and elites will seek
radical strategies because of perceived or real threats.
However, the strategic paradigm leaves two important questions unresolved: Why are
civilian groups targeted, rather than specific individuals or combatants? And, why is the goal to
systematically destroy civilian groups? The presence of armed conflict creates a desirable
environment for further violence, but it does not tell us why elites are pushed to extreme forms of
violence in some cases but not others. Why do elites need to target mass civilian groups rather
than enemy soldiers?35 Is it that elites perceive the presence of the out-group as a direct threat to
their very existence? Moreover, if wartime creates the conditions for genocide, why is it that
such a choice is rare? War and armed conflict occur far more frequently than genocide, so how
do we explain all the other cases where genocide never occurred?
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Ideological Paradigm
To address these shortcomings, another paradigm in the literature has emerged focusing
on the ideological factors of genocide. Scholars from this perspective argue that one needs to
understand the ideas and ideologies embedded in the thought process of elites to understand how
and why genocide occurs. Leaders will have certain ideological visions that constitute a
legitimate form of the state. Certain groups fit the criteria, while other groups pose a threat to this
purity or utopia of an ethnically or religiously homogeneous society.36 Jacques Semelin argues
that leaders seek to exterminate social groups from certain territories to purify their own group
and society. In his study of Nazi Germany, Bosnia, and Rwanda, Semelin argues that each case
represents an attempt to massacre a social group from a given territory. Semelin acknowledges
that the context of war and social upheavals matter since leaders use these environments to
decide who belongs to a specific community and who is an outsider. Elites will seek to unify ingroups to create fear and hostility towards out-groups or enemies. The goal of unity leads to
efforts to create purity, which in turn leads to the desire to eliminate out-groups.37
Similarly, Eric Weitz argues that leaders have grand ideological quests for utopian
societies based on common group characteristics. For Weitz, leaders see themselves as
revolutionaries seeking a better future based on extreme exclusionary policies. Weitz’s
comparative study of the Soviet Union, the Holocaust, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia,
illustrates how ideologies of race and nation contributed to each case. In his words, genocide
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occurs when leaders seek to construct a “society bereft of difference and marked by a
homogenous population.”38
The themes are also present in Ben Kiernan’s historical work covering genocides from
ancient Sparta to modern-day Darfur. Kiernan argues that there are four salient ideological
obsessions that lead to genocide: racism, territorial expansionism, agrarianism, and the desire to
restore purity based on imaginary antiquity.39 Similarly, Michael Mann contends that the source
of genocide is when elites envision the nation as organic in whole, leading to an ethnic
interpretation of democracy. He cites the phrase that genocide is greatest when the “demos” are
imagined as “ethnos.” For Mann, his sociological analysis is based on the historical development
of modern states and political ideologies. In this context, genocide, or what he refers to as
murderous ethnic cleansing, is a distortion of a democratic ideal of rule by the people. When the
people (demos) see themselves as an ethnic group (ethnos), they will automatically exclude other
ethnic groups living in the same territory.40
Thus, the ideological approach solves two issues left unanswered in the strategic
approach. First, it can address why civilian groups are the targets of genocide. One of the
shortcomings of the strategic approach is the inability to answer why civilian group selection is
the reason behind the violence. The strategic approach tells us that certain conditions – crises and
armed conflict – are conducive to genocide, but the ideological approach tell us what the
motivation is behind targeting social groups. The answer is an exclusionary ideology. Certain in-
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groups are legitimate to goals of a homogenous society, while out-groups are de-legitimate.

41

Second, the ideological approach addresses why leaders choose a policy of genocide and mass
violence in some wars, but not in others. The reason is that leaders will have different ideological
visions for what constitutes a legitimate nation. Leaders who envision ideologies of utopia,
purity, fantasy, and obsession are more likely to respond to perceived threats with genocidal
policies.42
Methodological Gaps in the Second-Generation Literature
Along with the theoretical gaps, the second-generation literature has methodological
shortcomings that need to be addressed in future studies. The shortcomings are centered on the
issues of conceptualization, hypothesis testing, and case selection. Genocide is a rare and
extreme occurrence, but many of the authors in previous studies have not come to a consensus on
how to define genocide without ambiguity. Many of the authors have selected cases based on the
presence of the dependent variable. Cases with similar antecedent conditions or explanatory
variables are neglected because the outcome of interest did not occur. The question remains, how
can we know what truly causes genocide without looking at similar cases where genocide did not
happen? Lastly, much of the previous research has been centered on cross-case comparisons that
have very little in common. This ties in with selection bias issues, but it is also problematic since
the universe of genocide is small and scholars are comparing cases that have very little in
common other than the outcome.
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On the issue of conceptualization, questions arise over what threshold constitutes
genocide? Who commits genocide? And which groups are victims in genocide? Valentino uses
mass killings, or the murder of 50,000 civilians in a five-year period for definitional purposes,
while Mann analyzes murderous ethnic cleansings, which include genocide, politicide,
classicide, ethnocide, and widespread deportation.43 Midlarsky and Semelin use the term
genocide, but they vary in what exactly constitutes genocide. Midlarsky stresses ethnoreligious
reasons for mass murder, while Semelin simply defines it as the destruction of civilians with the
intention of total eradication. The authors do not specify the perpetrators of the violence, rather
they converge over intentionality of mass extermination from a given territory.44 On the other
hand, Mark Levene defines genocide as systematic and physical elimination of a specific group
by the state. The state will engage in a policy of genocide until the group is no longer seen as a
threat to the state.45
One consequence of the conceptual variation leads to the issue of case selection. Most
authors in the comparative study utilize a “small-N” approach, yet they cannot come to a
consensus over which cases belong to the study of genocide. Out of the previously mentioned
authors, the only case they come to an agreement on is the Holocaust. The other classic cases of
genocide – Armenia, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Rwanda – vary from study to study. Moreover,
Valentino’s broad definition of mass murder allows him to employ an analysis of ten cases
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throughout the twentieth century, of which communist and colonial states are included. For
Midlarsky, Levene, and Semelin, the classic cases of Nazi Germany and Rwanda overlap, but
Semelin includes Bosnia, whereas Midlarsky and Levene choose Armenia.
The other related consequence is an issue of selection bias. Although authors in the
second-generation literature vary in the cases they select, they all share the similarity of selecting
on the dependent variable. Every one of the comparative studies – whether a three-case
comparative study employed by Semelin or the analysis of ten twentieth century genocides by
Valentino – selects cases where genocide is an outcome of interest. The issue of selection bias is
related to hypothesis testing since scholars are using the same methodological tools for their
research. Process tracing and cross-case comparisons are the standard procedures for developing
explanations of genocide. The overarching question is what do cases of genocide have in
common? Even with examination of so-called similar cases such as Armenia, Bosnia, Rwanda,
or the Holocaust, scholars have offered different causal explanations ranging from exclusionary
ideology, to nation-building and emergence of democracy, to instrumental goals of elites.47
Straus argues, “Some authors cover as many as one hundred years of a particular case. It is thus
easy for the various authors to focus on different dynamics, processes, and moments in the same
case…the cases are quite different, in terms of both explanatory and outcome variables.”48 The
solution is not simple with a small universe of cases that happen to be diverse temporally,
geographically, and empirically.
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Micro-Comparative Method and Political Violence
If scholars want to advance research in comparative genocide studies, then the main
research question needs to be reframed. Borrowing from research on political violence, the
research question should shift to explaining variation. By explaining variation, we can begin to
answer why genocide occurs rather than some other form of political violence? By reframing the
question, other avenues of research open including: investigating why some cases display more
group-selective violence than others; why some cases lead to a mass extermination of groups
from a physical territory rather than forced deportation; why violence occurs in some regions and
not others; or why violence is sporadic in some instances and more continuous in others. In
addition to increasing the variance on the outcome of interest, genocide studies would also
benefit from the micropolitical turn as emphasized by Charles King.49 King identifies the
micropolitical turn as the study of violence at analytical levels below the nation-state and as
having an attentiveness to the way violent episodes are framed.50 This allows scholars to
disaggregate cases to account for the variation in location and timing, rather than assuming a
uniformity to political violence. As King notes,
Episodes of social violence, whether riots or atrocities committed during civil
wars, may well be patterned, but they do not occur uniformly across time or
space. There are lulls and peaks. Violence comes to different cities, towns, and
neighborhoods at different times. It plays out differently in various social
contexts, even with a series of violent events that are lumped together as a single
ethnic conflict or civil war.51
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By disaggregating the case, scholars are offered two important advantages. Firstly, for those
engaged in “large-N” research, the number of observable cases increases. This is especially
important for genocide studies because the number of observable cases was always seen as
problematic due to the “small-N” nature. Secondly, for “small”-N research, disaggregation offers
avenues to understanding variance in violent outcomes within the nation-state.
The study of political violence using the micro-comparative method has led to
groundbreaking research within political science.52 For instance, Varshney examines
intercommunal violence and peace by studying riots in six Indian cities. By situating his unit of
analysis on the city-level, Varshney can investigate causes of communal violence and peace
across India. Varshney argues that concentrating on the city-level is important since HinduMuslim violence is city-specific, and by simply looking at the national level, one would miss
important explanatory variables for a presence or absence of violence.53
Additionally, Kalyvas’ analysis of violence in civil war focuses on the local village level
in the Argolid region in Greece. For Kalyvas, his theory of irregular war and microfoundational
theory of violence stresses the joint character of civil war violence. He highlights an interaction
between actors at the central and local levels, along with the interaction between soldiers and
civilians. This selective violence requires information, which is most easily attained by local
civilians, and represents one end of the joint process. Thus, civilians play an integral part in the
violence along with rebel groups and the state.54 Kalyvas’ study is breakthrough for two primary
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reasons. First, he distinguishes between the long traditions of violence as an outcome in favor of
violence as a process. Second, he argues that the use of violence is rational, and is the product of
rational actions by elites and civilians who seek to accomplish their goals within a given
territory.55
Several studies have also applied the micro-comparative study in the context of the
Rwandan genocide. Straus conducts one of the first in-depth micro-comparative studies of
genocide with his work on the Rwandan genocide. Straus discovers that genocide happened
differently in different locations. To explain the variation, he controls for national-level factors
and examines five communes that represented different patterns of mobilization leading to
genocide.56 Unlike previous studies of genocide that compared across cases and selected on the
dependent variable, Straus includes the within-case dynamics across regions that allow for
theory-testing and new insights to the motivations behind genocidal violence. He concludes that
three main factors led to the genocide in Rwanda: First, the context of war was important
because it provided the rationale for mass killing; security concerns. Second, the nature of state
institutions played a crucial role. By controlling the state, hardliners had the capability to enforce
their decisions and associate the killing of Tutsis with legitimate authority. Third, he finds that
ethnicity mattered, but not in the conventional sense of ethnic prejudice, ancient hatreds, or
propaganda. Rather, collective ethnic categorization of Tutsis as the enemy led to the genocide,
even though many Hutus had no apparent history of antagonism toward Tutsis.57
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Similarly, Lee Ann Fujii applies a dynamic lens to explaining genocidal approach – a
lens “that can take moving pictures, rather than just static snapshots.”58 Fujii also sees genocide
as a process, and this process allows actors to move between multiple “labels,” rather than
simply being labelled a victim, perpetrator, or bystander. The shortcomings of previous studies
rests on understanding the question of identity as one of fixed ethnic fears or ethnic hatreds. Fujii
labels this “state-sponsored ethnicity,” and instead proposes a social interaction argument
whereby “state-sponsored ethnicity operated not as an external causal force, like gravity, but as
an endogenously generated ‘script’ for violence…what mediated between the script for genocide
and people’s actual performances in a given moment were local ties and group dynamics.”59
Fujii’s micro-comparative lens focuses on two rural communes – Ngali and Kimanzi – to capture
the important historical differences that have existed between the north and south. She conducts
in-depth interviews with groups she defines as Joiners to understand the processes and
motivations behind genocidal violence. The advantages of her micro-comparative method allow
for extensive analysis on the local, intimate level, rather than assuming violence is a product of
static national narratives.60
Therefore, I intend to employ the micro-comparative method that has led to breakthrough
findings in political violence research recently, especially that of Kalyvas’ pioneering research
on civil wars. I seek to apply this same approach to the study of genocide by examining two
important key variables – territorial control and elite collaboration. However, unlike Kalyvas, I
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find that in cases where armed conflict and exclusivist ideology are present, collaborating elites
who exhibit complete control are more likely to carry out genocidal violence rather than civil
war violence. In other words, complete control actually results in political violence with higher
intensity and higher group-targeting as specified by the Political Violence Framework. This
important distinction serves as the catalyst for my argument below, which I hope adds a
significant contribution to the greater micro-level political violence research.
Argument
In addition to my methodological contribution, I propose a theory that takes into
consideration two explanatory variables: Structure and agency. However, unlike the strategic and
ideological paradigms, I contend that the presence of war and exclusivist ideology are only
necessary in the pre-genocide phase. On their own, neither of these arguments have strong
explanatory power for an already rare dependent variable. Both of these factors are important,
but only as scope conditions in the larger scheme of explaining genocide. What these paradigms
fail to account for is the presence of territorial control and elite collaboration. Taken together,
both of these conditions are part of the Opportunity Model, which seeks to account for the
explanatory variables in explaining the presence or absence of genocide. When accounting for
these two factors, we can begin to answer our primary question: why genocide occurs in same
cases and not in others.
Scope Conditions
Previous research has drawn a causal link between the conducive environment of war and
the increased likelihood of genocide.61 Crises or wars favor genocide because they justify

61

Barbara Harff, “The Etiology of Genocides,” in Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of
Mass Death, eds. Isidor Walliman and Michael Dobkowski, 41-59 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987); Harff, “No
Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?” 57-73; Matthew Krain, “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and

32
killings as a policy. The perpetrators of the violence see other groups as threatening, leading to
insecurity and fear, and ultimately a legitimization to use violence to eliminate the threat. If there
is one common empirical reality in previous genocide literature, it is that war and genocide are
related and must be studied together rather than separately. With that said, I contend that the
presence of war and/or a crisis is only an important scope condition. The presence of internal
strife – whether large scale or limited violence – does not effectively explain the negative cases
of genocide. War occurs more frequently than genocide, so how do we account for cases of
similar violence that do not escalate to genocide?
I argue that another condition – exclusivist ideology – is also an important scope
condition in the pre-genocide phase. An exclusivist ideology is defined as “a totalizing system of
meaning based on pronounced in-group and out-group distinctions permitting no shared forms of
identification between groups and premised on a radical devaluation of the out-group.”62 The
dangers of exclusivist ideologies are twofold: First, exclusivist ideologies create immense
divides between different social groups, as the in-group is seen as legitimate, while the out-group
is seen as illegitimate and belonging to the other category. Second, exclusivist ideologies seek to
target and dehumanize out-groups through various methods ranging from discrimination to
forced assimilation or expulsion. Obviously, the most severe form of exclusion results in mass
killings and genocide of the out-group. As Verdeja notes, exclusivist ideology “achieves its
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greatest resonance when it exaggerates and perverts already recognized differences between
groups.”63
Exclusivist ideologies are often formulated around a goal to purify ethnic communities
within a state, or the quests for utopia that drive radical visions for race and the nation.64 Thus, if
elites have grand visions to create ethnically, racially, or religiously homogeneous societies they
consider pure, then a policy of genocide becomes increasingly more likely. Adolf Hitler’s notion
of a master race drove his fanatical quests to create the ideal Aryan German society, and all
those that did not fit his exclusionary conception, mainly those of the Jewish faith, were targeted
for extermination. Similarly, Slobodan Milosevic’s quest for a Greater Serbia after the death of
Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia in the 1980s highlights the hyper-nationalist ideology to create a
common Serbian state uniting Serbs across the greater region. In a speech, shortly after the
communist dissolution of Yugoslavia, Milosevic stated, “We must secure unity in Serbia if we
wish, as the largest and most populous republic, to dictate the further course of events…these are
the questions of borders, essential state questions. The borders, as you know, are always dictated
by the strong, never by weak ones.”65 Thus, the presence of a crisis, internal strife, or war is
important because it increase the probability that genocide will occur, but it is insufficient
without the consideration of elites’ extremist ideologies. With the presence of extremist
ideologies, we can identify cases rooted in a fear or hatred of the other, which is a fundamental
precondition before elites seek to act on this ideology.
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Moreover, to fully understand the role of exclusivist ideology, one must understand
identity construction as a process too. In other words, when discussing the identities of the target
group, three interrelated processes of identity construction surface that explain leaders’ intentions
to perpetrate genocide: the target groups as other; as non-human; and as enemy.66 Human beings
categorize other human groups as others because of the natural division of the world into ingroups and out-groups. The inherent ability for people to divide the world into in-groups and outgroups leads to distinctions commonly framed around the “us” and “them” labels whereby the
target group is excluded from the greater society or state.67 This type of division is often
achieved through myth construction, where the in-groups is often portrayed to be under attack
from the threat of the out-group. Because the out-group poses a threat, members are often
dehumanized and calls for the group’s extermination develop.68
The dehumanization of out-groups is the next step in the identity construction process
that leads to genocide. Exclusivity based on in-group and out-group classifications cannot
account for the mass extermination of civilian groups on its own. To understand why certain
groups are targeted, one must understand why perpetrators of genocide label them as non-human.
Groups are most likely to be targets of dehumanization if they belong to a different ethnical,
national, racial, or religious group, and are seen as either inferior or threatening.69 As Gregory
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Stanton notes in his “Eight States of Genocide” typology, the notion of the target group as nonhuman “denies the humanity of the group” and overcomes “the normal human revulsion against
murder.”70 Whereby, classification of target groups as other is fundamental to human activity
across all cultures, the process of genocide can only occur when combined with the
dehumanization of these groups in order to justify mass murder with impunity.
Lastly, the identity construction of the target group as an enemy signal to the perpetrators
that the group poses a threat and must be physically destroyed. Scholars have noted that
perceptions of threat posed by the target group are said to be established due to a fear that the
target group will engage in killing of their own, or worse, extermination.71 For instance, Chirot
and McCauley argue that elites seeking to perpetrate genocidal violence are often motivated by
the fear that, “failure to enforce vengeance will ultimately allow the enemy to regain strength and
inflict further punishment.”72
Explanatory Variables
By identifying the presence of crisis/war and exclusivist ideology, we can narrow down
the cases that should be more alarming than others. With the scope conditions in place, I assert
that opportunity encompasses the explanatory structural and agency factors in explaining the
presence or absence of genocide. Opportunity refers to the “possibilities that are available to any
entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and
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possibilities.” Opportunity acts as an ordering concept, which is able to link environmental and
73

macrostructural factors to decision makers’ behaviors and motivations. Although the opportunity
framework has been used in international relations research to account for the possibilities
available for states, I argue that same logic can be applied to groups within the state.
The first explanatory variable that opportunity accounts for is territorial control, which is
defined in terms of adequate political space and territorial bases. Groups must have adequate
political space within a state to mobilize and escalate violence. Adequate political space may
include political freedom, state breakdown, or foreign support to mobilize without the effective
suppression from the state.74 If a group is the main perpetrator of the violence, then we should
expect them to establish effective political institutions that rival the state or are in place of a
failed or failing state government. The group may also be supported by a nearby state that offers
its support in order to thwart the current regime. If the state is the main perpetrator of the
violence, then we would expect a lack of effective suppression since the state is already in
power. Groups must also have a territorial base to effectively mobilize, whether within the state
or in a neighboring country.75 Again, if the state is the main perpetrator of the violence, then it
will not have an issue with territorial control, but for groups seeking to perpetrate violence, it is
crucial that they have effective military positions in order to escalate their violence against the
target group.
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Thus, territorial control – political space and a territorial base(s) – increases the
likelihood that wars or crises will escalate to genocide. If elites do not possess effective political
space and territorial bases, they will most likely be in several disadvantageous positions. It could
be that the group or state is overpowered and their goals of executing more extreme violence is
upended. It could also be that the group or state is in a two-sided combatant battle, which
obviously mirrors a civil war or at least armed conflict between belligerents. In such an instance,
genocide is unlikely to occur since the perpetrators have to allocate their resources to fighting an
effective resistance.
But how much territorial control is necessary for an outcome like genocide to occur? In
Kalyvas’ seminal work on civil wars, he argues that “selective violence can only take place in
those areas where control is complete enough for denouncers to denounce, but no so complete
that defectors have either fled or simply ceased to be of concern to the political actor.”76 In other
words, Kalyvas argues that we should expect the most violence under areas of dominant control
represented by varying zones ranging from 1 to 5. Zone 1 represents full control by the
incumbent, while Zone 5 represents full control by the insurgency. As for Zones 2, 3, and 4,
Zone 3 represents a state of parity, where the incumbents and insurgents enjoy equal levels of
control. It is in Zones 2 and 4, or zones of dominant control, that we should expect the most
violence. Thus, Zone 2 represents dominant incumbent control, while Zone 4 represents
dominant insurgent control.77
Kalyvas’ framework is helpful for understanding other forms of political violence –
especially genocide. However, whereas civil war violence is best explained by dominant control
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by either the incumbents or insurgents, I argue that genocidal violence is best explained by full
or complete control. If a group or the state has a level of complete control, we should expect the
probability of genocide to increase. The reason for this is twofold: First, civil wars are armed
conflicts between groups within a state. The actors involved, as noted by Kalyvas, may involve
competing actors including combatants and noncombatants, but, the main purpose of the
violence is not the physical extermination of a group from a given territory, but rather their
compliance. In Kalyvas’ account political actors will not use violence where they need it most
because individuals will face the strongest counterincentive to denounce. In cases of genocide,
the goal of the perpetrators is the physical extermination of a group from a given territory, so the
more control the perpetrators display, the more likely that they can achieve their goals. Second,
in civil wars, the actors – incumbents or insurgents – who have dominant control have already
placed the target group under their authority. Their goals have been effectively achieved and the
use of violence is less likely to occur. In cases of genocide, the perpetrators have not achieved
their goals until they can exterminate groups from the given territory without effective resistance.
With complete control, this outcome becomes increasingly likely.
In addition to the explanatory structural factor of territorial control, I argue that an
agency factor – elite collaboration – is also important for violence to escalate to genocide.
Because genocide is a radical and cumulative process dependent on events, interactions,
ideologies, and actors, then we have to also understand the behavior and actions of elites at
different levels of the state seeking to achieve certain goals. The type of elites involved in wars
include national elites, local elites, the military, and paramilitary groups, to name a few. National
elites matter because genocide is large-scale violence over specific territories that requires the
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participation of various state institutions. The state or group engaging in genocide must have
considerable administrative and territorial control to execute systematic massacres across a
country. Additionally, national elites often implement strategic goals they wish to achieve over
the greater state or region. By outlining clear goals, the national elites are on top of the
hierarchical chain and their orders flow downward to military commanders and brigades
stationed in different parts of the country, paramilitary groups seeking to contribute to the effort,
police forces and other armed civilians who choose to participate, and civilian leaders at various
local levels. Because genocide is a systematically coordinated phenomenon, national elites must
present clear goals at various stages of the process, namely, preplanning and coordination,
execution of violence over groups within territories, and the mass expulsion phase through either
ethnic cleansing or mass killing efforts.
Local elites matter because they can identify the specific groups in villages, cities, and
municipalities that the national elites want to execute.79 Local elites are also important because
they participate in the violence since they often live in the same territory as the out-group. For
instance, the participation of local elites is important for intelligence gathering on the various
individuals and groups living in the territory. Local elites must be able to effectively identify
important community members – business leaders, politicians, religious figures, doctors, etc. –
that must be eliminated. By eliminating community members, the consciousness and leadership
of the targeted group becomes depleted since they no longer have individuals to turn to in
moments of crisis. Moreover, local elites need to identify where members of the target group are
living and whether any individuals have fled or are hiding out in nearby villages. Because local
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elites are familiar with their territories, the ability to capture targeted groups into concentration is
very useful for national elites who can then decide whether groups should be forcibly removed or
killed. Lastly, local elites are often tasked with “national policies,” but it is their responsibility to
execute these as they see fitting for their own localities.
Thus, genocide requires persistent interaction between elites at different levels, or in
other words, elite collaboration. Elite collaboration is an explanatory variable because it
accounts for the overemphasis on the national level in previous studies. I propose that national
elites are crucial to understanding genocide, but the dynamic nature of genocide indicates that
local and regional elites are equally important. In all, my emphasis on the sub-national level
encompasses a host of actors who could play a role in committing genocide. This includes citylevel civilian administrators, local militias, local and regional brigades, and important
community or religious leaders. What the micro-level of analysis suggests is that there are
explanatory variables that go deeper than the state-level of analysis. In order to account for the
timing, location, and intensity of genocide, and to strengthen the causal mechanisms that lead to
genocide, a greater emphasis must be placed on the role local and regional-level leaders have on
the outcome.
Opportunity Model
In sum, my theory is two-step approach that can be used to explain the micro-level
dynamics of genocide. I argue that the previous second-generation literature offers important
insight into why genocide occurs. However, two points are worth noting: First, exclusively,
neither has the explanatory power to explain the complex nature of genocide. Genocide is far too
complicated to reduce it to either strategic or ideological explanations. Second, mutually, both
contribute to explaining the presence or absence of genocide, but not as explanatory variables.
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Instead, war/crisis and exclusivist ideology are vital scope conditions in the pre-genocide phase
that increase the likelihood that genocide will occur, as opposed to a case that lack these factors.
Once the scope conditions are in place, the second step is dependent on the two explanatory
variables of territorial control and elite collaboration. Once elites have political space, territorial
bases, and are coordinating their efforts at different levels of the state, then the likelihood that
genocide occurs further increases. Together, these variables establish a feedback loop, whereby
elite collaboration helps establish territorial control and greater territorial control incentivizes
elites to collaborate.
Thus, I introduce the Opportunity Model, which uses the city-level as the unit of analysis.
This differentiates from previous studies, which uses the state as the level of analysis. In altering
the perspective of comparative genocide studies, I find that a new theoretical framework is
needed to explain variation at the city-level within a state that experienced violence. Specifically,
I am offering a model that accounts for the importance of local territorial control and also the
involvement of local elites. This model encourages scholars to study cases of genocide at the
micro-level by accounting for the aforementioned factors that may vary across localities. By
accounting for variance, scholars can expand the universe of possible cases and break from the
stigma of the selection bias.
Caveats
One caveat with my research is that elites are not the only necessary actors for genocide
to occur. Everyday people – such as former friends, neighbors, and community members – can
commit atrocious violence. However, I take the view that genocidal violence is the result of a
systematic and coordinated effort by elites seeking to achieve certain goals. Ordinary people
engage in the violence, but such a policy cannot be achieved without effective leadership. The
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second caveat is that it is beyond my reach in this study to explain how exclusionary ideologies
develop in the first place. I cannot explain the deeper psychological dynamics behind why people
view certain groups of people as other, non-human, or enemy. What I am seeking to do is explain
how these perversions are part of the argument that makes genocide more likely to emerge in
certain situations but not others.
Observable Implications
The theory yields several observable implications worth investigating. First, I propose the
presence of a civil war or internal crisis is an important scope condition for genocide. Civil wars
will vary in degree of severity and duration, ranging from limited low-level violence to sustained
large-scale violence. The higher the degree of severity and the longer the war lasts will
increasingly have a positive effect on the outcome of genocide, whereas violence of lower
severity and duration will have a negative effect on the outcome.
Second, I propose that the presence of exclusivist ideologies also serve as important scope
conditions for genocide. Exclusivist ideologies include the rhetoric and beliefs of elites seeking
to achieve their goals in a territory. Elites propagating exclusive, rather than inclusive ideologies,
will have a positive effect on the outcome of genocide. Exclusivist ideologies represent
discriminate selection methods of individuals and groups, where the victims are systematically
chosen based on ethnic, national, racial, or religious characteristics that differ from the
perpetrators.
Third, I propose that territorial control will increase the likelihood of genocide. Elites
must have the ability to mobilize and escalate the on-going violence without effective
suppression by the state. This includes having political freedom to operate within the state,
taking advantage of state breakdown and assuming control, or having the support of a foreign
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government with a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict. Additionally, elites must have
sufficient territorial bases to mobilize and escalate violence. The presence of political space and
a territorial base(s) increases the likelihood of genocide. The probability of civil war occurring or
enduring increases when both sides can mobilize for violence. However, what differentiates
genocide from civil war is that only one side can mobilize and escalate violence.
Lastly, I propose that elite collaboration between national and local elites will increase
the likelihood of genocide. Genocide is a dynamic process of radicalization subject to escalation
and de-escalation. To successfully carry out a policy of genocide, elites at different levels and
across regions must be involved. National leaders may have grand genocidal visions to eliminate
the enemy groups and purify the state, but the involvement of local elites is crucial for
information gathering and organization of violence. Local elites are aware of the communities
they live in, which allows them to provide national elites with insight into who belongs to the ingroup and who belongs to the out-group. More importantly, central command will often task
local elites with the execution of violence against selected groups.
It is important to note that my argument is probabilistic, rather than deterministic. I have
outlined the likelihood of genocide occurring if certain factors are present, but there are always
exceptions. I agree with Varshney’s claim that proposing law-like generalizations on the study of
ethnic conflict, or in my case genocide, is very unlikely.80 Therefore, in my argument, I have
outlined both the scope conditions and explanatory variables that increase the likelihood of the
outcome occurring. Taking away one or two of these factors indicates that another outcome is
more likely.
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Explanatory Variables

Territorial
Control
Scope
Conditions

Dependent
Variable

War/Crises
+
Exclusivist
Ideology

Genocide

Elite
Collaboration

Figure 3: Opportunity Model
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Table 1: Dependent and Independent Variables
Genocide (DV)

Territorial Control
(IV)

Exclusivist Ideology
(Scope Condition)

Definition

Large-scale,
organized, group
destructive violence
that targets a specific
social group in a given
territory (Straus, 2012,
345).

The adequate political
space and territorial
bases to mobilize and
escalate violence.

Measurement

Was there evidence of
sustained policies by
states or their agents,
that resulted in the
deaths of a substantial
portion of a communal
or political group?
(“State Failure Task
Force: Phase III
Findings, 2000, p. v)

Do elites have
adequate political
space within a state to
mobilize and escalate
violence?

A totalizing system of
meaning based on
pronounced in-group
and out-group
distinctions permitting
no shared forms of
identification between
groups and premised
on a radical
devaluation of the outgroup (Verdeja, 2012,
315).
Do elites exhibit
rhetoric that excludes
certain groups from
the goals/visions of the
state?
A. “Other”
B. Dehumanizat
ion
C. “Enemy”

Are victimized groups
defined primarily by
their ethno-linguistic
or religious
characteristics?

Do elites have
complete control to
effectively achieve
their genocidal goals?
(Kalyvas, 2006, Ch. 7)

Bosnia’s Book of the
Dead (Sarajevo:
Research and
Documentation
Center)

Secondary sources

Speeches

Secondary sources

ICTY hearings and
decisions; UN
commissioned reports

ICTY hearings and
decisions; UN
commissioned reports

ICTY and ICJ
hearing/decisions; UN
commissioned reports

“State Failure Task
Force Report: Phase
III Findings”

United Nations, Final
Report of the
Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant
to Security Council
Resolution 780, Vol. IV, 27 May 1994.
(Witness reports,
interviews, first-hand
accounts; 76,000
documents)

Newspaper
interviews/clippings

United Nations, Final
Report of the
Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant
to Security Council
Resolution 780, Vol. IV, 27 May 1994.
(Witness reports,
interviews, first-hand
accounts; 76,000
documents)

Sources

Conflict and Genocide
in Former Yugoslavia,
1991-1995 (Yale
University: Genocide
Studies GIS Project)

Do elites have a
territorial base(s) to
effectively mobilize
for violence?

Do elites exhibit
rhetoric signaling for
ethnically, racially, or
religiously
homogeneous
societies?
A. “Purity
B. “Utopia”

Memoirs

Elite Collaboration
(IV)

The persistent
interaction between
elites at different
levels to achieve
certain goals.

Do local elites and
national elites share
information?
Do local elites and
national elites share
goals?
Do local elites and
national elites share
resources?
Do local elites and
national elites
participate in the
persistent, coherent
pattern of action to
bring about the
destruction of another
group’s existence in
whole or in part?
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Research Design and Methods
I will be employing a process tracing method to investigate the within-case dynamics,
while also using a controlled comparison to analyze variation in outcomes across my regions.
George and Bennett argue that, “process tracing is an indispensable tool for theory testing and
theory development not only because it generates numerous observations within a case, but
because these observations must be linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the
case.”81 To establish causal mechanisms, the process tracing technique can take several forms.
The simple form of causation is linear causality, or a direct chain of events that characterize
rather simple phenomena. The other type of causation is more complex, and the outcome flows
from the convergence of several conditions or variables (for instance, Theda Skocpol’s
discussion of social revolutions).82 Even more complex is the interacting causation, where
variables are independent of each other. Lastly, process tracing can be linked to the method of
path dependency.83 My study will align with the convergence of several conditions that explain
genocide in some locations and times and not others. Genocide itself is a process of violence, but
the process is more complicated than a linear explanation.
As for controlled comparisons, Slater and Ziblatt (2013) say that, “controlled
comparisons thus remain a powerful approach for scholars seeking to juggle the dueling
demands of internal and external validity within a single study. It allows scholars to develop and
test theories that travel across time and space but remain sensitive to establishing precise causal
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relationships among variables.” Also, much like Straus’ (2006) micro-comparative study of the
84

Rwandan genocide, I intend to employ the process tracing and controlled comparison research
tools to investigate dynamics in different municipalities.
Case Selection
Many previous studies explained genocide with national level factors, and the specific
dynamic, escalation, radicalization, and process of genocide has been largely neglected. The
question that I have is what happens when you look within the state? What do we discover by
looking within the state that we would otherwise miss by strictly focusing at the national level
and using this as a basis for comparative analysis? Moreover, what countries or genocides have
been overlooked or understudied using the micro-comparative method?
I identify the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) along the same lines scholars
selected other single-country studies to investigate subnational variation. Kalyvas uses the
Argolid region in Southern Greece to test his theory of selective violence, Varshney uses six
cities in India through a controlled comparison to illustrate both ethnic peace and violence, and
Straus uses five communes in Rwanda to explain the pattern of mobilization when it comes to
genocide. The advantage of such an approach allows the researcher to study the universe of cases
in one region and collect detailed and contextualized data of ethnographic quality. Besides
yielding thick detail, the research design allows for a subnational number of observations and
extensive empirical variation, prohibits sampling on the dependent variable, and permits high
level of control.85
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I will be investigating three municipalities that experienced some of the greatest warfare
in terms of death count (excluding Srebrenica). Two of my cases experienced genocides as
stipulated by my definition, while the other one experienced less severe forms of political
violence (Table 1). Prijedor and Zvornik are my cases of genocide, while Bratunac is a case of
political violence that did not reach genocide. I selected these cases to follow a most-similar
systems design comparison. It consists of comparing similar cases which only differ in the
dependent variable, on the assumption that this allows the researcher to find those independent
variables which explain either the presence or absence of the dependent variable. I can control
five main factors with my case selection: First, I selected the cases with high degree of political
violence, specified by death count throughout the three-year war period.86 Second, I can control
for national governmental control, since I am applying a micro-comparative analysis of the
cases. This is one of the primary strengths of the micro-comparative approach and something
previous genocide studies have lacked by comparing country cases solely on the dependent
variable. Third, I have selected cases with higher levels of populations per the 1991 population
census. I did this because I am interested at the municipality or city level, and not the village
level. Fourth, I have selected cases that were ethnically intermixed per the 1991 population
census. In all my selected cases, there are at least two dominant ethnic groups, and no one ethnic
group signifies a dominant majority. Lastly, I selected cases that belonged to the Serbian Arc, or
the strategically important territory that the Bosnian Serbs needed to link the Bosnian Serb
population of Serbia proper, eastern Bosnia, northwestern Bosnia, and Croatia. The question that
now remains is: considering the similar nature of these cases, why did genocide occur in Prijedor
and Zvornik but not in Bratunac?
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Table 2: Case Selection Overview
Violence

Municipality

Genocide

Prijedor

Genocide

Zvornik

Civil War/No
Genocide

Bratunac

Ethnic
Composition
44% Muslim;
43% Serb; 6%
Croat
59% Muslim;
38% Serb
65% Muslim;
34% Serb

Geographic
Location
Northwestern
Bosnia

Death Toll

Eastern Bosnia

3,383

Eastern Bosnia

2,343

3,554

Data Collection
I triangulated or used multiple measures to collect my data.87 I relied heavily on archival
data – which included, but was not limited to – newspaper clippings, speeches, memoirs,
personal accounts, and international, national, and regional legal documents. I also supplemented
these primary sources with secondary sources, but I was aware of the selection bias of secondary
sources that exists in social science research. Lastly, due to financial and time constraints, I was
unable to interview surviving victims, families of the deceased, and perpetrators. This is
something I seek to do in the future to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon and to add
a degree of human element to the research. Genocide is a highly emotional, personal, and
devastating act of violence, and some of the most vivid and detailed information comes from
those who experienced it. I also relied on my language proficiency to examine documents written
in Bosnian and Serbo-Croatian. This was especially useful with certain primary sources that were
not available in English.
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I also consulted several sources that have done a thorough and comprehensive collection
of primary data. Dr. Mirsad Tokača and his team of researchers have compiled the most
complete data on the Bosnian civil war and genocide. The Research and Documentation Center
in Sarajevo has published the Bosnian Book of the Dead, detailing a total list of 97,207 lost lives.
On top of this, they have compiled data by ethnicity, age, gender, religion, and most importantly,
municipality. As for the legal documents, all the court cases pertaining to International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were available online, and I was also able to
investigate the legal proceeding and special reports provided by the United Nations. Lastly, I am
gracious for my contacts within Bosnia, who themselves have either testified at The Hague,
witnessed the atrocities, or known individuals that were victims to the violence or that
perpetrated the violence against others. Within the United States, I am thankful to Fontbonne
University in St. Louis, Missouri for drawing my attention to this matter in 2012. The university
has developed the “Bosnia Memory Project”. The project is dedicated to establishing an enduring
record of Bosnian genocide survivors by recording interviews with survivors and their relatives
and collecting books, letters, and photographs that reflect the experiences of Bosnians during the
war and genocide.88 The Institute for Research of Genocide Canada (IGC) was also a useful
portal for primary data. They are dedicated to public scientific analysis of crimes against peace,
crimes of genocide, and other grave violations of international law from a historical, legal,
sociological, and political perspective.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE RISE OF NATIONALISM
Early History
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1918-1945
The history of Yugoslavia is rooted in the medieval kingdoms of Bosnia, Croatia, and
Serbia.89 All three Kingdoms emerged between the 10th and 11th centuries. Although the initially
fates varied between all three kingdoms, they were ultimately defeated by Ottomans in the 14th
century.90 It was not until 1918 that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – former
territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and formerly independent Serbia – merged to create
the newly independent state. The state was ruled by the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty under
Peter I until his death in 1921. Thereafter, his son Alexander I, also known as “Alexander the
Unifier,” renamed the kingdom to “Yugoslavia” in 1929.
The years of the “first” Yugoslavia were troubled since Croats and Slovenes wanted
autonomy within a federation, but the Serbs effectively created a unified state that put them in
power. Tensions escalated when Croatian leader Stepan Radić was assassinated in the national
parliament by a Serbian deputy. In 1934, Alexander I fell to the same fate as he was assassinated
89
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by the fascist Croatian organization known as the Ustasha. By 1939, the Croats and Serbs
reached a compromise. Vladko Maček of Croatia was named the vice premier of Yugoslavia and
Croatia was given autonomy and its own parliament.92
With the Nazi invasion on April 6, 1941, Yugoslavia was fully occupied and soon carved
up by the Axis powers. Under the Nazis, the Croatian fascist Ustasha regime was established
throughout the region. The Ustasha were responsible for a “genocidal campaign of murder and
terror against the Serbs.”93 Ultimately, the tactics and terror of the Ustasha led to the deaths of
over 300,000 Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia – most notably at the Jasenovac concentration camp.94
The resistance was composed of the Royal Yugoslav Army and the Yugoslav Partisans under the
command of Josip Broz Tito. Within the former, a Serbian guerilla group called the Chetniks
emerged as the opposition to the Ustasha. Tito’s Yugoslav Partisans were fighting on what
would eventually became the slogan for the post-World War II Yugoslavia; “Brotherhood and
Unity.” Unlike the extremists and nationalist Ustasha or Chetniks, the Yugoslav Partisans were a
pan-Yugoslavia movement with left-wing and socialist elements. Following Germany’s
withdrawal from Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Partisans were left in control after defeating the
Ustasha and Chetniks. By 1945, it was estimated that over one million people died in
Yugoslavia, half of these being Serbs.95
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Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1945-1980
Under the rule of Tito, Yugoslavia reestablished itself as a unified federal state. On
January 31, 1946, the new constitution established six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), two autonomous regions (Kosovo and
Vojvodina), and the capital of Belgrade in Serbia. Tito’s Yugoslavia was significant for three
main reasons: Firstly, he was able to distance himself from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc
of Eastern Europe. This gave Tito increasing political freedom and power whereby he was
named “President for Life” in 1963. In fact, the former Yugoslavia never fell under the control of
the great “Iron Curtain.” This geopolitical standoff created tensions in the alliance between Tito
and Stalin thereafter. Secondly, he paved the way for some cultural and political autonomy, but
mostly suppressed any notion of nationalist sentiment that did not accord with a common
Yugoslavian identity. Tito relied on purges and imprisonments to counter nationalism and
strongly opposed any publication of nationalist rhetoric. Thirdly, and in stark contrast with his
Brotherhood and Unity slogan, Tito increasingly conceded more and more autonomy to the
various republics.96 For instance, by giving into Croatian economic demands by allowing the
republic to retain a higher percentage of tourism earnings or by recognizing Muslims in par with
the other nations of Yugoslavia – ultimately showing that 39.5 percent of Bosnians and
Herzegovinians identified as Muslim.97
Soon after, decentralization was introduced with the 1974 constitution. In attempting to
solve the “national problem” of Yugoslavia, the constitution granted maximal autonomy to each
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republic and created extensive veto powers. As a result, any major decision necessitated
unanimity.98 After Tito’s death on May 4, 1980, ethnic tensions – which he originally sought to
suppress – grew in Yugoslavia. “Each nation’s writers and historians tended to trumpet the
heroic deeds of their nation’s history while obscuring its past atrocities and exaggerating the
historical crimes of other groups against theirs.”99 With the 1974 Constitution as the catalyst, and
the death of Tito as the final blow, Yugoslavia was left with weak central institutions incapable
of suppressing nationalist sentiments any longer.
Rise of Serbian Propaganda and Nationalism
SANU Memorandum, 1986
In the years following Tito’s death, Serbian propaganda was already underway among
segments of the Serbian elite. Defined as the Orientalists, these individuals took it upon
themselves to portray Muslims as alien, inferior, and dangerous to modern European
civilization.100 The so-called Orientalists of Serbia were academic specialists in Islamic affairs,
who developed a false ethnic classification in which the Muslims of Bosnia were dehumanized
for being non-Europeans and sharing a culture with Turks and Arabs instead. Relatedly, the
Serbian Orthodox Church – or at least a strong core of priests – helped to create an environment
of paranoia and hostility toward non-Serbs. The Serbian Orthodox Church would often stir up
memories of World War II to portray the Serbian people as victims of atrocities.101 The strategy
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was straightforward: use the history and imagery of World War II to convey to the Serbian
public that they were, and still are, under attack from their fellow non-Serb Yugoslavs.
All these sentiments unified eventually under a common agenda known as the
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU). On January 21, 1986, a
group of 216 Serbian intellectuals of the SANU sent a document to both the Serbian and
Yugoslav assemblies outlining the harassment of the Kosovar Serbs. Further, the document
depicted the Serbs as a constant victim of Tito’s policies and called on them to forcefully protect
their threatened identity, if not existence altogether. The top communist leaders condemned the
Memorandum. Ivan Stambolić referred to it as “Yugoslavia’s obituary,” and warned the
academics that they were not just provoking nationalistic sentiments, but also acting against the
core interests of Serbs.102 Only one leading Serbian leader declined to condemn the
Memorandum publicly, limiting his criticism to private meeting of the secret police leadership:
Slobodan Milošević. Milošević was Stambolić’s protégé and closest ally. He had been elected as
President of the Serbian League of Communists in May 1986 on Stambolić’s request.103 The
following passage epitomizes a common theme throughout the document:
Not all nations are equal. The Serbian nation, for example, did not gain the right
to its own state. Parts of the Serbian nation, who in considerable numbers live in
other republics, do not have the right, unlike the national minorities, to use their
own language and alphabet, to get politically and culturally organized, to develop
the unique culture of their nation. The undeniable expulsion of the Serbs from
Kosovo drastically demonstrates that these principles, protecting the autonomy of
a minority (Albanians) were not applied when it came to a minority within a
minority.104
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These crucial years invigorated the call for Greater Serbia by paving a common, unified
theme of ethnic hostility and Serbian victimization. The Albanians were accused of committing
genocide against Serbs in Kosovo, the Croats and Slovenes were accused of controlling the
Serbian economy, and the “Serbian Question” could not be solved until the creation of full
national and cultural unity of all Serb people in Yugoslavia. As described by Sabrina Ramet, the
period between 1981 to 1987 represented a “massive tectonic shift in which perceptions, values,
and expectations changed dramatically, preparing the way for Slobodan Milošević’s seizure of
power within the Serbian party apparatus and his launching of his abortive ‘antibureaucratic
revolution.”105 In other words, it was evident that nationalist sentiments were becoming part of
the mainstream dialogue throughout Yugoslavia. Brotherhood and Unity was long dead, and it
was replaced by propaganda, victimization, and xenophobia.
Slobodan Milosevic and the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution, 1987
The dissolution of Yugoslavia would not be possible without the rise of Slobodan
Milošević within the Serbian League of Communists in 1987. Milošević was a master at
developing and playing the nationalist card by effectively intimidating rivals with his control of
the media and violent street rallies.106 In his infamous speech at Kosovo Polje on April 24, 1987,
Milošević ignited the grievances of Serbs living in Kosovo by declaring, “No one should dare to
beat you; no one should dare to beat you!” He went on to say, “You need to stay here. This is
your land. Your homes are here, your memories.”107 His attendance that day was at the request of

105

Sabrina Ramet, “Under the Holy Lime Tree: The Inculcation of Neurotic and Psychotic Syndromes as a Serbian
Wartime Strategy, 1986-1995,” in Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and After eds. Sabrina P.
Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic, 83-97 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005): 86.
106

Ibid., 86-87.

107

Slobodan Milošević, “Speech at Kosovo Polje” (speech, Kosovo Polje, Kosovo, 24 April 1987).

57
Stambolić – president of Serbia at the time – to meet with various party delegates. When protests
erupted in the streets shortly thereafter, Milošević witnessed the sight of Albanian police officers
using force to push back at the crowd of mostly Serbs and Montenegrins. This inspired Milošević
to request a break and give an impromptu speech to the crowd of protestors. The speech was met
with chants of “Slobo, Slobo!” as the Serbian media broadcasted the event later that evening on
television.
Although the Serbs were a minority group in the ethnically dominate Albanian republic,
Kosovo was at the epicenter of Serbian history and mythology. The mythology has occupied a
special place in the hearts and minds of the Serb people since the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.
“Kosovo is held by almost all Serbs as the sacred site of national history, the fountainhead of
national spirit, and the guarantor of national values.”108 Thus, Milošević’s response to actual or
imagined grievances of the Kosovar Serbs was a decisive night in his political career. He
signaled – unlike past Serbian and Yugoslav leaders – that he had the ability to control the
masses. More importantly, by inviting delegates from the crowd of protestors to join the meeting,
he signaled that he had a willingness to listen to the accusations of a Serbian minority that had
resented the oppression put upon them by an Albanian majority.109 That night was significant
because it turned Milošević into a national hero and propelled his rise to power. Six months later,
Milošević would become the president of Serbia and the fate of Yugoslavia would change
forever.
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Milošević’s speech was a critical turning point in Yugoslav politics because it diverged
from Tito’s slogan of Brotherhood and Unity. Under Tito, a policy of inter-ethnic relations was
encouraged among the various groups of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as
specified by the 1963 and 1974 constitutions. Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins,
Serbs, and Slovenes, as well as national minorities consisting of Albanians, Bulgarians,
Hungarians, Italians, Jews, and Romanians, coexisted as part of a federation. Each individual
was permitted to express their own ethnicity as they wished, while each ethnic group was
required to maintain peaceful relations amongst one another. By 1987, if not before, it was
evident that slogan of Brotherhood and Unity was gone. What was to come was Milošević’s selfproclaimed “anti-bureaucratic” revolutions throughout Kosovo, Vojvodina, and the Republic of
Montenegro.110 The name itself is derived from a so-called revolution against corrupt
bureaucratic governing structures, but the campaign was widely considered to be the early stages
of Milošević’s utopian vision of a Greater Serbia.111
Milosevic and the Campaign for “Greater Serbia”, 1987-1991
Milošević’s political strategy was based “on appeals to a xenophobic and authoritarian
version of Serbian nationalism.”112 This strategy allowed Milošević to attain and consolidate his
political will over his opponents. For example, Milošević utilized his anti-bureaucratic
revolution” against his opponents in the region of Vojvodina – who were critical of his
leadership – to paint them as autonomists and remove them from power. A typical “anti-
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bureaucratic” rally would consist of “paying unemployed youths from Serbia proper to travel to
the provinces and participate in violent nationalist demonstrations.”113 These rallies were often
accompanied by calls for ending provincial autonomy and included intimidation of minority
residents within the region. By 1989, Milošević placed Kosovo under martial law and the party
leadership of Montenegro – also adversaries of his leadership – were forced to resign. As a
result, Serbia had acquired four out of the eight votes on the federal state presidency and fullcontrol over the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).114
This prevailing climate of ethnic and religious animosity was also fostered through the
censorship, indoctrination, and misinformation by the media. According to report of the Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights, “the media denigrates Muslims and Islam through sensationalist
and distorted accounts of historical and existing crimes which they have committed against the
Serbian people.”115 This negative portrayal, which began in the 1980s, of Muslims as dangerous
enemies was pushed even further once actual violence broke out in the early 1990s. The Serbian
elite – politicians, intellectuals, religious figures, and the media – referred to Muslims as
‘fanatics,’ ‘terrorists,’ ‘extremists,’ and ‘fundamentalists.’ The Muslims were represented as
provokers of aggression and Islam was regarded as a violent religion.116
Much like his 1987 appearance in Kosovo, Milošević would once again give a career
defining speech two years later. In a passionately charged speech at Gazimestan – the name of
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the memorial site and monument commemorating the Battle of Kosovo (1389) – Milošević
indicated the intention of his government to extend the nationalist agenda beyond the borders of
Serbia. He emphasized that the “Serbs have always liberated themselves and, when they had the
chance, also helped others to liberate themselves.” This statement committed Serbia to a forcible
redrawing of Yugoslav borders in order to liberate all Serbs living outside Serbia per the
Memorandum’s declaration.117 Milošević wrapped up his speech by addressing the connection
between Serbia and Europe. He portrayed the medieval Serbs as defenders of Serb territory, but
also of European territory against the Ottoman Turks. He declared, “Six centuries ago, Serbia
heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at the
time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in
general.”118 It was an appeal to the values of Europe – namely Christianity and modernity – as a
defense against the widespread Orientalist sentiments of the Muslims.119
By 1991, Milošević made it clear that territorial expansion was the only desirable
outcome for the Serb people. In a session of the Serbian Parliament in April 1991, Milošević
openly stated that territorial expansion needed to be achieved by force and that few, if any,
alternatives remained for non-Serbs. In his speech, Milošević expressed that:
We must guarantee that we are unified within Serbia if we, as the largest and most
populous republic, want to dictate the flow of events. The question of borders is a
vital issue for a state. As you know, it is always the powerful who dictate what the
borders will be, never the weak. Thus, we must be powerful.120
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By the end of 1991, Milošević coupled his strong rhetoric with action by reorganizing the
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) along ethnic lines. In his book, Borisav Jović, a member of the
Federal Presidency, noted that on December 5, 1991, he and Milošević consulted with JNA
commander Veljko Kadijević about transferring soldiers of Bosnian and Herzegovinian descent
to Bosnia. Further, Milošević ordered Kadijević to redeploy “all Bosnian Serbs to Bosnia.” The
impetus was straightforward: Milošević feared Bosnia would be seeking independence soon and
he wanted the Bosnian Serbs to be ready for war.121
Radovan Karadzic and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), 1989-1991
Milošević is often referred to as the mastermind behind the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s,
but it would be inappropriate to lay blame solely on his shoulders for the ethnic hostility and
violence that unfolded. Akin to the efforts of Milošević, various other elites were on board with
the tenets of the Memorandum and the utopian visions of Greater Serbia. Most notably, a
Montenegrin-born psychiatrist – Radovan Karadžić – followed the encouragement from Dobrica
Ćosić and Jovan Raškovic and founded the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1989. The party’s main goal was to unify the Republic’s Bosnian Serb and Croat
Serb population in the event of secession by Bosnia and Croatia.
Karadžić’s mentor – Raškovic – was the leader of the Croat Serbs but also a fellow
psychiatrist. Although he died shortly into the eventual conflict that would unfold in Croatia and
later Bosnia, Raškovic admitted on Serbian television that he felt responsible for having “lit the
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fuse of Serbian nationalism.”

It is speculated that Karadžić may have been influenced by

Raškovic’s theories of Serbian superiority. When asked in May 1990 if he had a role model or
mentor, Karadžić replied, “above all, Jovan Raškovic.”123 As the founding member of the SDS,
Karadžić served as its President from July 1990 to 1996, but he would later assume the more
prominent role as President of the Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina) and the Supreme Commander of the armed forces on December 17, 1992.124
Karadžić’s staple on politics also came with a resounding speech given to the Bosnian
Assembly on October 14, 1991. Whereas Milošević used the platform in 1987 and 1989 to
bolster Serb nationalist sentiments in Kosovo, similarly, Karadžić used his speech to provoke
anxieties and offer an ultimatum to Bosnian Muslims seeking to hold a referendum on
independence. Karadžić stated:
You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the same highway of hell and
suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are traveling. Do not think that you will not
lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps
lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the Muslims cannot defend
themselves if there is war – How will you prevent everyone from being killed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina?”125
Karadžić gave a harrowing account of the consequences of possible Bosnian secession. Within
the speech, Karadžić noted that he was not acting like the “God of War,” or that he was
threatening the Muslims population, but rather asking them to take the will of the Serbian people
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seriously. Few would believe the assertion that Karadžić was not making threats. He referenced
the ongoing conflicts in Croatia and Slovenia, highlighted a “highway to hell” for Muslims if
they seceded, and noted that Muslims would have no way of defending themselves against an
attack.
Furthermore, documents have recently come to light in proceedings of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) showing that Karadžić’s infamous speech
was not spontaneous but the result of careful deliberation.126 A month before his public
declaration of a “Muslims extinction,” Karadžić had a conversation with Momčilo Krajišnik, a
close associate and later the President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, about possible responses to
a Bosnian Muslim secession plan. Karadžić indicated, “Can you see where this leads? Do you
realize you will disappear in this? Man, you will disappear. Many of us will disappear, but you
will be annihilated!”127 Relatedly, two days before his speech, in an intercepted conversation
between Karadžić and Gojko Doko, Karadžić repeated four times that Bosnian Muslims would
“disappear” in the event of a war. In his words, “They don’t understand that there will be
bloodshed and that all the Muslim people could disappear. Misguided Muslims, who do not
know where he [Izetbegovic] is taking them, that they could disappear…they will disappear, this
people will disappear from the face of the earth.”128
It was evident, that by the October 1991, if not earlier, that powerful elites were
threatening war with the Bosnian Muslims if certain Serb interests were not met. Karadžić, as the
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leader of the Bosnian Serbs within Bosnia, openly and privately spewed his xenophobic rhetoric.
Around the time of his speech, Karadžić had met with Warren Zimmerman, Ambassador to
Yugoslavia at the time and echoed similar sentiments. Zimmerman noted that Karadžić
complained about Bosnian borders, calling them arbitrary and noting they do not reflect history
correctly. He blamed the “chronic dishonesty” of the Muslims on their leader Izetbegović’s
Islamic faith. Stating, “They’re prone to oriental despotism. They’re always cheating us. We
can’t stand it anymore.” What surprised Zimmerman the most during the meeting was
accusations that Izetbegović was a secessionist, even though Karadžić was responsible for the
creation of a Serbian autonomous region prior to any Bosnian secession.129
Following Karadžić’s speech, the Bosnian Parliament passed a resolution on
independence the following day on October 15, 1991. Immediately after, SDS leadership
convened to discuss the steps needed to achieve the “homogenization of Serb people and
territories.”130 The top priorities were establishing a separate Bosnian Serb Assembly and
holding a plebiscite exclusively for Serbs to determine whether they wanted to remain in
Yugoslavia. A regionalization plan was put in place, in which parallel organs of authority were
created. In other words, a Bosnian Serb para-state would exist within the borders of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.131 By October 24, 1991, The Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was established, and two weeks later, Bosnian Serbs voted to remain a part of
Yugoslavia. A few months later, on January 9, 1992, the Serbs created The Republic of the Serb
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Karadžić’s rhetoric was

met with policy, as the Bosnian Serb leadership was preparing its exclusivist, but also
expansionist goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Republika Srpska would be a unified
home for Bosnian Serbs, but it would also be part of the larger effort in uniting Serbs under a
common state living in Yugoslavia. Milošević’s echoes were being heard – the Bosnian Serb
leadership was on board with the vision of Greater Serbia.
The Propaganda War, 1990-1992
The growing nationalistic sentiment, and the oppression of the opposition, created an
environment in which support for establishing a Greater Serbia flourished beyond Milošević and
Karadžić.133 It was evident that Serb leaders within and outside the Republic of Serbia were
endorsing the idea of a Greater Serbia. For instance, Vojislav Šešelj, the head of the Serbian
Radical Party (SRS) at the time, stated that he hoped to see the republics of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, and the Serbian areas of Croatia incorporated into
Serbia.134 It is not surprising to note that Šešelj eventually became the leader of a paramilitary
units responsible for committing some of the most atrocious crimes during the war. Similarly,
Vuk Drašković, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM), wanted Greater Serbia to
incorporate the Republics of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, along with the regions of
Kosovo, Vojvodina, and certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.135
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Moreover, high-ranking officials within the SDS were some of the most outspoken
proponents of a Greater Serbia. Biljana Plavšić, who was one of the Vice-Presidents of
Republika Srpska from 1992 until 1996, advocated for the importance of partition of territory
within Bosnia and Herzegovina. In May 1992, Plavšić insisted that Serbs were entitled to 70
percent of the territory and that Bosnian Serbs “were used to living in wide spaces” while
Muslims typically lived in cities.136 She went on to say that “if it takes the lives of three million
to solve this crisis, let’s get it done and move on.”137 Her sentiments were echoed by Nikola
Koljević, who would repeatedly claim that it was impossible for the different ethnic groups to
live together, and Momčilo Krajišnik, who stated that the main objective of the Bosnian Serb
effort was to separate from the Bosnian Muslim and to create their own state based on “ethnic
purity.”138 It was clear that the civilian leadership advocated, and in some cases, threatened for
the types of policies championed by Milošević and Karadžić. In order to put these exclusionary
policies into place, it was necessary to establish political and territorial control throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina and certain parts of Croatia. Thus, the militarization phase ensued, and
it was inevitable that conflict would soon erupt as well.
Militarization of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Yugoslav National Army (JNA), 1991-1992
Although Serbs made up only about a third of Bosnia’s population at the time, they were
set on capturing 70 percent of the territory. This political strategy, and ultimately military reality,
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was known as the Serbian arc for Greater Serbia. A crucial issue in Bosnia was how Bosnian
Serbs would overcome their numerical deficit in relation to the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat coalition. The strategy adopted was irredentist in nature; Serbs living within the Republic
of Serbia and outside of it (primarily Bosnia and Croatia) would be united into political units.
With a large number of Serbs living in Bosnia at the time, especially in certain Serb-held
territories, it was important to consolidate these territories by eliminating Muslim enclaves
within them.139 Specifically, the arc extends from the municipality of Goradze in the southeast
and follows the Drina River that borders Serbia proper and the strategic border town of Zvornik,
through Banja Luka and Prijedor in northwest Bosnia. From there, the arc would continue along
the Sava and Korenica Rivers, which form the boundaries of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia.140
This task was relatively easy due to Serbia’s military dominance over the Muslims and
Croats. Prior to 1991, the military was a multiethnic army composed of soldiers from the various
republic. This was much the case throughout Tito’s rule, but the demographics quickly shifted
toward a dominantly Serbian army after 1980. In fact, by March 1992, with the exception of a
minority of Montenegrin soldiers, the army was 90 percent Serb.141 With a primarily Serb
infantry, the JNA began to disarm the Bosnian troops in the months leading up to the
independence referendum. The JNA maintained that that in order to secure peace and stability
within Bosnia, weapons must be handed over to the federal army. The Bosnian Government
initially supported these efforts because the JNA was collecting weapons from Bosnian Serbs
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too. However, by the early spring of 1992, the JNA was in an overwhelmingly advantageous
position to launch the ethnic cleansing campaign for Greater Serbia.142 Based on the
implemented measures of the JNA, James Gow, a military analyst, drew the following
conclusion:
As a result of these measures, the Serbs had succeeded in repositioning their
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of their strategy of securing the
infrastructure that was to be a part of a ‘mini-Yugoslavia,’ carving up the new
state in the process: the eastern part was to be attached to Serbia, the southern
parts to Montenegro, and the western part to Serb-populated and occupied regions
in Croatia.143
By April 1992, as conflict erupted, the JNA had approximately 80,000 troops deployed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. A month later General Ratko Mladić was appointed the JNA commander, but
under pressure from the international community, the JNA “withdrew” its forces. This did little
to shift the balance of power because Yugoslav officials directed the JNA personnel originating
from Bosnia to remain and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. The net effect was a loss of
25,000 troops or so, but this still left General Mladić with 55,000 JNA troops, JNA weaponry
and equipment, and daily contact with both the Bosnian Serb and the Federal Yugoslav Defense
Ministries in Belgrade.144
The irony in all this was that on May 17, 1992, Karadžić announced that federal troops
would be transferred to the newly autonomous region of Republika Srpska. Nevertheless,
Karadžić insisted that this new Bosnian Army was completely independent of the Republic of
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Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He stated, “Serbians and Yugoslavs have nothing
to do with our rights down there. I can see that nobody believes us, but it is the truth.”145 On the
contrary, the Serbs and Yugoslavs had everything to do with the conflict unfolding in Bosnia.
Republika Srpska was fully supported, and in many ways, actively coordinating with the
leadership in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Milošević’s government in Serbia.
On all accounts, the period leading up to the Bosnian civil war was a Serb offensive both
within Bosnia and from the neighboring territories outside of it. Reports from military analysts
indicated that Serbian forces in Bosnia regularly received military equipment – aircraft fuel,
tanks, and armored vehicles – from Serbia. Additionally, Serbian-marked vehicles would deliver
supplies to Bosnia on a daily basis, especially in the northwestern Bosnia and the territory along
the Drina River bordering Serbia proper.146 Tensions between Karadžić and Milošević may have
deteriorated later into the war, but this initial period was marked by mutual interests and a
common strategy in Bosnia. Both men alleged to be independent of one another; Milošević
insisted that Karadžić’s actions within Bosnia were his and only his, yet the so-called distance
suited both leaders. On the one hand, it allowed Milošević to evade accountability for aggression
since he could claim that the Bosnian Serb leadership under the command of Karadžić was
responsible for the violence. On the other hand, it allowed Karadžić to avoid the label of being
Milošević’s “puppet,” and rather a Serbian hero on his own right.147 According to Ambassador
Zimmerman, “Karadžić’s actions to partition the republic [Bosnia], beginning in the spring of
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1991 and continuing right through the war, would have been impossible without the JNA. And
the JNA dependent on Milošević.”148
Crisis Staffs, 1992
With the command and structure established at the national level, the next steps involved
linking the various regions throughout Bosnia under the unified goal of Greater Serbia. This was
achieved by setting up similar institutions referred to as “Crisis Staffs” throughout Bosnia.
Although the existence of Crisis Staffs was made known to the public in the early months of
1992, their inception can be traced to preparations made in August 1991. Karadžić set guidelines
ordering all municipal and regional committees of the SDS to work undercover in appointing one
individual from each local community who would be responsible for alerting homes of “ten to
twenty houses.”149 These operations were being kept a secret from the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats and were intended to prepare local Serb communities to the possibility of war
mobilization. By the end of December 1991, the municipal-level Crisis Staffs were established.
The Crisis Staffs played a crucial role because they coordinated with the Assembly of the
Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the SDS Central Committee. According to
Karadžić, each Crisis Staff was to be composed of the following individuals: a president from the
SDS Municipal Committee, a Secretariat from the SDS Municipal Committee, municipal
representatives in the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs, and members of the SDS Central Committee
from each municipality.150 More importantly, the Crisis Staffs were ordered to cooperate with the
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commanders of the JNA, the SDS Central Committee, and Assembly of Bosnian Serbs, along
with Karadžić, Krajišnik, and Plavšić. According to Dorothea Hanson’s expert testimony, “The
Crisis Staffs coordinates functions of authorities with the objective of defending the territory,
securing the safety [of people and property], establishing the authority and organizing areas of
life and work…The Crisis Staff is obliged to collect information on conditions in the field...”151
Consequently, the Crisis Staff played an important role in information gathering for national
elites and the military. They served this function by providing headquarters where civilian and
military leadership could collaborate their efforts at the municipal level.
In order to legitimatize the existence of these secret cells, the Bosnian Serb leadership
eventually renamed the Crisis Staffs the “War Committees.” The differences were only in name
change, since that War Committees took on the same responsibilities as the Crisis Staffs – that is,
they “ensured that the genocidal politics of the SDS and the so-called Bosnian Serb government
were implemented through coordinated actions of the police, the military, and paramilitary
forces.”152 Effectively, the Crisis Staffs had an active role in planning and executing the policies
to establish a Greater Serbia. They served as an intermediary between the civilian leadership at
various levels of the state and the military leadership composed of federal army, later renamed
the Bosnian Serb Army, municipal police units, and the paramilitaries who penetrated onto the
scene in early 1992 from Serbia.
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Paramilitaries, 1991-1992
Aside from the participation of the regular forces during the Bosnian war, the other key
players were a mixture of irregular forces. The irregular forces were composed of three types of
soldiers: criminals who were freed from prison in order to take part in the violence, former JNA
officers who had defected to their respective ethnic army, and reservists who were armed and
trained by the current JNA officers.153 The paramilitary units varied by locality – their efforts
were often limited to one municipality – with each unit operating under the command and
control of a local leader. Still, the units closely coordinated their operations with JNA leadership,
the SDS, Crisis Staffs, and each other. Amongst these groups, the most active included the Beli
Orlovi (White Eagles), under the leadership of Vojislav Šešelj, and the Serb Volunteer Guard (or
Arkan’s Tigers) under the leadership of Željko Ražnatović (informally known as Arkan).154
The White Eagles were a Serbian paramilitary group closely associated with the Serbian
National Renewal (SNO) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). They were often referred to as
Chetniks, sharing the common moniker with the Serbian guerrilla groups of World War II. The
group could be identified by their uniforms, which included white ribbons on their sleeves and
on their hands. The insignia of the group was a skull and cross bones. The group was active in 34
municipalities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely Ključ, Zvornik, Foča, and Ilidža.155
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Arkan’s Tigers were also a Serbian paramilitary group named after their infamous leader
Arkan. Arkan gained notoriety as a career criminal when he was placed on Interpol’s most
wanted list in the 1970s and 1980s for various robberies and murders committed in a number of
European countries. Arkan would go onto form the Tigers in response to the growing ethnic
tensions between Croatia and Serbia in 1990. With the onset of the Croatian war, the Tigers were
active in the Vukovar region, but would later also establish control in Bosnia months before the
war broke out.156 During the Bosnian war – from 1992 to 1995 – the group was most notably
involved in northeastern Bosnia in the municipalities of Bijeljina, Brčko, and Zvornik, as well as
Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Sanski Most in the northwest part of the country.157
The paramilitary units, especially the White Eagles and the Tigers, were responsible for
some of the most brutal aspects of the ethnic cleansing campaign. The specific incidences will be
discussed in subsequent chapters, but it is worth noting there was a common pattern to ethnic
cleansing campaign throughout the country. First, these paramilitary units, often with the
assistance of the JNA (later renamed the Bosnian Serb Army VRS), would seize territorial
control of a specific region. Prior to the takeover, Serbian residents living in the municipality
would be warned of an upcoming attack so they could properly leave the area. Once the Serbian
residents evacuated the area, the homes of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats would be
targeted for destruction, along with religious places of worship such as mosques and churches.
Second, the paramilitary units would assume control of the territory and terrorize non-Serb
residents through beatings, lootings, rapes, and even killings Third, the area would be
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administered by local Serb authorities – often the Crisis Staff of the respective municipality – in
conjunction with the paramilitary units. During this phase, non-Serb residents were fired from
their jobs, their property was often confiscated, and many would face the fate of being sent to a
concentration camp, or even worse, fall victim to the mass killings.158
When confronted about the presence of Serbian paramilitary units in Bosnia, Ambassador
Zimmerman told Milošević that any notion of plausible deniability on his behalf had lost its
credibility. In response, Milošević asserted that:
Our television is free to broadcast whatever it wants. You shouldn’t take it so
seriously. I have instructed the Serbian Minister of Interior to prevent any armed
Serbs from crossing into Bosnia. Arkan’s presence in Bosnia isn’t confirmed. As I
understand, he’s no more than a simple sweetshop owner.159
Zimmerman noted to himself that although Arkan did own a sweet shop, it was a cover similarly
to that of Chicago gangster Dion O’Banion owning a floral shop.160 In fact, Zimmerman offered
a damning conclusion after his meeting with Milosevic:
He was in denial – denial that he bore responsibility for the growing violence in
Bosnia; denial that his contempt for frontiers had given paramilitaries form Serbia
a license to invade Croatia and Bosnia; denial that his pernicious doctrine of ‘all
Serbs in one state’ was an incitement to aggression; denial that his creation of the
Bosnian Serb Army had given Karadžić a crushing military advantage in Bosnia;
denial that his press and television, through distortion and lies, had goaded the
Serbian people toward support of the most rapacious nationalism.161
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Zimmerman was candid in his condemnation: all roads lead to Milošević. Thus, by spring 1992,
the environment was advantageous for a Greater Serbia campaign to succeed. Milošević was a
nationalist, Karadžić was an autonomist, the media was a propaganda machine, and the civilian
and military leadership – including the JNA, local police, Crisis Staffs, SDS, and the paramilitary
units – were actively cooperating in a “Joint Criminal Enterprise” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Joint Criminal Enterprise, 1992-1995
The Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) is a legal doctrine used by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to prosecute individuals responsible for war crimes,
including genocide, committed during the Bosnian civil war. Essentially, the doctrine holds each
individual member of the organized group responsible for crimes committed by the group within
the framework of a common goal. The concept is of particular importance because it allows the
Chamber to bring charges against members of the group responsible for war crimes or crimes
against humanity even if there is no evidence that the particular individual physically
participated in the crimes.162 However, if it could be established that each individual knowingly
and willfully shared the intent and state of mind for commission of the crimes, then charges
could be brought against various civilian and military leaders throughout this period.
In the case of Bosnia, the evidence that emerged from the numerous trials at The Hague
indicated that the goals of the JCE were organized with a top-down approach, in which the
Bosnian Serb and Serbian authorities played a decisive role in dealing with the Bosnian Muslim
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population.

According to Cigar, the mode of operation commonly seen throughout the war

was Commander’s intent:
It is unlikely that Milosevic or Karadzic could or need have known about or
controlled the details of all operations. Although in some instances direct
guidance on what to do was not available, in many cases, ‘commander’s intent’
was more likely used, whereby the leadership could set certain policy goals and
assume that subordinates would have the latitude to use virtually any means to
achieve them. Subsequent claims by the Serbian and the Bosnian Serbian
leadership, that they had no control, seem to have been intended primarily to
provide convenient plausible denial to the outside world without hampering their
policy.164
Thus, the Greater Serbia campaign was established with specific goals and intentions in mind
that were dictated from the most senior leadership and followed all the way through to the
various underlings participating in the campaign. For Milošević and Karadžić, it was important
to establish a perceived distance from one another and the leadership engaging directly in
violence. But, it is evident that an ethnic cleansing campaign – and in some cases genocide – was
not an impulsive act of aggression aimed at ancient hatreds. On the contrary, it was a systematic
and thorough campaign that Milošević and Karadžić could use to achieve their goals of political
and territorial dominance. These goals were intended to create nationalistic fervor among the
Bosnian Serb and Serbian population, which in turn intensified ethnic differences to the point
that ethnic cleansing and genocide could be effectively achieved.
At the time, it was reported by various international journalists that most Bosnian Serbs
either joined or reacted passively to the goals of the Greater Serbia campaign. These findings
illustrated that Serbs – whether part of the JNA or paramilitary groups – were often responsible
for the violence across municipalities in Bosnia. But on top of this, it was nearly impossible to
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achieve these goals without the coordination of local Bosnian Serbs who provided information
on their Bosnian Muslim neighbors.165 Additionally, during the trial of Momčilo Krajišnik,
further evidence obtained by the Chamber stated that the JNA had a plan of action prepared by
the political leadership. Karadžić and Krajišnik did not need to know the daily briefings of the
Bosnian Serb Army, and instead, trusted their newly appointed commander Ratko Mladić to
articulate the political goals expressed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly on May 1992:
The first goal is separation from the other two national communities – separation
of states. Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used every
opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would continue with
such practices if we were to stay together in the same state. The second strategic
goal, it seems to me, is a corridor between Semberija and Krajina…there will be
no Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian Krajina or alliance of Serbian states if we
don’t secure the corridor…The third strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the
Drina Valley, that is, elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds.166
Karadžić’s statement came only a month after the war officially broke out on April 6, 1992, and
they were indicative of the emotional appeals Karadžić would often use when speaking to his
fellow assemblymen and the Bosnian Serb public. Moreover, Karadžić’s words that day
highlighted the ongoing aggression to establish a unified Serbian state with a corridor extending
from the Drina River valley and cutting all the way through northwestern Bosnia and into the
Krajina region in Croatia. It should be of no surprise that these regions – especially Prijedor and
Zvornik – experienced some of the greatest atrocities committed during this three-year period.
Prijedor represented the strategic territory in northwest Bosnia, linking both the Drina River
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valley with the territory in Croatia. Prijedor was also the home to many Bosnian Serbs, who
accounted for nearly half of all citizens prior to the outbreak of conflict in 1991. On the other
hand, Zvornik was a border town on the Drina River, and the Drina River was the border
separating eastern Bosnia from Serbia.167 In all, Karadžić was referring to the Serbian arc, or the
complete separation from the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and the subsequent political
and territorial control in order to establish a Greater Serbia state throughout Yugoslavia.
As for Milošević, lead ICTY prosecutor Geoffrey Nice presented evidence linking him to
the control of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP), and also the State Security Service
(DB). By establishing a close relationship with Jovica Stanišić – the chief of the Serbian Secret
Service – Milošević was able to also establish control over special paramilitary units who were
trained in Serbia but operated in Bosnia. These included Arkan’s Tigers, the White Eagles, the
Red Berets, and Medić’s Scorpions. Further, Milošević was well aware of the events unfolding
in Bosnia at the time through national sources, such as the Serbian MUP and the State Security
Service, but also his close cooperation with Karadžić. According to the Chamber, it was reported
that Stanišić told Milošević, “Mr. President, everything we have done so far, we did with your
knowledge and your consent.”168 This comment came on May 13, 1997, two years after the war,
and on the anniversary of the founding of one of the paramilitary units. In his last cable to the
Secretary of State, titled, “Who Killed Yugoslavia?” Ambassador Zimmerman offered a
poignant critique of Milošević when he said:
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Innocent bystanders…never had a chance against Milosevic’s combination of
aggressiveness and intransigence. Historians can argue about the role of the
individual in history. I have no doubt that if Milosevic’s parents had committed
suicide before his birth rather than after, I would not be writing a cable about the
death of Yugoslavia. Milosevic, more than anyone else, is its gravedigger.169
The cable came on May 16, 1992 and was Zimmerman’s last official act as Ambassador to
Yugoslavia. His departure was marked by resistance to the Bush administration to intervene.
While the cable was written during the early stages of the conflict, his words rang true in what
would soon be the death of Yugoslavia at the expense of Greater Serbia.
In sum, the ICTY Chamber concluded that the JCE was effectively in existence from
August 1, 1991 to December 31, 1995, with the sole purpose of “the forcible and permanent
removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from
large areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the commission of crimes which
are in violation of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal.”170 These included “grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949,” “violations of the laws or customs of war,”
genocide,” and “crimes against humanity.” The individuals responsible for this concerted effort
included the top political leadership of Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo
Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, and Borisav Jović; the top military leadership of Ratko Mladić, Veljko
Kadijević, and Blagoje Adžić; the top leadership in the Serbian MUP and State Security of
Jovica Stanišić, Franko Simatović, Radovan Stojičić, and Milan Martić; and the paramilitary
leadership of Željko Ražnatović (Arkan) and Vojislav Šešelj.
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CHAPTER 4

ZVORNIK
Background
Zvornik is a city on the Drina River in northeastern Bosnia and Herzegovina along the
Bosnian-Serbian border. As a border town, Zvornik was strategically important because it linked
Bosnia and Serbia via car bridge and railroad bridge. Specifically, Zvornik was a key link
between the Belgrade-Sarajevo line and the Belgrade-Tuzla line. By assuming control of
Zvornik, the movement of forces and/or materials between Serbia and Bosnia could be achieved
without any difficulties.171 Along with Zvornik’s strategic geopolitical location, it was also
ethnically intermixed with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. According to the 1991 census,
Zvornik had a population of 81,11, of whom 59 percent were Bosnian Muslims and 38 percent
were Bosnian Serbs.
The case of Zvornik fits into the universe of quadrant C in the “Political Violence
Framework” typology as illustrated by Table 3. The level of violence signifies a higher level of
intensity, indicating that Zvornik was a case of large-scale violence or war rather than low-level
conflict. Additionally, Zvornik was a case of a high-level group targeting, signifying that groups
– especially civilians – were targeted for ethnic, national, racial, or religious reasons and that a
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substantial portion of Bosnian Muslims had been killed as a result. The territorial control and
elite collaboration variables were present in the case of Zvornik, allowing for the Bosnian Serbs
to rapidly achieve two primary goals: separation from the Bosnian Muslims and the creation of a
purified Bosnian Serb state. In order to achieve both of these goals, the elimination of the
Bosnian Muslims was necessary through mass deportation, forced expulsion, or even mass
killing.
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Table 3: Dependent and Independent Variables – Zvornik
Genocide (DV)

Territorial Control
(IV)

Exclusivist Ideology
(Scope Condition)

Definition

Large-scale,
organized, group
destructive violence
that targets a specific
social group in a given
territory (Straus, 2012,
345).

The adequate political
space and territorial
bases to mobilize and
escalate violence.

Measurement

Was there evidence of
sustained policies by
states or their agents,
that resulted in the
deaths of a substantial
portion of a communal
or political group?
(“State Failure Task
Force: Phase III
Findings, 2000, p. v)

Do elites have
adequate political
space within a state to
mobilize and escalate
violence?

A totalizing system of
meaning based on
pronounced in-group
and out-group
distinctions permitting
no shared forms of
identification between
groups and premised
on a radical
devaluation of the outgroup (Verdeja, 2012,
315).
Do elites exhibit
rhetoric that excludes
certain groups from
the goals/visions of the
state?
D. “Other”
E. Dehumanizat
ion
F. “Enemy”

Are victimized groups
defined primarily by
their ethno-linguistic
or religious
characteristics?

Do elites have
complete control to
effectively achieve
their genocidal goals?
(Kalyvas, 2006, Ch. 7)

Level of Intensity:
High

Political Control:
Creation of Serbian
Municipality of
Zvornik; establishment
of Zvornik Crisis Staff

Zvornik

Level of Group
Targeting: High
One-sided violence
against Bosnian
Muslims; mass
expulsion of Bosnian
Muslims; mass killing
of Bosnian Muslims in
camps

Do elites have a
territorial base(s) to
effectively mobilize
for violence?

Territorial Control:
“Ethnicization” of
JNA; training of
Serbian TO; arming of
Bosnian Serb
residents; positioning
of JNA and
paramilitaries near
Zvornik

Do elites exhibit
rhetoric signaling for
ethnically, racially, or
religiously
homogeneous
societies?
C. “Purity
D. “Utopia”

Strategic goals of
Greater Serbia based
on notion of “ethnic
purification”
References to Bosnian
Muslims as
“fundamentalists”,
“fanatics,” and
“Turks”
Mythical references to
Zvornik and Drina
River as Serbian land

Elite Collaboration
(IV)

The persistent
interaction between
elites at different
levels to achieve
certain goals.

Do local elites and
national elites share
information?
Do local elites and
national elites share
goals?
Do local elites and
national elites share
resources?
Do local elites and
national elites
participate in the
persistent, coherent
pattern of action to
bring about the
destruction of another
group’s existence in
whole or in part?
Command by national
elites: Karadžić
ordering formation of
Crisis Staffs and
coordinating with proSerbian JNA
Involvement by local
elites: Political rule of
Zvornik by Crisis
Staff; participation by
local paramilitaries,
Bosnian Serb police,
and Bosnian Serb TO
units in violence
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The rest of the chapter will outline the course of events that occurred in Zvornik
beginning with the development and mobilization phase in the early 1990s, the militarization and
pre-planning phase from 1991 to 1992, and the subsequent attack and ethnic cleansing campaign
that unfolded over the spring and summer months of 1992.
Development and Mobilization, 1990 – 1992
Geographic Importance of Zvornik
Although Bosnian Muslims enjoyed a slightly greater demographic composition over
their Bosnian Serb counterparts, Zvornik was a mostly multiethnic municipality that had great
strategic importance for the Bosnian Serbs. Zvornik sits directly on the Drina River, and the
Drina River serves as a large portion of the border divide between Bosnia and Serbia. Moreover,
the town of Mali Zvornik, which served as a strategic stronghold for JNA and pro-Serbian
paramilitary forces, sits right across the river in Serbia. The Drina River has a mythical place in
the hearts and minds of the Serbian people, often being referred to as “the backbone of the
Serbian national body.”172 This symbolism is also captured in a poem by Milutin Savčić: “As
long as the Drina River flows…through landscapes of the heavenly region…as the backbone,
strong and firm, uniting all the Serbian people.”173 From a political standpoint, the Bosnian Serb
Parliament was concerned with establishing an ethnically homogeneous Serbian state, and in
order to ensure this, it needed to “establish a Drina valley corridor, thereby eliminating the Drina
River as a border between Serb states.”174 In other words, Zvornik was of the utmost importance
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to achieving the Greater Serbia campaign. Capturing Zvornik meant overcoming the border
between two internationally recognized states.
Militarization of Zvornik, 1991 – 1992
The political and military importance of Zvornik, as expressed by the leadership, had a
societal impact on the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serb residents. In the early months of 1992,
social life between the two ethnic groups rapidly worsened. Tensions were present in the
workplace, at school, and throughout the community.175 Two conclusive pieces of evidence point
to the notion that the Zvornik attack was coordinated and pre-planned: First, toward the end of
the year in 1991, military exercises were being conducted in Osmaci, a small village
approximately 20 kilometers from Zvornik. The exercises were organized by the JNA – only
inviting Serbs – under the pretext that the Territorial Defense Units (TO) needed to be trained.176
TO units were a separate part of the armed forces dating back to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. The forces were set up as a “Home Guard,” or the equivalent of reserve forces.
Shortly after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Territorial Defense in the fall of 1991, SDS leaders
in Zvornik began recruiting, arming, and training a new ethnically Serb TO unit.
Second, in the weeks leading up to the attack, members of both ethnic groups obtained
weapons for their personal use. However, Bosnian Serbs were being armed through the
assistance of the SDS and the JNA, while Bosnian Muslims largely acquired their weapons
through various private channels.177 On top of securing comparatively more weapons than the
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Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serbs citizens were engaged in organized evacuation exercises in
case of an actual attack on Zvornik. For instance, throughout the month of March, many
residents would leave Zvornik for the weekend and return the following Monday for work. It is
important to note that when the actual attack occurred, most of the Bosnian Serb women and
children had already fled Zvornik.178 Military analyst James Gow described the events leading up
to the Zvornik attack as the following: “In view of the speed with which they were implemented
and high level of coordination they revealed, these operations clearly had not been mounted
spontaneously.”179
Coordination and Pre-Planning, 1991 – 1992
These preparations were also the result of decisions made at the national level by the
Bosnian Serb leadership. The formation of an autonomous and self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb
government, following the fiery speech delivered by Karadžić on October 15, 1991, implied that
the Bosnian Serbs were dissatisfied with the Bosnian Muslim position to hold an independence
referendum. In retaliation, the leadership proclaimed they would be uniting all the Serbs under a
commonly recognized para-state since they wished to remain part of the Yugoslav government.
Next, the Bosnian Serb leadership secretly instructed local Serb officials to make preparations
for a Crisis Staff in each respective municipality. In Zvornik, Branko Grujić was appointed
President of the Crisis Staff, while other leading members included SDS officials and the
municipal command staff of the JNA.180 Lastly, with the proper institutional guards in place
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throughout the various municipalities of Bosnia, the period in the early months of 1992 was an
evacuation and militarization phase of the local Bosnian Serb population. For Zvornik, this
meant proper military exercises, the arming of residents, and contingency plans for evacuation
prior to a military attack.
The most conclusive piece of evidence suggesting that the attack on Zvornik was
coordinated and pre-planned was the removal of Bosnian Serb women and children. This shows
that their Bosnian Muslims neighbors were not informed of the coming danger, and those who
suspected it, obviously understood that they were not a priority due to their ethnic differences
Furthermore, documents highlighting the political and military planned separation of Zvornik
indicate that a decision was made on December 27, 1991.181 The decision stemmed from Article
4 of the “Instructions for the Organization and Functioning of Serb Bodies in Bosnia and
Herzegovina under Special Circumstances.” This eventually led to the self-proclaimed Bosnian
Serb municipality of Zvornik on March 15, 1992.182 Prior to the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb
municipality, a coalition government was formed between SDA and SDS officials following the
1990 elections. Official positions were apportioned between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Serbs. For instance, Abdulah Pašić – a Bosnian Muslim – was appointed president of the
municipality, whereas Jovan Ivanović – a Bosnian Serb – was appointed chairman of the
Executive Boar of the Municipal Assembly.183
Following the Establishment of a “Serb Municipality of Zvornik,” a physical military
presence came soon thereafter. The JNA’s Twelfth Corps were positioned on the right bank of
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the Drina River – in the neighboring town of Mali Zvornik – between February and March
1992.184 After the vote for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on March 1, 1992, 99.7
percent voted in favor of the referendum and the Bosnian Parliament accepted the official result
on March 6.185 By April 6, 1992, the European Community (EEC) recognized Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an independent state. It was evident from official documents that the Bosnian
Serb leadership was expecting the Bosnian Muslims to vote for independence since they had
made a decision in December 1991 to establish a Serb municipality of Zvornik. However, after
the official vote was held, JNA armor, artillery, and anti-aircraft units from a deserted garrison in
Jasterbarsko, Croatia were formally repositioned near Zvornik, as well as on the Serbian side of
the Drina River bank.186 Subsequently, paramilitary units were also deployed to the border town
of Mali Zvornik in the weeks leading up to the attack. The first of these irregular forces were
Arkan’s Tigers, followed by Šešelj’s White Eagles and the Bosnian Serb TO units. By late
March and early April 1992, the paramilitary forces, TO units, and the JNA were positioned for
what would be the first Serbian aggression against the newly independent state of Bosnia.187
The aforementioned information highlights the two-stage implementation prescribed by
Karadžić in 1991. Speaking to members of the SDS, Karadžić stated: “I am asking you to be
energetic and strict; to get ready and establish authority in your own territories; in municipalities,
regions, local communities, and to prepare yourselves for restructuring and regionalizing the
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municipalities.”

The first stage was achieved by the formation of Crisis Staffs and Bosnian

Serb Assemblies – Zvornik included. This established civilian rule – or the presence of political
control – whereby the Bosnian Serbs were able to create a separate, parallel Bosnian Serb parastate. The second stage called for territorial control. In Zvornik, this was largely achieved by the
positioning of JNA units and other irregular forces near the town of Zvornik and on the Serbian
side in Mali Zvornik.
By April 7, 1992, negotiations were scheduled between SDS leadership in Zvornik, the
SDA, and the JNA for the “peaceful surrender of the city.”189 However, when Arkan was
informed about the meetings, he quickly called off the negotiations and accused the Serb
representatives of selling Serbian land.190 This day marked the eve of the Greater Serbia
campaign, and what would ultimately be the genocide of Zvornik.
Violence in Zvornik, 1992
Take-Over of Zvornik, April 8 – April 9, 1992
A day later, new negotiations took place across the river bank in Mali Zvornik between
SDS and SDA officials from Zvornik and Arkan. The Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb
representatives reached an agreement aimed at dividing the city. The Muslim section of the city
would be in the center, while the Serbian side would be in the north and near the Karakaj
industrial zone. Even with an initial agreement, the SDA members feared a looming attack due to
the ongoing dissatisfaction of Arkan.191 Once again, Arkan prevented the negotiations from
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proceeding any further, and instead, gave the Bosnian Muslims an ultimatum: if they did not
surrender their weapons by the next morning, there would be a military attack leading to the
destruction of the town. Following this tense meeting, a telegram was sent to the Commander of
the JNA Tuzla Corps to deploy troops to protect the Bosnian Serbs of Zvornik. The concern was
that Arkan was provoking conflict and that the Bosnian Muslims would retaliate. Arkan and the
Tigers subsequently took military command. This period already saw a large evacuation of
Bosnian Serb citizens – especially women and children – to Serbia proper or villages with a
predominantly Serb population.192 As to why the Bosnian Muslims did not flee, several
indications can be drawn. It is likely that the Bosnian Muslims were not forewarned like their
Bosnian Serb counterparts of an impending attack. It is also possible that the Bosnian Muslims
did not understand the severity of the events that were about to unfold, and therefore decided to
stay. According to Bećirević, the prior statement is more likely since the Bosnian Serbs were
engaged in bureaucratic preparations that included warning Bosnian Serb residents that a planned
aggression was coming. “The fact that Serb women and children were able to leave towns prior
to military attacks in an organized way, without letting their Bosniak neighbors know of the
coming danger, shows that members of the Serb civilian population were well informed of their
leaders’ political and military plans.”193 With the remaining citizens being primarily Bosnian
Muslims, an attack was launched on Zvornik from Bosnian and Serbian territories the same day.
The units which took part in the attack included Arkan’s Tigers, members of the local
police force, the Bosnian Serb TO, the JNA, and other irregular forces including the White
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Eagles. The first step in setting the stage for a takeover was to employ the JNA in blocking off
the main roads, while Bosnian Serb TO units assisted by cutting off secondary roads. This
ensured that the Bosnian Muslims would not be able to flee, and that any attempt at outside
support would be relatively difficult. The second step ordered Bosnian Muslims to surrender
their weapons and offer loyalty pledges to the Serb establishment.194 When the Bosnian Muslims
did not meet the ultimatum, Arkan’s Tigers proceeded from the north via the Bukovic and
Meterize city districts toward the center of the city. In addition, the JNA – in cooperation with
the White Eagles – approached the city primarily from the west in a second wave.195 Although
the Bosnian Muslims were able to put up an initial resistance, their lack of weapons resulted in
the swiftly coordinated takeover of Zvornik the following day. By the morning of April 9, 1992,
a Serbian flag was flying over the main mosque and Serbian music was played through
loudspeakers on the minarets.196
Jose Maria Mendiluce, an official of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees,
recalled the events that unfolded that day in Zvornik:
I knew how the system of ethnic cleansing functioned, and in Zvornik I had the
opportunity to witness it. For days, the Belgrade media has been writing about
how there was a plot to kill all Serbs in Zvornik. The authorities in Zvornik
realized that the point in question was a typical maneuver by Šešelj’s Radical
volunteers. This maneuver always precedes the killing of Muslims, as had already
happened in Bijeljina and many places along the left bank of the Drina River.
There were many soldiers, tanks and much shooting in the city. I guess they were
so preoccupied with shooting and killing that they did not see me. There were
many corpses strewn about and I saw them kill some elderly people who were
unable to escape.197
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The maneuver Mendiluce was referring to was a pattern witnessed by UN officials and reporters.
Bosnian Serb forces would immediately attack certain villages after the local Bosnian Serb
media – or propaganda machine – would claim that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were
preparing to massacre the Bosnian Serbs.198 Mendiluce’s account was corroborated by Šešelj, the
President of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and leader of the White Eagles, who noted that the
takeover of Zvornik was planned in Belgrade:
The Bosnian Serbs forces took part in it. But the special units and the best combat
units came from this side (Serbia). These were police units – the so-called Red
Berets – special units of the Serbian Interior Ministry of Belgrade. The army
engaged itself to a small degree – it gave artillery support where it was needed.
The operation had been prepared for a long time. It wasn’t carried out it any kind
of nervous fashion. Everything was well-organized and implemented.199
Thus, the civilian and military authorities within Bosnia and Serbia were unified in a wellcoordinated and prepared effort in taking over Zvornik. But, it was the participation of the
paramilitary units – namely Arkan’s Tigers and the White Eagles – who caused the most terror
among the Bosnian Muslims. Although the JNA was crucial in initiating bombardment through
artillery fire and tank units, the intention was never to cause complete destruction of Zvornik.
Rather, the goal had always been to frighten and terrorize the inhabitants – suggesting that the
attackers wanted to control the town and not merely destroy it.200
At the time, Jon Western, an analyst for the U.S. State Department, reviewed thousands
of documents coming out of Bosnia and Herzegovina each day. Many of these documents –
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consisting of reports by local and foreign journalists, briefs by humanitarian workers, and
intelligence reports – affirmed the Serbian preparation of mass war crimes:
Bosnian Serb artillery would begin by unleashing a barrage on a given village;
Serb paramilitaries would launch infantry assaults; killing armed men, rounding
up unarmed men, and sending women and children into flight. When most Serb
forces moved to the next village, a cadre of paramilitaries and regulars stayed to
‘mop up.’ Within hours, they had looted valuables, shot livestock, and blown
roofs off houses. Non-Serb life in Serb territory was banned.201
The aggressive activities of the paramilitary units suggest that they may have had some degree of
freedom from the regular JNA forces. Although the overall goals of the ethnic cleansing
campaign were shared among the different organs of the Bosnian Serb leadership partaking in
the takeover, it was common for paramilitary units to operate without any reservations when it
came to their own self-interest. Apart from their military tasks – where they were supervised by
JNA officers – the paramilitary units would often engage in looting of private homes, factories,
and vehicles.202 For instance, during the two days of the takeover, it was reported that Arkan’s
Tigers were accompanied by local Serbs as they went from house to house, engaging in beatings,
rapes, and killings of the Bosnian Muslim population. The right to be the first to loot, which was
a matter of pride, served as a means of payment for their efforts.203
In many ways, these forces were often composed and led by career criminals who
operated with a different set of rules from those of the regular forces. After all, Arkan, was the
key figure behind the failed negotiations and the subsequent attack, indicating his hierarchy
above JNA commanders and local members of the SDS. It is likely that these forces disregarded
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authority and simply acted out when it suited their own self-interest. It is also likely that Arkan
was acting on behalf of the Greater Serbia campaign, while at the same time capitalizing on his
own efforts. Whatever the reason may be, the actions of the paramilitary – often seen as ruthless
and uncontrolled – served the interests of the civilian and military leadership too. By laying
blame on Arkan, Karadžić, Milošević, and commanders of the JNA were seeking to dodge any
responsibility of war crimes and human rights violations.204
Occupation of Zvornik and Surrounding Villages, April – June 1992
In the days following the successful Serb takeover, Arkan’s Tigers deployed to Bratunac
and Srebrenica (nearby municipalities in eastern Bosnia just south of Zvornik and near the
Serbian border), while Zvornik fell under the civilian control of the Crisis Staff and the local
SDS leadership. Immediately after the occupation, a night curfew was imposed on the
population. Men were allowed to move around during the day, but only if they obtained a permit
from the newly installed local Serbian police. The women were only permitted to leave their
home to go grocery shopping, but they had to cross over into Mali Zvornik since many of the
stores in Zvornik had already been looted. As a whole, Bosnian Muslims were prohibited from
working, except for persons deemed indispensable such as hospital workers.205 Additionally,
JNA officers and military equipment were present during the occupation period, along with the
Serbian TO units and members of various paramilitary groups. The JNA was composed of units
from different corps, but it was ultimately under the direct command of the 1st Belgrade Military
region which oversaw territories in northeastern Croatia, northern Serbia, and Bosnia.
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On April 9, the artillery attacks commenced on the medieval town of Kulagrad – the cite
of the famous Zvornik Castle. Kulagrad was of strategic importance because it offered one of
two escape routes for Bosnian Muslims fleeing from Zvornik.206 They could either travel east
toward the town of Mali Zvornik in Serbia, or southwest toward Tuzla, Bosnia. Many favored
the latter option, in which Kulagrad was en route to the destination. Before the attack on
Kulagrad, the Bosnian Serb media reported that “several thousand Muslim extremists” were
hiding in Kulagrad, but the reality was that only a few dozen Bosnian Muslims organized under
the command of a former JNA officer. The group of men were spontaneously organized and their
resistance only included very light military arms. Kulagrad was eventually conquered in a
concerted attack between JNA and paramilitary units on April 26, 1992.207
Shortly after, various other villages in the area were also conquered, including Kozluk,
Divič, Dulići, and Liplje.208 Kozluk, a predominantly Bosnian Muslim village approximately 20
kilometers from Zvornik, was surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces who had set up barricades in
surrounding villages and cut off exit routes. At this point, the Bosnian Muslims population
handed over their weapons and the remaining residents were subject to harassment, intimidation,
and even beatings and killings from mid-April to mid-June. In a written document, it was noted
that Bosnian Muslims had requested voluntary resettlement, but According to Fadil Banjanović,
a Bosnian Muslim resident forced to flee Kozluk, this was not true. Banjanović stated, “They
wrote this letter saying that we were doing everything voluntarily, but in fact, they expelled us.
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We left in trucks, in buses. The stoning, the beating, the killings were not an act of benevolence
but an act of expulsion. Why would 5,000 people leave their homes?”209 During his testimony at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Chamber had sided with
Banjanović’s statement. The Chamber argued that even though some Bosnian Muslims had
provided statement seeking to voluntarily leave, this was largely in response to the intimidating
and violent circumstances imposed on the residents.210
In the villages of Dulići and Divič, residents were given a similar ultimatum to surrender
their weapons and pledge loyalty to the local Serb authorities. However, before the Bosnian
Muslim residents could meet the ultimatum, Divič was attacked by forces consisting of Arkan’s
Tigers, the White Eagles, and reserve police officers. The attack resulted in the fleeing of 1,000
or so Bosnian Muslims to nearby villages. Later that month, on May 28, between 400 and 500
Muslims women, children, and elderly persons were bused out to Muslim territory. Major
Svetozar Andrić, commander of the Bosnian Serb Army 1st Birač Brigade, ordered the Zvornik
TO units to organize and coordinate the deportation of the Bosnian Muslims population with
municipalities through which they were allowed to pass through. The order only permitted
women, children, and the elderly to be moved out, while men fit for military service were to be
placed in concentration camps.211 By early June, Serbs moved into the villages which Bosnian
Muslims had been evicted from in the Zvornik municipality.
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The Greater Serbia Campaign, 1992
Ethnic Cleansing, May – June 1992
After the capture of the surrounding villages, the situation in Zvornik had stabilized to
some degree. Many members of various paramilitary groups and JNA (now the Bosnian Serb
Army) had left town and most of the local Serbs who fled Zvornik prior to the April 8 attack had
resettled back into their homes. At this point, the Crisis Staff, calling itself the “Serbian
Community of Zvornik,” issued an appeal for Muslim refugees to return to Zvornik as well:
The situation in town was now back to normal and everybody would be able to
come back unharmed. Any personal property would have to be registered with the
Zvornik police by May 15 as all unregistered property would otherwise fall to the
Serbian Community of Zvornik.212
The appeal for Bosnian Muslim residents to return to Zvornik was broadcast daily for
approximately two weeks by Radio Zvornik, Radio Loznica, and by the Belgrade TV station.
When respondents from Zvornik were asked about the their “reason for return,” nearly thirty
percent of the interviewees said they had returned mainly because of “property,” “valuables,”
“houses,” and “documents.”213 The return of Bosnian Muslim refugees was in response to the
loss of property, but it would soon be evident that there return was met with ulterior motive; the
Bosnian Serbs had officially initiated the ethnic cleansing phase.
The expulsion of the Bosnian Muslim inhabitants, much like the military attack a month
earlier, required careful preparation. What followed was the result of an underlying systematic
approach. During the military occupation phase, lasting until the fall of Kulagrad and the
surrounding villages on April 26, the goals of the Serb aggressors did not accelerate into a full-
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blown ethnic cleansing campaign. This was only achieved after a large number of Bosnian
Muslims returned to register their property. The registration, however, served an entirely
different purpose: to register all male Bosnian Muslims and deport them to concentration camps.
Additionally, the plea to return had wider-ranging consequences. Once residents from
Zvornik and the surrounding villages returned, they were all gathered into a common space,
allowing the Bosnian Serbs to begin the mass expulsion phase. With Zvornik’s strategic location
as a border town to Serbia, many of the expellees were brought as far as Subotica on the SerbianHungarian border, while others were issued Yugoslav passports and sent via train to Hungary
and Austria.214 According to the Drina Corps Command of the JNA, the arrival of the
paramilitary units, particularly Arkan’s Tigers, helped liberate Zvornik from the “Turks.” “Turks
made up 60% of the municipality’s population and it has now been cleansed and replaced with
an ethnically pure Serb population.”215 The Bosnian Muslims were often referred to as “Turks”
to denigrate their religion and to equate them with the rule of the Ottoman Empire. By the end of
June, very few Bosnian Muslims remained in the Zvornik region due to the overwhelming ethnic
cleansing campaign of the Serb aggressors.
Concentration Camps and Mass Killings, April – June 1992
The mass deportation phase was coupled with the establishment of “prison camps” or
“detention camps,” according to the Bosnian Serb leadership, but more commonly understood to
be concentration camps. Based on the UN Commissioned Report, under the direction of M.
Cherif Bassiouni, the Bosnian Serbs operated numerous camps where grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions and other violations of international law were committed. The Bosnian
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Serbs used these camps in Bosnia to accelerate political and territorial control of strategically
importantly locations and to eliminate non-Serb populations from these areas.216 It was at the
camps that the “large-scale, organized, group-destructive violence targeted at a specific social
group in a given territory,” or genocide, occurred to the highest degree.217 By setting up the
camps, the Bosnian Serbs were able to send non-Serb civilians – frequently community leaders,
businessmen, religious figures, and political leaders to concentration camps for crueler
punishments. After identifying the elites of each community, the Bosnian Serbs would then
divide the remaining citizens – men of military age from the women, children, and elderly. Men
from the ages of 18 to 60 were often considered “fit to fight” and were sent to concentration
camps, while women, children, and the elderly were either deported from the area or sent to
separate camps prior to being expelled.218 Moreover, it was established that the ethnic cleansing
campaign was most brutal and inhumane within the geographical “Serbian Arc” – a strategic
corridor extending from Eastern Bosnia, through Northwestern Bosnia, and into ethnically
Serbian territory in Croatia. This primarily included the municipalities of Bijeljina, Brčko, Foča,
Prijedor, Višegrad, and Zvornik. According to the report:
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The Serbs required absolute control in order to establish a separate nation with
contiguous borders and an uncompromised geographic link with Serbia and
Montenegro. That control required the subjugation, if not the disappearance of the
non-Serb populations of the area. In large part, that subjugation and elimination
was accomplished by wholesale detention of those populations in various places
of detention.219
In Zvornik, there were a total of 28 reported concentration camps (25 were corroborated by
multiple or neutral sources), of which 23 were operated by the Bosnian Serbs. During the
expulsion phase that occurred in mid-May when Bosnian Muslims were asked to return and
register their property, a combined JNA and paramilitary effort occupying Zvornik and Mali
Zvornik reportedly abused and killed somewhere around 1,000 Bosnian Muslims. The remaining
Bosnian Muslims – those who had not been expelled – were transferred to various concentration
camps in Zvornik and the surrounding regions.220 In total, nine camps were operating in Zvornik,
seven in the village of Karakaj, two in the village of Čelopek, two in Drinjača, two in Divič, and
one each in the villages of Piliće, Caparde, Bajkovica, Salihovici, Liplje, and Novo Selo.221
Although the Bosnian Muslims were being systematically massacred during the takeover of
Zvornik, and the subsequent period from early April to late May, it was at the camps were the
Bosnian Serb aggressors were able to commit their most grotesque crimes. Of these camps, the
grossest atrocities were committed at Gero’s Slaughterhouse, the Karakaj Technical School, the
Dom Kulture building, and at the Ekonomija farm.
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At the Karakaj Technical School, approximately 750 Bosnian Muslim men were held in a
very tightly enclosed room between May and June 1992. On the first night of detention,
approximately 20 detainees died from either heat strokes, lack of water, or suffocation. Between
the days of June 1 and June 5, many of the detainees were beaten and approximately 160 of them
were killed.222 In general, the detainees were often beaten and verbally harassed, and most had
their valuables stripped from them upon then arrival. It was reported by survivors that “rich or
prominent people” would often be selected and taken to separate rooms, in which the witnesses
would hear moaning, screaming and gun bursts.223 The victims at Karakaj Technical School were
all of Bosnian Muslim descent, and were specifically targeted for execution on this basis. In
keeping with the common theme of the expulsion phase, many of the community leaders who
were considered “important,” suffered some of the worst atrocities.
Following the execution of the 160 detainees at the Karakaj Technical School, on June 5,
1992, the remaining 550 detainees were placed on buses under the notion that they would be
exchanged for Bosnian Serb prisoners. The detainees were instead taken to one of the
concentration camps at Pilica and upon their arrival were stripped of all their money and gold by
local Serb police and JNA guards at the camp.224 On June 8, these same detainees were told they
were once again being taken for exchange but were instead driven to Gero’s slaughterhouse in
the Karakaj industrial area near the Drina River. At the slaughterhouse, the detainees were
separated into several rooms and told to face the wall. At this point, two JNA officers with
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machine guns began shooting detainees in one room before moving onto the next room. After
various witness accounts, the ICTY Chamber estimated that around 190 Bosnian Muslim men
were brought to Gero’s slaughterhouse between June 5 and June 8 for execution.225
At the Dom Kulture center, men, women, and children were detained from late May to
late June 1992. On May 30, 1992, around 300 detainees were collected from the villages of
Drinjača and Kostijerevo, while the remaining detainees were brought from another part of
Kostijerevo, as well as from Drinjača, Sopotnik and Devanje.226 Immediately, the women and
children were separated from the men and taken via bus to barns and sheds before being allowed
to go to Bosnian Muslim territory. As for the men, they were beaten and verbally abused by
Bosnian Serb guards wearing JNA reserve uniforms. The guards forced the detainees to sing old
Chetnik songs common to the guerilla group during World War II, while at the same time taking
individual groups of men onto stage and beating them.227 On the same night, detainees were
taken outside in groups of ten and executed. One of the detainees managed to escape the
shooting and witnessed dead bodies on the concrete as he fled. The detainee provided a list of 88
individuals who had been executed from the aforementioned villages, as well as five other
individuals who were killed throughout the day while trying to escape. The ICTY Chamber
found the White Eagles responsible for all the executions on the night of May 30.228
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A month later, Dušan Vučković, a paramilitary soldier with the Yellow Wasps was
responsible for killing 16 men and wounding another 20 at the Dom Kulture center. Vučković
was indicted in a local district in June 1994 with the alleged crimes. The significance of this case
was that it was the first time that Serbs had prosecuted another Serb for the war crimes
committed during the Bosnian war. According to the indictment, the episode at the Dom Kulture
center followed the common violent theme seen throughout various regions in Bosnia:
The events described in the indictment fit a pattern broadly established by the
United Nations for the first six months of the Bosnian war: The rounding up of
Muslim civilians; their incarceration, often by Serbian paramilitary groups, in
various makeshift prisons or concentration camps, and the execution or shooting
of groups of men, women and children.229
Following these events, the remaining survivors were transferred in mid-July by the Bosnian
Serb guards and the Zvornik Crisis Staffs to the Batković camp in the Bijeljina municipality.
The Ekonomija farm, which served as an agricultural cooperative, was in a secluded area
of the Karakaj industrial area and, as a consequence, was primarily used as a death camp.230 The
facility consisted of horse stables, storehouses, and a slaughter room. Additionally, a chamber
was used for the primary purpose of “butchering “detainees.231 The camp’s detainees were
constantly subjected to severe beatings and acts of sexual violence, and although the death count
was not as high as it was at Karakaj Technical School, Gero’s slaughterhouse, or the Dom
Kulture center, the detainees were nonetheless subject to extreme inhuman acts between April
and the May.232

229

Roger Cohen, “Serbs Put a Serb on Trial for War Crimes,” New York Times, 12 June 1994.

230

Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, (Judgement) IT-95/18-T, (14 March 2016), para. 1340.

231

Tretter et al, “Ethnic Cleansing Operations in the Northeast-Bosnian City of Zvornik.”

232

Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, (Judgement) IT-95/18-T, (14 March 2016), para. 1347.

103
In all, the camps shared a common purpose to detain mostly Bosnian Muslim men, but
also at times other non-Serb men for the ultimate purpose of killing them at a mass scale. The
victims were often captured as innocent bystanders, without having anything to do with the
ongoing conflict in Zvornik. As mentioned above, most of these captured individuals were
important community leaders, and their detention was seen as a vital blow to the rest of the
community. Apart from the elites of the community, the rest of the men were considered to be of
military age, and therefore, separated from women, children, and the elderly. The killings of
these individuals were part of the widespread and systematic attack against non-Serb civilians in
order to achieve the Greater Serbia campaign in the Zvornik municipality.233
The killings at the various concentration camps were systematically coordinated mass
killings against Bosnian Muslim civilians – mostly men. The victims were captured, detained,
and stripped of all valuables upon their arrival, signifying they were defenseless against the
armed Bosnian Serb guards in charge of the camps. The concentration camps, therefore, were
important to the Serb aggressors because it allowed them to detain a large number of men in one
place and kill them on the basis of their ethnic and/or religious descent. But the mass killings
were not only committed in the concentration camps. It became evident that once the Bosnian
Serbs were evacuated from Zvornik prior to the attack, the remaining citizens could also be
easily targeted as part of the Bosnian Muslim group.
On the morning of April 9, Serb soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms, masks, and black
gloves stormed a building on Filipa Kljajića street in Zvornik. They detained over 30 men,
women, and children and ordered them to surrender any weapons they may have. The soldiers
then separated the men from the women and children, forced the men to line up against the wall
233

Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, (Judgement) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006), para. 719.

104
outside, and began firing at them. According to two female witnesses, they had seen dead bodies
of men who had been taken out in front of the street. One witness even noted that when she
returned to the scene a week later, she had found her husband’s hat and her son’s shoes covered
in blood.234
In all, approximately 507 Bosnian Muslims civilians were massacred in the Zvornik
municipality from April to June 1992. The first of these massacres occurred during the takeover
of Zvornik on April 8, in which dozens of civilians were killed. Moreover, over the next two
days Arkan’s men were responsible for piling the dead bodies, including bodies of children,
women, and elderly person onto four or five trucks while other bodies remained in the streets and
outside houses.235 According to the witness testimony of Jovan Ivanović, these individuals were
not killed during combat, but rather to “sow fear, to create chaos.”236 These massacres were most
likely what Jose Maria Mendiluce was referring to when he was passing through Zvornik on
April 9. Mendiluce noted that a similar strategy – especially in Bijeljina – was being carried out
along the left bank of the Drina River.237
Of course, the massacres with the highest severity and group targeting occurred within
the concentration camps. Specifically, from late May to mid-June, approximately 438 Bosnian
Muslim men were massacred at the Dom Kulture center, the Karakaj Technical School, and
Gero’s slaughterhouse. These camps were not the only sites of killings, but they were
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overwhelmingly used for beating, harassing, torturing, and ultimately executing unarmed
civilians.
The remaining villages in the region were also conquered summarily. Most citizens –
who had not already escaped on their own – were forced to leave the municipality. This led to a
large exodus of Bosnian Muslim citizens, rather than any identifiable mass killings. Still, it was
at this point that the demographics of the region dramatically changed. Prior to the outbreak of
violence, Zvornik was a majority Bosnian Muslims municipality, but Bosnian Serbs still made
up nearly 40 percent of the population. It was now a predominately Bosnian Serb municipality,
and the goals of the Greater Serbia campaign were achieved in large part due to the forced
expulsions and massacres of the Bosnian Muslim population.
Analysis
Scope Conditions: Crisis and Exclusivist Ideology
The presence of internal strife was definitely evident in Zvornik for three primary
reasons: First, ethnic tensions increased at turn of the year in 1992. The tensions were
exacerbated when the JNA began training Bosnian Serbs in nearby villages and passing out
weapons; giving the Bosnian Serb civilians an upper-hand compared to their Bosnian Muslim
neighbors. Second, the declaration of the parallel Serb Municipality of Zvornik signaled to the
Bosnian Muslims that the Bosnian Serbs had no intentions of supporting their vote for
independence. Around the same time, Bosnian Serb forces and paramilitary units were being
mobilized in and around Zvornik. By this point, most Bosnian Serb citizens were told of an
impending attack and were taking proper precautions to exit Zvornik. Third, and most
importantly, once the nearby municipality of Bijeljina was overtaken on April 1 with little
Bosnian Muslim resistance, it was clear that Zvornik was the next logical target along the Drina

106
River valley. By the time negotiations were arranged in Zvornik, the war had officially broken
out in Sarajevo on April 6 – the day the European Community recognized Bosnia’s
independence. Three days later, with failed attempts to negotiate a peaceful division of the city,
Zvornik was overtaken by the Bosnian Serb forces with relatively little effort.
The nationalistic rhetoric by this point had already infiltrated the mainstream lexicon of
the Bosnian Serb and Serb leadership across the greater region. Milošević appealed to the
emotions of Serbs by invoking the mythology associated with Kosovo. These speeches propelled
Milošević’s political career and established him as a Serbian folk hero. Karadžić used a similar
tactic by painting Bosnian Muslims as “Islamic fundamentalists” and pushing an openly proSerbian state free from “arbitrary borders” of Bosnia that “do not reflect history.”238 Ambassador
Zimmermann, who had numerous meetings with both the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović
and Karadžić, described Izetbegović as a conciliatory figure, whereas Karadžić commonly used
confrontational language in their meetings.239 Additionally, key leaders in both the Bosnian Serb
and Serb government, namely Biljana Plavšić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Vojislav Šešelj,
outwardly expressed their desires for an ethnically pure Serb state and admitted that they could
not envision living with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Cigar summarizes this exclusivist
rhetoric by stating:
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It is improbable that the Serbian political elite really believed, or cared, whether
the Muslims were fundamentalists. Few of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslims, in any
case, seem to have been motivated by political Islam or by movements from other
countries. Neither have Muslim cleric played a significant role in politics. On the
contrary, it is probable that whatever the level of the Muslims’ religiosity or
consciousness, Muslims would still have been targeted simply because they stood
in the way of Serbian national interests. The propaganda campaign against
fundamentalism did provide a convenient basis to the Serbian political elite for a
threat portrayal and emotive symbology. Both of these tactics could be used as
mobilizing tools and as a hoped-for cover to convince domestic and international
audiences of the righteousness of Serbian policy.240
Whether each of these prominent political leaders actually believed the words they constantly
spewed publicly is debatable. After all, the rhetoric was used for the purpose of achieving a
Greater Serbia state, and could have likely be overly chauvinistic to get the attention of the
masses. But, by dehumanizing certain segments of society – especially along ethnic and religious
lines – the Bosnian Serb and Serb elites sought to achieve two main purposes. One, they needed
to mobilize ordinary citizens to back their message, even if they did not directly get involved in
the atrocities committed. Two, they needed to establish that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats were dangerous, alien, and implacable enemies to the Serbian people. Once these
objectives were accomplished, the case for a legal, moral, or even mandatory reason to commit
inhumane acts against the “other” group became increasingly legitimate in the eyes of the
perpetrators.
This common theme especially resonated in Zvornik due to the strategic and symbolic
location of the municipality. Karadžić went as far as to say that eliminating the Drina River as
the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia was necessary because it “cut off the
Green Transversal” – or in other words, the so-called Islamic caliphate that Karadžić and his
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colleagues said was being established from the “Great Wall to the Adriatic Sea.”

This was

echoed by Arkan during the negotiating phase of Zvornik where he ultimately called off the
meeting and accused the Serb representatives of selling “Serbian Land.” A clear indication that
Zvornik rightfully belonged to the Serbs, even though it was located in Bosnia and had a Bosnian
Muslim majority. Later on, after the completion of the mass expulsion and mass killing stage, a
top JNA commander proclaimed the land to be cleaned of “Turks” with an ethnically pure Serb
population.
Therefore, it is evident that the Bosnian Muslims living in Zvornik were in the way of an
extremist Serb strategy. A Greater Serbia was not possible without the elimination of Drina
River border and the establishment of the corridor linking important Serb communities
throughout Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Exclusivist ideology served the purposes of Bosnian
Serb and Serb elites who shared the common goal of “ethnic purification.” In their eyes, all
Bosnian Muslims were equally to blame for being “fanatics” or “secessionist” or even a “threat”
to Bosnian Serbs living in Bosnia, but certain territories took precedence over others. Zvornik
was one of these territories, which explains why it was among the first municipalities attacked
after the war broke out in early April.
Territorial Control
The territorial control variable was present via the territorial bases and political space in
Zvornik. The first step came directly from the orders of Milošević when he organized the federal
army along ethnic lines. Milošević openly declared the necessity of territorial expansion in his
fiery speech to the Serbian Parliament in April 1991. “The question of borders is a vital issue for
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a state. As you know, it is always the powerful who dictate what the borders will be, never the
weak. Thus, we must be powerful.”242 Following his speech, Milošević ordered that all Bosnian
Serb soldiers be redeployed to Bosnia by the end of the year. Additionally, the military was
almost exclusively composed of soldiers of Serbian descent. By 1992, the federal army was only
“federal” in name and the pro-Serb military was stationing troops within Zvornik and across the
border in Mali Zvornik for a looming attack.
Furthermore, various paramilitary units, Serbian TO units, and everyday Serbs
overpowered their Bosnian Muslim counterparts. The paramilitary units – namely Arkan’s Tigers
and the White Eagles – established their position in Mali Zvornik and awaited instructions to
attack Zvornik. Around this same time, the JNA was equipping and training a new Serbian TO
unit by recruiting Bosnian Serb residents from nearby villages. Under the former Yugoslavia,
each republic had a “home guard” known as a TO, but by early 1992, this home guard was
exclusively Bosnian Serb in Zvornik. Lastly, in order to prepare Bosnian Serb residents living
within and around Zvornik, the SDS and JNA began arming them. Bosnian Muslims were also
able to acquire weapons, but at a significantly lower rate and only through private channels. The
weaponization of the residents was coupled with evacuation exercises aimed at getting Bosnian
Serb women and children out of Zvornik in preparation for the attack. In all, by April 8, 1992,
the JNA, paramilitary groups, the TO, and ordinary Bosnian Serbs were disproportionately
armed compared to their Bosnian Muslim counterparts. The JNA was primarily composed of
Serb soldiers, the paramilitary groups were from Serbia, the TO units were exclusively
designated for Bosnian Serbs in the municipality, and the various military factions were stationed
in and around Zvornik.
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Political space was established in two phases prior to the attack. First, the secret
formation of Crisis Staffs across various municipalities were political preparations for the very
real possibility of war. Karadžić wanted Bosnian Serbs all across Bosnia to be prepared to
establish control once the municipality was in the hands of the Bosnian Serb leadership. Each
Crisis Staff operated locally, but with the unifying objective to combine the various localities
under a single Serbian state. Second, by the end of 1991, a separate Serbian Municipality of
Zvornik was declared signaling a clear intention that the Bosnian Serb leadership was unwilling
to live in an independent Bosnian state. The Bosnian Serbs had already established a selfproclaimed Bosnian Serb para-state, and now they needed the strategically important territory to
achieve this purpose.
When assessing territorial control in the case of Zvornik, it is evident that the Bosnian
Serb and Serb leadership established adequate territorial bases and political space that resulted in
the rapid takeover of Zvornik, the occupation of surrounding villages, and the mass exodus and
mass killing of Bosnian Muslim civilians. Moreover, the overwhelming territorial and political
power was too much for a Bosnian Muslim defense, allowing the Greater Serbia campaign to
escalate aggressively and swiftly.
Elite Collaboration
By establishing political and territorial control with relative ease, and expressing their
xenophobic goals, it is clear that territorial control and exclusivist ideology were present in the
Greater Serbia campaign in Zvornik. Prior to the initial attack, the JNA, paramilitary groups, and
the Serbian TO of Zvornik were stationed in and around the municipality. They were heavily
armed and equipped by the JNA, which was progressively becoming an ethnically Serb army.
Once the attack commenced, the Bosnian Muslim resistance did little to thwart the Serbian
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offensive. Within a day, Zvornik had fallen to the military control of the various paramilitary
groups and the JNA, and the political leadership of the local Crisis Staffs and members of the
SDS assembly. Of course, all this was occurring while prominent Bosnian Serb and Serb
nationalists were openly demeaning their fellow Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat neighbors
and seeking to establish a “Serbian Arc” linking the various communities throughout the region.
The abovementioned points are linked by one overarching variable: elite collaboration.
In the case of Zvornik, civilian and military leaders were systematically coordinating their efforts
a year in advance for the takeover. From above, Karadžić ordered the various local SDS leaders
in Bosnia to prepare Crisis Staffs for the impending conflict. Simultaneously, Milošević was
pushing the Greater Serbia policy highlighting the importance of territorial expansion and
reorganizing the JNA to favor the Serbian cause. By 1992, the JNA was an ethnically dominant
Serbian army stationed outside of Zvornik. Their presence resulted in military equipment and
weapons for local Bosnian Serbs and the training of an all-Serbian “home guard.” Their efforts
were complemented by the presence of Serbian paramilitary stationed outside in Mali Zvornik
and other nearby villages. Therefore, the preplanning phase was a highly coordinated and
executed effort from national and local elites from the civilian and military sector.
The result was an overwhelming takeover of Zvornik, in which Arkan’s Tigers led the
way followed by the JNA and the TO. The takeover was completed by the next day due to
successful shelling on behalf of the JNA and the atrocities committed by the paramilitary units
on foot. Bosnian Muslim civilians were beaten, harassed, and killed, while properties were
looted and religious sites were destructed. Many of the most inhumane acts were committed by
Arkan’s Tigers or the White Eagles, which in turn allowed national elites and the official military
command to excuse themselves of any wrongful doing.

112
Once Zvornik was conquered, the takeover of the surrounding villages followed shortly
after. In a less than a month, the entire municipality of Zvornik was under the civilian and
military control of the Bosnian Serbs. What followed next was the crucial ethnic cleansing phase.
This effort would not be possible without the Zvornik Crisis Staff. The Crisis Staff was
responsible for registering and gathering Bosnian Muslims under the false pretense of recovering
lost property and goods. Once the Bosnian Muslims returned, it was revealed that the purpose
was to implement a decisive ethnic cleansing campaign. This highly organized process saw the
mass exodus of many women and children, while prominent community leaders and most men of
military age were taken to concentration camps. At the concentration camps, JNA soldiers, local
police, TO officers, and paramilitary members regularly engaged in the maltreatment of the
detainees, ranging from verbal and psychological abuse, inhumane living conditions, physical
beatings, and at times an outright slaughtering.
In sum, the elite collaboration variable supports two main findings. First, the
collaboration was organized at different levels of the state well in advance. Much of this period
is connected to the territorial control variable where elites were exerting their political and
military power over strategic territories in Bosnia. Second, by having the civilian and military
leadership all on the same page, the resulting implementation phase was extremely rapid and
successful. The municipality was overtaken, local Bosnian Serb leadership was established, and
the Bosnian Muslims were expelled through cleansing and mass killing from April to June 1992.
Genocide
In the case of Zvornik, the territorial control and elite collaboration variables were
present and effective in explaining the violence that escalated in the spring of 1992. I would
contend that, above all else, the participation of the paramilitary groups was crucial for the
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Greater Serbia campaign. They ruthlessly committed some of the worst atrocities in Zvornik –
acting often without any reservation when it came to their self-interest. At the same time, their
military purpose was closely coordinated with the JNA and they assisted the local Crisis Staffs in
implementing political rule over Zvornik once the municipality was conquered. Therefore, as
proposed by the theory, the variables increased the likelihood that genocidal violence occur, but
it was the elite collaboration variable that had the strongest impact.
As for the characterization of Zvornik as a genocide, two main findings are present: First,
the level of intensity as proposed by the Political Violence Framework places Zvornik beyond
the middle point in either quadrant C or quadrant D. The participation of various military
factions, along with their overwhelming force illustrates a one-sided conflict without any
effective Bosnian Muslims resistance. Second, the level of group targeting clearly indicates that
the Bosnian Muslims were the primary victim due to their ethnic/religious makeup. Most of the
civilians were ethnically cleansed by the end of June 1992, but a large number of individuals –
mostly Bosnian Muslim men – were killed in the concentration camps. Consequently, the onesided nature of the violence and the atrocities committed clearly indicates there were sustained
policies in place that resulted in the deaths of a substantial portion of Bosnian Muslims from
Zvornik. For these reasons, I identify the case of Zvornik in Quadrant C based on the Political
Violence Framework.

CHAPTER 5

PRIJEDOR
Background
Prijedor is a municipality located in northwestern Bosnia in an area referred to as
Bosanska Krajina. It sits between the town of Sanski Most to the south, the Bosnian-Croatian
border towns of Bosanski Novi to the west and Bosanska Dubica to the north, and the regional
capital of Banja Luka to the east. Prior to the referendum – declaring Bosnian independence from
Yugoslavia – the population census of 1991 accounted for a total population of 112, 740. The
population was ethnically intermixed whereby Bosnian Muslims made up 44 percent of the
population, while 42.5 percent was Bosnian Serb.243
The case of Prijedor fits into the universe of quadrant C in the “Political Violence
Framework” typology as outlined by Table 4. The level of violence signifies a higher level of
intensity, indicating that Prijedor was a case of large-scale violence or war rather than low-level
conflict. Additionally, Prijedor was a case of a high-level group targeting, signifying that groups
– especially civilians – were targeted for ethnic, national, racial, or religious reasons and that a
substantial portion of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats had been killed as a result. The
territorial control and elite collaboration variables were present in the case of Prijedor, whereby
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the Bosnian Serbs achieved their strategic goals of separating from the Bosnian Muslims and
then creating their own Bosnian Serb state. In order to achieve both of these goals, the
elimination of the Bosnian Muslims was necessary through mass deportation, forced expulsion,
and even mass killing.
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Table 4: Dependent and Independent Variables – Prijedor
Genocide (DV)

Territorial Control
(IV)

Exclusivist Ideology
(Scope Condition)

Definition

Large-scale,
organized, group
destructive violence
that targets a specific
social group in a given
territory (Straus, 2012,
345).

The adequate political
space and territorial
bases to mobilize and
escalate violence.

Measurement

Was there evidence of
sustained policies by
states or their agents,
that resulted in the
deaths of a substantial
portion of a communal
or political group?
(“State Failure Task
Force: Phase III
Findings, 2000, p. v)

Do elites have
adequate political
space within a state to
mobilize and escalate
violence?

A totalizing system of
meaning based on
pronounced in-group
and out-group
distinctions permitting
no shared forms of
identification between
groups and premised
on a radical
devaluation of the outgroup (Verdeja, 2012,
315).
Do elites exhibit
rhetoric that excludes
certain groups from
the goals/visions of the
state?
G. “Other”
H. Dehumanizat
ion
I. “Enemy”

Are victimized groups
defined primarily by
their ethno-linguistic
or religious
characteristics?

Do elites have
complete control to
effectively achieve
their genocidal goals?
(Kalyvas, 2006, Ch. 7)

Level of Intensity:
High

Political Control:
Creation of Bosnian
Serb Assembly of
Prijedor and Bosnian
Serb Republic;
formation of Prijedor
Crisis Staff

Prijedor

Level of Group
Targeting: High
One-sided violence;
mass expulsion of
Bosnian Muslims;
mass killing of
Bosnian Muslims in
concentration camps

Do elites have a
territorial base(s) to
effectively mobilize
for violence?

Territorial Control:
“Ethnicization” of
JNA; arming Bosnian
Serb residents;
headquarters in Banja
Luka

Do elites exhibit
rhetoric signaling for
ethnically, racially, or
religiously
homogeneous
societies?
E. “Purity
F. “Utopia”

Strategic goals of
Greater Serbia based
on notion of “ethnic
purification”
References to Bosnian
Muslims as
“extremists” and
“Mujahedeen”;
references to Bosnian
Croats as Ustasha
Propaganda through
television and radio
stations;
“White flag” decree to
mark non-Serbs

Elite Collaboration
(IV)

The persistent
interaction between
elites at different
levels to achieve
certain goals.

Do local elites and
national elites share
information?
Do local elites and
national elites share
goals?
Do local elites and
national elites share
resources?
Do local elites and
national elites
participate in the
persistent, coherent
pattern of action to
bring about the
destruction of another
group’s existence in
whole or in part?
Command by national
elites: Karadžić
ordering formation of
Crisis Staffs and
coordinating with proSerbian JNA
Involvement by local
elites: Political rule of
Prijedor by Crisis Staff
and establishment of
concentration camps;
Bosnian Serb police
and paramilitary
participation
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The rest of the chapter will outline the critical events that surfaced in Prijedor beginning
with the development and mobilization phase in the early 1990s, the militarization and
propaganda phase from 1991 to 1992, and the ensuing attack and ethnic cleansing campaign that
unfolded from April to September 1992.
Development and Mobilization, 1990 – 1992
Political Divisions, 1991 – 1992
Prijedor was geographically important to the Bosnian Serbs because they wanted to
create a corridor between Serbia proper and the region of the Croatian Krajina. This Greater
Serbia arc, would need to cut through northwest Bosnia – the Bosanska Krajina region – in
which the multiethnic municipality of Prijedor was located in.244 If Zvornik was important for its
geopolitical positioning on the mythical Drina River that served as the border between Bosnia
and Serbia, then Prijedor was important because it was situated in the middle of the Serb
communities of Eastern Bosnia and Serbia and those located in northeastern Croatia. In order to
link all these communities under a common para-state, it was crucial to capture Prijedor and
establish an uninterrupted passageway.
Tensions between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs escalated in 1990 with the
rise of nationalist parties. Initially, there was a cordial relationship between the Bosnian Muslim
party, known as the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the main Bosnian Serb party, named
the Party of Democratic Action (SDS). The turning point was the inclusion of Vojislav Šešelj in
several SDS meetings, and his expressed displeasure in the thought of Bosnian Serbs living
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By 1991, various other SDS representatives proposed that Prijedor

be divided into two separate municipalities along ethnic lines. This proposal took effect on
January 7, 1992, when the SDS members left the Prijedor Municipal Assembly to form their own
assembly – the self-proclaimed Assembly of the Serbian People of the Municipality of Prijedor.
Milomir Stakić was appointed as its President, and Milan Kovačević was appointed as President
of the Executive Board.246 The Bosnian Serb plan to “opt out” of Bosnia came only two days
before the official declaration of the “Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,” whereby it deemed itself as a “legitimate, freely and democratically elected
representative and protector of the Serbian people.”247 On January 17, the newly established
Prijedor Serb Assembly unanimously voted to join the greater Serbian Autonomous Oblast of
Bosanska Krajina (ARK). The ARK was composed of local Bosnian Serb districts in northwest
Bosnia. These districts were self-proclaimed because they opposed the independence movement
of Bosnia, and therefore, created parallel political institutions to represent the Bosnian Serbs of
the region. Shortly after, the Prijedor Crisis Staff (later renamed the War Presidency) was put in
place to act as a 24-hour information and communication center; the beginning of the Prijedor
takeover was underway.248
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Crisis Staffs
The Crisis Staff of Prijedor was crucial in the following ways: it assisted in establishing
control over Prijedor, arming local Bosnian Serbs within the area, blocking communications of
non-Serbs, destroying multiethnic relations throughout the community by spreading propaganda,
and providing logistical support to the army through the takeover of industry and production
units.249 Various individuals – including Milomir Stakić, Milan Kovačević, and Simo Drljača –
were also part of the greater “joint criminal enterprise” that included prominent figures such as
Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Biljana Plavšić. Evidence that emerged after the war
highlighted a specific, deliberate strategy on part of the Crisis Staff to capture Prijedor. In a 1995
interview on Radio Prijedor, marking the third anniversary of the takeover of Prijedor, Simo
Drljača, chief of police during the war, and his colleagues Milan Kovačević and Slobodan
Kuruzović recalled the events of that day. During the interview, they had confirmed that the
April 30, 1992 seizure of Prijedor was the result of months of preparations and that the
operations were guided from the central hub in Banja Luka by Karadžić and Plavšić.250
Specifically, they noted that the police – with the assistance of armed Serbs – were responsible
for the takeover of the municipality. The police were dispatched between 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.
with a list of prominent Bosnian Muslims who were forbidden from entering various buildings.
The list included the President of the Municipality, Muhamed Čehajić, the Chairman of the SDA,
Mirsad Mujadžić, and other top officials of the SDA.251
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In the weeks following the takeover, the Crisis Staff was responsible for imposing
ethnically motivated restrictions on the non-Serb community, including freedom of movement
and the right to employment within Prijedor. The purpose of the exclusivist measures was to
restrict the non-Serb population to their villages in order to carry out subsequent attacks on those
areas by the combined forces of the JNA, the TO units of Prijedor, the police, and paramilitary
units supported by the local SDS leadership. Furthermore, all non-Serbs who held positions in
the municipal government were either asked to express full support for the new Serbian leaders
publicly or were removed from their positions.252 In all, the Crisis Staff of Prijedor was
instrumental in the collaborative planning and execution of a range of operations – from
restrictive measures on the non-Serb populations to the formation and authorization of
concentration camps at Keraterm, Omarska, and Trnopolje. It served as a liaison between
Bosnian Serb officials at the national level – top SDS leaders and the JNA, and the local police
and paramilitary units stationed in Prijedor. The orders from the Bosnian Serb Government were
for the formation of Crisis Staffs across Bosnia in preparation for the impending reality of war,
and these local civilian officials were to assist the military, paramilitary, and Bosnian Serb police
in the ethnic cleansing campaign that would follow after the takeover of each municipality.
Militarization and Propaganda of Prijedor, 1991 – 1992
Around the time the Crisis Staff of Prijedor was formed, four other crucial events
generated the growing tensions between the Bosnian Serb and non-Serb populations in Prijedor.
First, the Croatian War in 1991 was a precursor for the type of violence that would unfold in
Bosnia soon thereafter. The JNA was in need of conscripts, but many Bosnian Muslims and
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Bosnian Croats chose not to respond to the call-up. This created a situation where the majority of
the national Yugoslav military was composed of soldiers of Bosnian Serb descent engaging in
violence across the border.253 It should also be noted that this occurred a few months before the
JNA was reorganized along ethnic lines by Milošević. Therefore, by the end of the year, most of
the soldiers fighting in Croatia were Bosnian Serbs, with the exceptions of a small minority of
Montenegrins.
Second, by early 1992, a rise in propaganda was used to instill fear among on the nonSerb community. Radio and TV broadcasts blocked content coming in from Croatia and
Sarajevo, and only permitted broadcasts from Serbia or the Bosnian Serb hub of Banja Luka. On
Radio Prijedor, Bosnian Muslim doctors were accused of seeking to reduce the Bosnian Serb
birth rate by either sterilizing women or giving pregnant women “special injections” so they
would be limited to only giving birth to girls. Relatedly, Bosnian Serbs were encouraged to
accept a policy of discrimination against their non-Serb neighbors or fear the consequence of
being labeled “traitors.”254 The situation at this time was recapped by British journalist and
academic, Sir Noel Malcolm, who stated:
Having travelled widely inside Bosnia over fifteen years, and having stayed in
Muslim, Croat, and Serb villages, I cannot believe the claim that the country was
forever seething with ethnic hatred. But having watched Radio Television Belgrade
in the period 1991-1992, I can understand why simple Bosnian Serbs came to
believe that they were under threat, from Ustasha hordes, fundamentalist jihads or
whatever.255
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Malcolm went on to quote an independent journalist from Belgrade, Miloš Vasić, who equated
the events with the same extremity as the Ku Klux Klan taking over TV stations in the United
States. “You must imagine a United States with every little TV station everywhere taking exactly
the same editorial line – a line dictated by David Duke. You too would have war in five
years.”256
Third, starting in 1991 and until the initiation of the takeover in April 1992, weapons
were being distributed by the JNA to the Prijedor TO and Bosnian Serb citizens. The weapons
given to Bosnian Muslims were outdated and often contained the wrong ammunition, whereas
the Bosnian Serbs were being equipped by JNA military helicopters that would land several
times a day in Serb-concentrated villages of Prijedor to distribute weapons. Insofar as weapons
were concerned, “only four percent of the Muslims in Prijedor has been licensed to have
weapons. Many Muslims and Croats had their application for a license to carry to turned down
without any reason given.”257 The pretext for weapons distribution was that it was a necessary
defense against the “enemies of the people,” or the Muslim extremists and the Ustasha. It also
allowed Bosnian Serbs throughout the municipality to establish checkpoints in different
villages.258 The weapon distribution phase was also coupled by JNA-run training groups for
Bosnian Serbs similar to the ones that were present in Zvornik before the takeover.259
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Lastly, the Bosnian Serbs were able to establish considerable military control in a number
of municipalities in northwestern Bosnia. After the political division from the Bosnian Muslims
and the SDA, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Bosanska Krajina (ARK) established forces in
the following municipalities: Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiška, Srbac,
Prnajvor, Laktaši, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Banja Luka, Čelinac, Kotor Varoš, Skender Vakuf,
Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Mrkonjić Grad, Glamoć, Bosansko Grahovo, Titov Drvar, Bosanski
Petrovac, Ključ, and Šipovo.260 Additionally, cooperation among Bosnian Serb civilian
authorities, police, military and paramilitary forces was commonplace in the region. The
involvement of local government and police indicated that the presence of a civilian structure
was necessary to facilitate military and paramilitary activities.261 The headquarters for the
coordinated Serbian effort were in Banja Luka – only 55 kilometers east of Prijedor. It was
reported that the region had a well-organized chain of command, and because of the war in
Croatia and the close proximity to the border, many military men were already situated in Banja
Luka. The strong Bosnian Serb military presence in northwestern Bosnia proved to be crucial for
the ensuing takeover of Prijedor.262 The situation was ripe for a coup, and the early stages of the
Prijedor genocide were underway.
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Violence in Prijedor, 1992
Takeover of Prijedor, April 30 – May 30, 1992
On April 30, 1992, a takeover of Prijedor was implemented by the Prijedor Crisis Staff in
coordination with JNA forces and members of the Bosnian Serb police stations. Sometime
between the hours of 1 and 5 a.m., the Bosnian Serb forces organized patrols, machine gun and
sniper posts, and checkpoints throughout the municipality with little to no resistance from the
non-Serb community.263 By early morning, the Bosnian Serb soldiers had established control
over the Municipal Assembly building, the police station, the hospital, court building, bank, post
office, and the radio station. That same day, Bosnian flags were removed from municipal
buildings and replaced with Serb flags.264 Non-Serb policemen were disarmed and asked to
pledge loyalty in order to secure their employment or face the consequence of being terminated
from their post. At this time, Simo Drljača took over as the Chief of the Prijedor Public Security
Service SJB, while Dušan Janković assumed command of the Prijedor Police Station and Željko
Mejakić became a squad commander of the police.265
In the following weeks, the Crisis Staff – with assistance from JNA and paramilitary
soldiers – increased exclusivist measures against Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats by firing
them from the workplace, prohibiting children from attending school, and restricting the freedom
of movement throughout the municipality. These measures extended to the local media too,
specifically, Radio Prijedor and the local newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik. Both served as agents of
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propaganda for the new Bosnian Serb leadership, with Radio Prijedor broadcasting Chetnik
songs, attacks on SDA leaders, and statements likening Bosnian Muslims to Islamic
fundamentalists who were establishing control in the area to wage a genocide against Bosnian
Serb citizens. The general situation in everyday life worsened drastically after the restrictive
institutional measures and media propaganda to the point that some Bosnian Serbs would often
take to the streets and shout, “All Muslims and Croats ought to be slaughtered,” or “Your Alija
(president of the Bosnia and Herzegovina) will lead you to extinction.”266
The exclusivist measures took a crucial turning point on May 30 when Radio Prijedor
began demanding that all Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats living in ethnically intermixed
areas mark their homes with white flags and themselves with white armbands; a sign of
surrender.267 This was the beginning of the Greater Serbia campaign in Prijedor, and the
genocidal violence that would follow over the next few months. It was also the first times since
1939 – when the Nazis ordered Polish Jews to wear the Star of David on their sleeve – that
individuals of an ethnic or religious group were marked for mass deportation and mass killing.
The Bosnian Serb forces escalated their offensive that day by forcing the non-Serb population
onto buses. The buses escorted the individuals to the notorious camps of Keraterm, Omarska,
and Trnopolje, while the remaining individuals were subject to harassment and beatings. In
subsequent documents issued by the ICTY Trial Chamber, the following statement was issued on
the violence that persisted in Prijedor May 30:
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Approximately three weeks after Serbs forcibly took control of government
authority in Opstina [district] Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, intensive shelling by
Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim and Croats areas in Prijedor caused Muslim and
Croat residents to flee their homes. The majority of them were seized by the Serb
forces…[who] shot or beat them on the spot…the Serb forces began taking
prisoners to the Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje camps.268
Around the time of the shelling and mass deportation of non-Serbs from Prijedor, the Bosnian
Serb forces also issued ultimatums calling for all civilians to hand over their weapons in the
predominantly Muslim surrounding villages. Believing they would be safer, most individuals
complied by turning in their hunting rifles and pistols to Bosnian Serb authorities. Nonetheless,
days after the ultimatum, the surrounding villages were attacked as the Bosnian Serb offensive
expanded its aggression.
Attack on Surrounding Villages, May – June 1992
The first attack was initiated by the Bosnian Serb leadership on the predominantly
Bosnian Muslim village of Hambarine on May 22, 1992. Prior to the attack on the village, a
shooting incident occurred between Bosnian Muslim soldiers and JNA soldiers at a checkpoint.
According to Mirsad Mujadžić, he testified that he had heard gunshots near his parents’ house
around 7:00 p.m. When he approached the scene, Mujadžić, along with other eyewitnesses, noted
that soldiers displaying the White Eagles uniform approached Hambarine in a vehicle and began
firing at Bosnian Muslim TO personnel. In retaliation, a Bosnian Muslim TO soldier fired back
at the Bosnian Serb soldiers, killing two and injuring at least another two.269 However, according
to the testimony of another witness, it was actually the Bosnian Muslim personnel who had
opened fire first. The witness mentioned passing through the checkpoint earlier in the day and
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noticing that the Bosnian Muslim soldiers were armed. When the vehicle carrying Bosnian Serb
soldiers approached the checkpoint, commander Aziz Alisković asked the men to surrender their
weapons before passing through. When they refused, the Bosnian Muslims fired at the car from a
nearby trench with a M54 machine-gun.270 The Chamber had concluded that it was in fact the
Bosnian Muslims who had fired first, resulting in a Bosnian Serb ultimatum later that night.
The ultimatum was issued later that evening on Radio Prijedor. The ultimatum ordered
several individuals, including commander Aziz Alisković, to surrender themselves and all their
weapons or face attack.271 When the Bosnian Muslims failed to comply with the order, the
shelling of Hambarine began at around noon the next day. The shelling came from three different
directions and lasted until about 3:00 p.m. Two or three tanks fired at the village, while Bosnian
Serb soldiers on foot shelled houses and the old mosque.272 In all, approximately 400 women
children, and elderly residents fled Hambarine as a result of the attack, while other villagers fled
towards the Kurevo woods.273 According to the testimony of a female witness, the villagers that
fled toward the woods were pursued by tanks, while soldiers in multi-colored uniforms were
shooting at villagers with automatic rifles.274After a period of brief resistance by the Bosnian
Muslims, the remaining weapons were collected from villagers, the Bosnian Muslim TO, and
local police, and ultimately surrendered over to the Bosnian Serb forces.275
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The units that engaged in the May 23 attack on Hambarine included the 1 Krajina Corps,
st

the 6th Krajina Brigade, the 43rd Motorized Brigade, the Prijedor police, and members of various
Bosnian Serb paramilitaries. Relatedly, in subsequent documentation presented to The Chamber,
it was evident that the attack on Hambarine was ordered by Simo Drljača on behalf of the
Prijedor Crisis Staff:
Since the resident of the village of Hambarine did not abide by the Decision of the
Ministry of People’s Defense of the Serbian Republic and did not surrender their
weapons, refused to cooperate with the legal authorities regarding the attack
against soldiers, and rejected the demands set by the army, the Crisis Staff of
Prijedor Municipality decided to intervene militarily in the village in order to
disarm and apprehend those known to have perpetrated the crime against
soldiers.276
Additionally, this was corroborated by the 1st Krajina Corps regular combat report published on
May 24. In the report, Major General Momir Talić conveyed the following information to the
main Serbian Republic Army staff:
In the area of Prijedor, and particularly, in the area of Hambarine, there was an
armed attack by Muslim units, which our forces cleared from the area. Further
conflicts can be expected in that area and in the area of Kozarac village…The
mopping up of the extremist Muslim units in the area of Hambarine village near
Prijedor has been completed and Kozarac village is sealed off. A group of 35
experienced soldiers from the 5th Infantry Brigade was sent to Prijedor.277
The Prijedor Crisis Staff also sought to justify the violence in Hambarine through a press release
in Kozarski Vjesnik on May 29. In the statement, the Crisis Staff argued that the purpose of the
military attack was to issue a warning to the residents that perpetrators of such acts must be
surrendered over. When these demands were not met, the Army of the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina felt justified to retaliate. This point was contested by the witness
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testimony of military expert General Wilmot. General Wilmot argued that if there was no
compliance with the ultimatum, the military would indeed be justified in seeking the
perpetrators. General Wilmot even acknowledged that violence would be likely to ensue because
of the retaliation. However, he made it clear that attacking the civilian population and destroying
houses – which was the actual course of events – was an unjustified form of retaliation.278
Following the attack on the village of Hambarine, similar events unfolded in the town of
Kozarac – encompassing the villages of Kamičani, Kozaruša, Sušići, Brdjani, and Babići.
Kozarac was a predominantly homogenous town, with approximately 98 to 99 percent of the
population being Bosnian Muslim. The Bosnian Serb leadership – via Radmilo Željaja –issued
an ultimatum to Kozarac by demanding that weapons of the Bosnian Muslim TO and local police
be turned over.279 Soon thereafter, Kozarac was attacked by a military convoy approaching from
the direction of Prijedor and Banja Luka. The military convoy was accompanied by foot soldiers
who opened fire on checkpoints, homes of Bosnian Muslims, and civilians fleeing the area.280 It
was estimated that nearly 5,000 soldiers participated that day in Kozarac, including paramilitary
units led by the infamous leaders Šešelj, Arkan, and Jović.281
The attack on Kozarac lasted until May 26 – the Bosnian Serb soldiers achieved their
ethnic purification of the mostly Bosnian Muslim enclave of 25,000 residents. On that day, the
Bosnian Serb aggressors moved their tanks and loudspeakers to the edge of the town and began
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crying out, “Muslims get out! Muslims get out! Surrender and everyone will be safe!”

The

magnitude of the attack led to the destruction of houses and buildings within Kozarac, where
witnesses reported seeing the Bosnian Serbs set houses with people inside of them on fire.
Additionally, the Bosnian Serbs engaged in organized looting – mostly refrigerators and stoves
that would be collected every few days from different homes.283 Thus, the terms of surrender
were agreed upon that day: Bosnian Muslims seeking to evacuate the town were to form a
column in return for a ceasefire to take effect. What they did not know was that they were being
subjected to a “carefully planned and coordinated attack designed not only to remove the
population, but to liquidate its leaders and destroy its homes so that the ‘cleansing’ would be
irreversible.”284
As thousands of Bosnian Muslim residents emerged from the forest waving white flags of
surrender, it was the role of Goran Borovice – a Serb resident working in close conjunction with
the Bosnian Serb police and the JNA – to identify the town’s elite during the mass exodus phase
that follow the attack. These elites were either subject to arrest, forced detention in a
concentration camp, or altogether death. According to several witnesses, those identified by
Borovice that day included judges, Bosnian Muslim parliamentarians, Bosnian Muslim police
officers, restaurant owners, entrepreneurs, factory managers, and local sports heroes. According
to the reporting of Battiata, the following was witnessed that day:
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Some of the men were shot on the spot. Others were taken into the house or
adjacent bus shelter where their throats were slit. The sink in the house was filled
with blood, according to a 60-year old man who said he saw 10 corpses slumped
there that day. Others were killed as they were loaded onto buses bound for
detention camps – Omarska, Keraterm, Trnopolje – that has been hastily set up
earlier to handle the exodus.285
As for the rest of the civilians, they were taken out on convoys traveling toward Prijedor and
Banja Luka. Once on the convoys, the Bosnian Muslims learned that women and children were
to be separated from the men. The women and children were taken to Trnopolje, while the men
were forced to into the two more notorious camps of Keraterm and Omarska. Once again, the
objective to separate individuals was part of the Greater Serbia ethnic cleansing campaign. The
mass expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from Kozarac was achieved relatively swiftly in three days.
However, it was only the initial step in what would lead to more atrocious acts of human rights
violations.
During the trial of Dr. Milomir Stakić – at the time the President of the Prijedor Crisis
Staff – The Chamber concluded the events that unfolded in Hambarine and Kozarac were part of
a larger Bosnian Serb offensive to achieve two strategic goals laid out by Radovan Karadžić on
May 12, 1992. At the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Karadžić summarized six strategic goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership in Bosnia.
Of these goals, the first two were largely employed in northwest Bosnia, specifically the
municipality of Prijedor:

285

Ibid.

132
The first goal is separation from the other two national communities – separation
of states. Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used every
opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would continue with
such practices if we were to continue to stay together in the same state.
The second strategic goal…is a corridor between Semberija and Krajina. That is
something for which we may be forced to sacrifice something here and there, but
is of the utmost importance for the Serbian people, because it integrates the
Serbian lands, not only of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, but integrates Serbian
Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbian Krajina and Serbian Krajina with Serbian
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia...which will integrate us, which will provide
us unimpeded flow from one part of our state to another.286
The remaining goals included one similar corridor in the Drina River Valley – the site of the
Zvornik Municipality, a border on the Una and Neretva Rivers, the division of Sarajevo into
Muslim and Serb enclaves, and access for the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
the sea. Ultimately, Karadžić concluded by stating, “We believe, and we have faith in God,
justice and our own strength, that we shall achieve what we have planned, all six strategic goals
– of course, according to the hierarchy, and that we shall finally and definitely finish the job of
the freedom struggle of the Serbian people.”287 Therefore, the overnight coup of Prijedor on
April 30, and the subsequent attacks on Hambarine and Kozarac, followed the systematically
calculated goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership. These goals were ordered by Karadžić and
executed faithfully and successfully by Crisis Staffs and the military leadership. The stage was
now set for the mass expulsion and mass killing phase of Prijedor.
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The Greater Serbia Campaign, 1992
Ethnic Cleansing, April – December 1992
The ethnic cleansing phase of Prijedor was initiated after the attack on Hambarine,
especially throughout June and July 1992. According to the Prijedor police report, approximately
20,000 non-Serbs had evacuated Prijedor by the end of the summer, and another 18,000 fled by
October.288 Additionally, by the end of the year, most of the non-Serb towns and villages, along
with Bosnian Muslim mosques, were abandoned and destroyed. The mass expulsion of non-Serb
residents was facilitated primarily by the Prijedor Crisis Staff, whereby the residents were forced
to sign over their property to Bosnian Serb authorities of the ARK and Republika Srpska. Any
remaining property was seized by the Crisis Staff as property belonging to the municipality.289
In his closing arguments to The Chamber, Nicholas Koumjian, the prosecutor in the trial
against Dr. Milomir Stakić, argued the following in regard to the ethnic cleansing that occurred
in Prijedor:
What happened in Prijedor resembles genocide in that the aim of this criminal
campaign was to destroy the Croat and Muslim communities of Prijedor. The
crimes were committed to ensure that these two communities would no longer
exists in Prijedor: their houses, their places of worship, were destroyed…The
bodies of those who had been executed were even hidden to make sure that none
of these people would have any reason for coming back: no house, no mosque or
church, not even a grave where they could mourn their relations.290
This assessment was corroborated by the United Nations Commission, which described the
course of events as the following:
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A key to understanding the nature of the conflict in Opstina Prijedor is to
recognize that the non-Serbian population was not fleeing from a war in the
district. Their departure was not a side effect of an armed conflict. Conversely,
their removal was exactly what the Serbs used military might to achieve. The aim
of the entire operation was the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Opstina Prijedor – i.e. to
remove the non-Serbs so that the population which would continue to live on in
the district would be almost exclusively Serbian.291
The report highlighted the first two strategic goals expressed by Karadžić in May – the
separation from the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and the creation of a Greater Serbia
corridor linking the Serbian communities of Serbia proper, Bosnia and Croatia. The entire
Bosnian Serb strategy was formed around the mass expulsion of non-Serbs and the violence that
ensued was a direct result of this very strategy. The Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of
Prijedor never put up a legitimate defensive front, instead, it was the overwhelming military
presence of the Bosnian Serbs that allowed for expedited one-sided violence. To call the events
that unfolded in Prijedor as traditional warfare would be a falsehood.
The events in Opstina Prijedor are unfortunately no aberration in this respect. The
‘ethnic cleansing’ is the core of the Serbian military operations in Bosnia. It may
even be argued, as some observers do, that the events in Sarajevo – where there is
a more traditional theatre of war with all its horrors – are staged, in part at least, to
take away international attention from the eradication of entire ethnic groups in
areas where there has not even been any real war, only tremendous abuses of
military power – such as in Opstina Prijedor.292
The events that unfolded in Sarajevo are better understood as occurrences of traditional warfare.
Although the Bosnian Serbs held a military advantage over their Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat counterparts, they did not capture the city completely. Instead, they engaged in a threeyear war of attrition in order to reduce the number of casualties and shift the international focus
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away from events of gross human rights violations. According to Bosnian military officials,
“conditions in Sarajevo had to be bad enough to gain international attention, but not bad enough
to compel the international community to intervene militarily.”293 With the international
community fixated on the violence in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serb leadership could wholly
achieve the ethnic cleansing campaign in strategically important territories – especially Prijedor.
Thus, what materialized in Prijedor was not traditional warfare, but a systematically coordinated
plan to extinguish groups of people based on their ethnic and religious identity. What
materialized in Prijedor was genocide, and the critical turning point of this genocide followed
after the creation of some of the deadliest concentration camps witnessed on the European
continent since the Holocaust.
Concentration Camps and Mass Killings, May – September 1992
The concentration camps were established shortly after the attack on Hambarine village
in the Prijedor municipality. More precisely, the camps operated from May 24, 1992 to
September 1992 under the direct supervision of the Crisis Staff and Dr. Stakić and with the
coordinated effort of the Bosnian Serb forces and Bosnian Serb police.294 At least two of the
concentration camps – Keraterm and Omarska – served as places for killings, torture, and brutal
interrogations of non-Serb civilians. Keraterm and Omarska were often used for eliminating the
non-Serb leadership that consisted of businessmen, community leaders, intellectuals, politicians,
and religious figures. The third camp, Trnopolje, served as a holding center for massive
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deportations of mostly women, children, and elderly men – although killings and rapes did also
occur there.295 In all, there were 28 camps administered by the Bosnian Serb leadership, but
Keraterm, Omarska, and Trnopolje were the sites of some of the greatest atrocities committed
during the three-year war period.296
At Camp Omarska, the Bosnian Serbs detained almost the entire non-Serb elite of
Prijedor, including members of the SDS, religious figures, academics and intellectuals,
entrepreneurs, and local judges and police officers. According to Simo Drljača, the chief of the
Serbian secret police and member of the Crisis Staff, 3,334 people had been arrested in the camp
between May to August 1992. This included 3,197 Muslims, 125 Croats, 11 Serbs, and 1
other.297 The conditions at the camp were horrendous – food was inefficiently distributed,
medical care was scarce, and the overall hygiene facilities were poor. In some instances, the
detainees had limited access to water and toilet facilities. The room were crowded, and it was
typical to have anywhere from 200 to 300 detainees in as single room at on time. 298
The detainees at Omarska were subject to serious mistreatment and abuse. Witnesses
were beaten with rubber batons, metal rods, and baseball bats. It was also commonplace to call
out a handful of detainees each night for abusive interrogation sessions.299 In particular, both the
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“Red House” and the “White House” were the sites of some of the most notorious beatings and
killings that occurred at Omarska. At the “Red House,” it was common for prisoners to be taken
there for gross beatings that would often end in mutilation and death. It was rare for any prisoner
to survive the “Red House,” and corpses were often dumped on the grass near the structure
where they were left out for days to rot.300 As for the “White House,” it was described as the
“most infamous” structure at the camp. The camp authorities would hold those detainees they
referred to as “extremists” in the “White House.” One room in the house was used for
punishment, where hardly any detainee came out alive. These detainees were hardly every killed
by guns, and instead, the guards chose to beat them to death.301 According to one Serbian guard,
he stated that, “we will not waste our bullets on them. They have no roof, there is sun and rain,
cold nights, beatings twice a day, we give them no food and water. They will starve like
animals.”302 It was reported that other detainees would often see bodies piled up the next
mornings – including five to ten bodies each morning and as many as 30 on certain nights.303
The records kept at Omarska were inadequate compared to the ones of the Nazi
concentration camps during World War II. Although it is difficult to pinpoint an exact number of
deaths, but according to eyewitnesses, journalists, and the Red Cross, anywhere between 1,200 to
2,000 were estimated to be killed at Omarska.304 Additionally, The Chamber at the trial of Dr.
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Stakić concluded that three specific mass killings occurred of detainees held at Omarska. The
first one included the killing of approximately 180 civilians brought to Omarska from Hambarine
village in July. Upon their arrival, the detainees were piled into the “White House,” and in the
middle of the night on July 17, gunshots were heard that continued until dawn. The next
morning, camp guard Zivko Marmat was seen shooting rounds into the bodies, which were
eventually loaded onto trucks and taken away.305 One the second cassation, 44 individuals were
taken from Omarska toward the direction of Bosanska Krupa in late July. The individuals were
under the impression that they were being taken there for prisoner exchange, but instead were
never seen after that day. During the exhumation of certain victims, it was reported that 56
bodies were found in total. Most of the individuals died from gunshot injuries, and DNA analysis
confirmed the bodies of Sureta Medunjanin, Ekrem Alić, and Smail Alić – all who were last seen
at Omarska.306 In a third instance, two buses of approximately 120 detainees made their way
from Omarska toward the direction of Sanski Most on August 5. Along the way, Bosnian Serb
guards killed 126 detainees and the bodies were found in an area called Hrastova Glavica.
Forensic experts confirmed that 121 of the deaths resulted in gunshot wounds.307
Camp Omarska was ultimately shut down between the days of August 6 and 7, 1992 after
the visit from international journalists. Roy Gutman and freelance photographer Andre Kaiser
were the first to break the story by reporting on the maltreatment and killings of detainees.308
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Following their breakthrough discovery, Ed Vulliamy, another British journalist described what
he witnessed at Omarska with the following account:
The men are at various stages of human decay and affliction; the bones of their
elbows and wrists protrude like pieces of jagged stone from the pencil thin stalks
to which their arms have been reduced…There is nothing quite like the sight of
the prisoner desperate to talk and to convey some terrible truth that is so near yet
so far, but who dares not. Their stares burn, they speak only with their terrified
silence, and eyes inflamed with the articulation of stark, undiluted, desolate fearwithout-hope.309
For all intents and purposes, the primary function of Omarska was a death camp. The detainees
were not imprisoned due to any wrongdoing on their part, they were not brought there for
manual labor, and the guards had no intention on transferring the detainees to any other
locations. The abysmal conditions of the camp and the appalling treatment of the detainees –
ultimately resulting in the mass killing of many – suggested above all that the camp served the
Greater Serbia goal of eliminating non-Serbs from the geographically important territory.
At Camp Keraterm, detainees – mostly men of military age – were subject to similar
conditions as those at Omarska. Formally a ceramic tile factory, Keraterm was set up around
May 23 or 24 and included four separate rooms for detainees. It was established by the Crisis
Staff, and operated under the supervision of Duško Sikirica.310 It estimated that approximately
4,000 non-Serbs, almost exclusively Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat, where detained at the
camp throughout its operation. Keraterm held up to as many as 1,500 detainees at any one time,
and including to various eyewitness reports, Room 2 and Room 3 held the majority of people
ranging anywhere from 200 to 500 men.311
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The detainees were frequently beaten and mistreated during their time at Keraterm. It was
common for guards to call out detainees at night time, take them out for beatings, and return the
detainees bloody and bruised. Arifagić, a detainee at Keraterm, said that bodies of men who had
died from the beatings were taken out at night and placed in what was referred to as the “garbage
dump” at the camp.312 Arifagić noted that he was also beaten during his stay at Keraterm.
According to Arifagić, he and Safet Tači, a young Bosnian Muslim man from Kozarac, were
placed in Room 2 upon their arrival to Keraterm in mid-July. During the night of their arrival,
the detainees in Room 2 were asked to lie down on the ground outside and were severely beaten
until they confessed to being members of the Green Berets (a Bosnian Muslim paramilitary
group consisting of former JNA members).313
The most grotesque event at Keraterm occurred between the nights of July 24 and July
25. A few days before, between the days of July 20 and 21, detainees from Kozarac were
evacuated out of Room 3 and relocated to Rooms 2 and 4. Room 3 was then used for newly
captured detainees from the Brdo area – comprising the villages of Bišcani, Rizvanovići,
Rakovcani, Hambarine, Čarakovo, and Zecovi.314 Leading up to the event, the new detainees
were denied access food and were subject to physical abuse. On July 24, the detainees were
granted permission to go outside for a few hours, where witnesses claimed that they noticed an
increase in soldiers. When the detainees were brought back to their room, the door was locked
behind them, while detainees in Room 2 were told to stay calm and face the wall.315 Later that
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night, the detainees reported hearing increased chatter outside, including members of the army
entering on trucks. The soldiers set up a table and positioned a machine gun facing toward Room
3.316
At around midnight, the machine gun fired at the window of Room 3, while soldiers
threw pebbles at the windows and roof. According to a witness – who sat in the back of the room
and began to faint – the pebbles were some sort of tear gas or poisonous gas. The witness
claimed that the shooting lasted four to five minutes, and although he passed out briefly, he could
hear the detainees crying out for help while the soldiers prevented them from escaping.317 Tači
corroborated the event, remarking that he heard one of the Serb soldiers swearing and yelling,
“Don’t come out or we’ll shoot. There they are. They’re fleeing.”318 At this point the Tači claims
to have heard the gunfire, which most likely indicates that detainees in Room 3 were trying to
escape the presence of the tear gas, allowing for the Bosnian Serbs to shoot at them as they
exited the room.
The next morning, the witness in Room 3 estimated that he had seen around 200 bodies
piled inside and outside the room.319 The survivors of the massacre were told to come outside,
and as a truck pulled up in front of Room 3, those who looked strongest – including Arifagić and
Tači – were ordered to load the bodies onto the truck. Arifagić testified that the same type of
violence transpired later that night. He observed hearing someone yell, “What are we going to
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do? There are survivors here,” in which approximately 40 more individuals were executed. Once
again, a truck arrived the next morning and bodies were piled onto it.320
The Chamber reported that a minimum of 190 persons – mostly Bosnian Muslim – were
killed in Room over the nights of July 24 and 25. Additionally, The Chamber reported that out of
the 570 detainees in Room 3, only about half survived the massacre over the course of those two
nights.321
At Camp Trnopolje, women, children, and elderly men were brought there after the
successful attacks and captures of Kozarac and Hambarine by the Bosnian Serbs. The camp was
established in a former elementary school, and included additional buildings consisting of a
gymnasium, shop, a former municipal center, and a theater referred to as the “dom.” The camp
was mostly used as a staging area for the mass deportation of civilians, however, men of military
age were later transferred to the Trnopolje after Keraterm and Omarska were shut down.322
The detainees were held at Trnopolje from May 24 to September 30, 1992, which was
established by the Crisis Staff and commanded by Slobodan Kuruzović.323 During their time at
Trnopolje, detainees were held in poor conditions, including a lack of space, medical care, food,
and poor sanitary conditions. Male detainees were subjected to beatings and forced labor, while a
number of women were raped by camp guards – including Kuruzović.324 For instance, Idriz
Merdžanić, a detained doctor at the camp, testified to treating men who had been severely beaten
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and women who had been raped. “They were taking wooden legs from the tables and they would
beat people with those, whatever they would find there. We heard screams and the beatings.
Some of the people that they beat up, they would bring them to us to help them, to dress their
wounds.”325 Merdžanić even took photographs of the abused victims without the knowledge of
the guards. He said he acquired the camera from another inmate and would hide it in the water
tank in the surgery, vowing, “if it had been discovered, I would probably have been killed.”326
Although conditions at Trnopolje improved toward the end – largely due to the
international outrage over Keraterm and Omarska – the situation as a whole remained dire. The
overall violence against camp detainees decreased, especially killings, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) sought to provide food to detainees. However, Mazowiecki,
a United Nations Human Rights envoy stated, “words fail me,” when asked to describe the
conditions at the camp. And although the violence reduced, many detainees mentioned how
random shootings by Bosnian Serbs were used to intimidate them.327 By late August, most
detainees who had a home to return to in the municipality of Prijedor were released, though,
many did not return due to the risk of being killed. As for detainees from Kozarac, Hambarine,
and other destroyed villages, they were registered by the ICRC, which served as a “passport”
needed to flee Serbian persecution.328
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Even though the conditions at Trnopolje improved in late-August, that did not prevent the
Bosnian Serbs from organizing another mass execution of non-Serbs. On August 21, a convoy
was organized by the Crisis Staff to transport individuals from Prijedor into Muslim enclaves.
The convoy stopped at Trnopolje, where mostly male detainees and a few women and children
were loaded on for transfer. The buses, accompanied by the police and military vehicles, headed
toward the direction of Kozarac.329 Near Kozarac, the buses were joined by four other buses and
eight trucks, which included Bosnian Muslims men, women, and children from Tukovi and
under the command of Miroslav Paraš. In all, the convoy consisted of eight buses and eight
trucks, continuing through Banja Luka, Skender Vakuf, and moving toward the final destination
at Mount Vlašić near the Bosnian Muslim controlled territory of Travnik.330
Shortly after reaching Skender Vakuf, the convoy stopped again, whereby men of
military age were ordered to get on two empty buses. After the women and children were taken
away on separate buses, about 250 men were left. The buses drove another 10 to 15 minutes
before stopping on a road with a deep cliff on one side and a deep gorge on the other. The
detainees were ordered to exit the buses, form a column, and begin walking down the road. After
about 100 meters, the men were directed to stop and kneel down facing the gorge. According to a
witness, he remarked hearing a police officer say, “here we exchange the dead for the dead and
the living for the living,” followed by the shooting of the men down into the gorge. The witness
shouted at his father to jump into the gorge; his father pushed him into the gorge. The witness
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fell to the bottom of the gorge and broke his ankle, but pretended to be dead because men made
their way into the gorge shooting anyone who tried to escape.331
It was reported that approximately 200 dead bodies were found near Mount Vlašić after
the incident on August 21.332 On September 3, 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps reported to the main
Bosnian Serb Army command that Simo Drljača was responsible for the incident. The report
stated that it had “caused indignation” among citizens and members of the 1st Krajina Corps and
that it created a “dark stain,” but luckily the “international community did not find out about it in
more detail.”333 Ultimately, none of the policemen involved in the incident were held
accountable. Instead, the police officers and high-ranking, including Drljača, were rewarded
with medals of bravery by Radovan Karadžić.334
In all, by 1993, the Bosnian Serb police estimated that 42,000 fewer Bosnian Muslims
and 2,000 fewer Bosnian Croats had moved out of Prijedor, while 14,000 Bosnian Serbs had
moved in.335 Slobodan Kuruzović, confirmed that Bosnian Serbs had a play to reduce the number
of Bosnian Muslims to 10 percent or less, and then later to 2 percent or less. By 1995 – toward
the end of the war – the population of Prijedor consisted of approximately 92 percent Serbs, 5
percent Bosnian Muslims, and 1 percent Bosnian Croats.336
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Analysis
Scope Conditions: Crisis and Exclusivist Ideology
The presence of an internal strife was evident for two primary reasons in Prijedor. First,
the creation of the Prijedor Crisis Staff (later the Wartime Staff) signaled that preparations were
being taken in Prijedor for the certainty of war. Prijedor was part of the strategic locations that
the Bosnian Serbs needed linking eastern Bosnia with the Krajina region of Croatian, therefore,
taking over Prijedor would allow for a direct passage into neighboring Croatia. Along with the
local Crisis Staff, the civilian and military elites established a regional headquarters in the nearby
city of Banja Luka to coordinate efforts in the greater northwest region of Bosnia. Second, by the
time the Bosnian Serb forces reached Prijedor on April 30, war had already broken out over
much of eastern Bosnia and Sarajevo. It was only inevitable that Prijedor would be attacked soon
thereafter.
In addition to the rhetoric of national elites – such as Karadžić’s labeling of Bosnian
Muslims as “Islamic fundamentalists” and his assertion that Bosnian borders have always been
arbitrary.337 Or the calls by prominent Bosnian Serb and Serb individuals for an ethnically
“purified” state separate from Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The exclusivist ideology
was rampant in Prijedor prior to the takeover. Kozarski Vjesnik printed accusation and insults
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The term Ustasha was invoked to compare Croats
to those of the ultra-nationalist and fascist organization operating between the years of 1929 to
1945. Another example was labeling Bosnian Muslims as Mudzahedi, or Mujahedeen, to invoke
a negative connotation by comparing Bosnian Muslims to extremists. Relatedly, Radio Prijedor
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joined in the propaganda against non-Serbs. The attacks against non-Serbs were directed toward
the professional competence of leaders, their private lives, and against “extremist” Muslims who
were accused of preparing to execute a genocide against the Bosnian Serb population.338
After the takeover, the Crisis Staff authorities assumed control over the newspaper, radio
and television stations which allowed them to more easily attack Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats. The sole purpose of the media was to act as a propaganda machine for the Bosnian Serb
offensive – justifying the offensive by painting the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as
threatening enemies. Relatedly, the Crisis Staff went as far as to issue a harrowing decree:
Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serbs had to wear white armbands for identification purposes
and as a sign of surrender to the Bosnian Serb authorities. This decree was also issued to
residents living in villages by requiring each non-Serb home to hang a white flag outside the
house as a sign of loyalty to the authorities. Such a decree was the first of its kind since the
marking of Jewish citizens in 1939, and precisely like the events of the Holocaust, the “white
flag” was used for two primary purposes: One, to identify, humiliate, and threaten non-Serb
civilians in Prijedor. This allowed the authorities to easily classify victims in day-to-day matters,
but also convey the message that they were now in charge. Two, the “white flags” were
ultimately used for achieving the goals of separation from non-Serbs and the formation of an
ethnically Bosnian Serb state. In other words, the “white flags” represented the preliminary stage
of marking individuals from an ethnic group for mass deportation or mass killing.
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Territorial Control
The territorial control variable – similar to its application in the Zvornik case – was
present through the overwhelming territorial bases and political space established in Prijedor.
Politically, the Bosnian Serbs were organized in four main ways. First, after the rise of
nationalist parties and the inclusion of Vojislav Šešelj into major SDS meetings, the Bosnian
Serbs of Prijedor deemed it necessary to establish their own parallel municipality that was to be
separate from the Bosnian Muslims. Thus, the Bosnian Serbs and the main SDS party of Prijedor
formed the Assembly of the Serbian People of the Municipality of Prijedor on January 7, 1992.
Second, this formation of a “para-municipality” was accompanied by a larger initiative; the
Bosnian Serb Republic on January 9, 1992. Now the Bosnian Serbs had politically achieved their
vision of a separate Bosnian Serb state – even if only in name. Third, because of its strategic
importance to the Greater Serbia plan, the Bosnian Serb municipality joined the Serbian
Autonomous Oblast of Bosanska Krajina (ARK). This was a group of self-proclaimed Bosnian
Serb districts in northwest Bosnia opposed to an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fourth,
the localization of power in Prijedor was achieved with the formation of the Crisis Staff. The
Crisis Staff served an important logistical role by acting as an intermediary between elites at the
national level and forces composed of the military, TO units, paramilitary groups, and the
Bosnian Serb police. Additionally, the Crisis Staff was most familiar with Prijedor, which
allowed them to swiftly take over the town and surrounding villages, and establish concentration
camps with the assistance of the Bosnian Serb forces.
Territorially, the Bosnian Serbs were organized in three ways: First, the “ethnicization”
of the JNA was well underway in 1991 and largely achieved by the end of the year. The war in
Croatia not only had a spill-over effect into the Prijedor region due to its close proximity, it also
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resulted in the deployment of a large number of Bosnian Serbs to fight in the war. Thus, by the
end of the Croatian War, and right before the takeover of Prijedor, the JNA was organized along
ethnic lines that overpowered any type of defensive put up by the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats. Second, the “weaponization” phase followed in the early months of 1992. The JNA
began arming the Bosnian Serb TO units and ordinary Bosnian Serb citizens, but not their
Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat counterparts. Again, from a local perspective, this allowed
Bosnian Serbs to establish strategic checkpoints in Prijedor prior to the takeover. Third, the
Bosnian Serb effort in northwest Bosnia was united under the ARK. The region served as the
headquarters for the JNA, which largely worked in close cooperation with paramilitary units, the
police, and civilian authorities.
All these efforts operated from the regions headquarters in Banja Luka. Banja Luka was
the operational base where the civilian and military elites, both national and local, could organize
their collective efforts for the entire region and the Prijedor municipality. Banja Luka was
directed by the Bosnian Serb leadership up top – specifically Karadžić, and then conveyed these
orders to the various military corps, paramilitary forces, police units, and civilian authorities of
the Crisis Staff in Prijedor. Thus, when addressing territorial control in the case of Prijedor, it is
evident that the Bosnian Serb leadership had the necessary instruments in place to dominate the
municipality through civilian and military channels prior to the takeover. And when the actual
takeover was orchestrated, the capacity to achieve the goals of Greater Serbia was both
coordinated and rapid.
Elite Collaboration
The exclusion of non-Serbs from Prijedor would not have been possible without the
participation of various elites – both civilian and military – at different levels of the state.
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Beginning with the takeover, it was evident that the events that unfolded after April 30 were a
result of a carefully coordinated and deliberate plan to achieve the goals of the Greater Serbia
campaign. The orders to execute a coup of Prijedor were directed from the national level,
channeled through the Crisis Staff, and implemented through the Bosnian Serb forces on the
ground in coordination with paramilitary and police units. Once Prijedor was in the hands of the
Bosnian Serb leadership, the Crisis Staff was able to place ultimatums on the surrounding
villages, and when those were not met, various Bosnian Serb forces – namely the 1st Krajina
Corps, the 6th Krajina Brigade, the 43rd Motorized Brigade, the Prijedor police, and members of
various Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, carried out the assault on the ground. Following the
takeover of the municipality at-large, the Bosnian Serb leadership now had the necessary
conditions to execute the final stage; mass deportation and mass killing. Once again, the military
forces worked closely with the Crisis Staff in seizing property and territory belonging to nonSerbs, in rounding up non-Serb civilians for expulsion, and finally in determining which civilians
would be taken to the deaths camps of Keraterm and Omarska. With the direct supervision of the
Crisis Staff and Dr. Milomir Stakić, the camp guards were composed of military, paramilitary,
police, and other Serb citizens, who were responsible for some of the greatest atrocities during
the three-year period in Bosnia.
In accordance with the six strategic goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership, the elite
collaboration variable supports the same findings present in the Zvornik case. The collaboration
was organized at different levels of the state, illustrating a strategically coordinated effort
developed months in advance of the initial violence. With the political and territorial control to
support the coordinated effort, the Bosnian Serb leadership proceeded to effectively achieve
phase two by launching an attack on the municipality. Once phase two was achieved, the
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necessity of the local officials was crucial for phase three. The Crisis Staff was instrumental
because it served as a liaison between the national elites and military command, but more
importantly, it was involved in the political control, movement of people, the seizure of property,
and the formation of the concentration camps in Prijedor. The collaboration between the civilian
and military leadership was necessary for the quick and successful achievement of phase three.
The municipality was in the hands of the Crisis Staff, and the Bosnian Muslims were eliminated
through the ethnic cleansing and mass killing campaign from April to September 1992.
Genocide
In the case of Prijedor, the territorial control and elite collaboration variables were
explanatory variables for the violence that unfolded and escalated from April to September 1992.
Similar to the case of Zvornik, the crucial factor was the elite collaboration variable and the
participation of local-level elites. However, in Zvornik, it was the participation of the
paramilitary groups that largely led to the aggressive, coordinated, and swift Greater Serbia
campaign. The paramilitary groups callously committed some of the worst atrocities, and were
essential in the militarization, takeover, and ethnic cleansing phases by closely collaborating
their efforts with the JNA and the Zvornik Crisis Staff. As for Prijedor, the implementation and
participation of the Crisis Staff was the fundamental local-level factor needed to achieve the
Greater Serbia campaign.
First, they effectively orchestrated the takeover of Prijedor in close coordination with the
military and police forces. Once the takeover was achieved, the Crisis Staff established de facto
rule in the municipality by imposing restrictive measures on the non-Serb population and
assuming control of the Municipal Assembly building, the police station, the hospital, court
building, bank, post office, and the media. Second, they successfully arranged for the takeover of
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the surrounding villages in the following weeks by using their control of the media to urge nonSerb residents to surrender and pledge loyalty to the Bosnian Serb forces. Third, and most
importantly, they created and administered some of the most severe concentration camps seen
throughout the Bosnian war. It was at this stage where the Greater Serbia goals were largely
achieved because most non-Serb resident were either subjected to mass deportation or killings in
the camps.
Thus, the categorization of Prijedor as a genocide is appropriate for two reasons: First,
the level of intensity as proposed by the Political Violence Framework places Prijedor beyond
the middle point in either quadrant C or quadrant D. The participation and overwhelming force
of elites at various levels – both civilian and military – illustrated a situation of one-sided
violence. The Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were never able to stage an effective
defense, indicating that the ethnic cleansing and mass killing campaign was the main goal and
not an effect of war. Second, the level of group targeting clearly indicated that the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were the primary victim group due to their ethnic and religious
makeup. Most of the victims were civilians who were effectively deported from the region. This
effort was extremely aggressive and organized such that the demographics makeup of Prijedor
was almost exclusively Bosnian Serb in only a year’s time. Additionally, the remaining victims
were subject to cruel and inhumane treatment in the various concentration camps. Once in these
camps, the Bosnian Serbs were able to organize several large-scale massacres of mostly Bosnian
Muslim men. Consequently, the one-sided nature of the violence and the atrocities committed
clearly indicates there were sustained policies in place that result in the deaths of a substantial
portion of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat civilians. For these reasons, I identify the case of
Prijedor in Quadrant C based on the Political Violence Framework.

CHAPTER 6

BRATUNAC
Background
Bratunac is a municipality located in eastern Bosnia to the south of Zvornik, east of
Vlasenica, and north of Srebrenica. Much like Zvornik, the Drina River serves as a border divide
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to the east. Additionally, the Bratunac-VoljvacaBjelovac-Skelani route leads to a bridge situated over the Drina River, which allows easy
passageway to Serbia and from.339 Prior to the breakout of conflict, the population of Bratunac
was 33,375. And, although the Bosnian Muslims composed a higher demographic of the
population than in Prijedor or Zvornik, it was still a 62 percent Bosnian Muslim to 36 percent
Bosnian Serb population. In other words, the municipality was almost exclusively composed of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, with neither side constituting an all-out majority.340
The case of Bratunac fits into the universe of quadrant D in the Political Violence
Framework typology as outlined by Table 5. The level of violence signifies a higher level of
intensity, indicating that Bratunac was a case of large-scale violence or war rather than low-level
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conflict. However, Bratunac did not exhibit high-levels of group targeting and there was not a
substantial portion of Bosnian Muslims killed as seen in Prijedor and Zvornik. While the
Bosnian Serbs seemed to have similar goals within Bratunac as demonstrated across other
municipalities in early 1992, they lacked the necessary territorial control and elite collaboration
to achieve their goals. Additionally, they did not anticipate the pushback by Bosnian Muslims,
which put them in a two-sided battle in mid-1992 through early 1993.
The exclusivist ideology variable was a present scope condition prior to the conflict, but
unlike Prijedor and Zvornik where the Bosnian Serbs hurled anti-Muslim propaganda, Bratunac
witnessed the rise of threatening rhetoric on behalf of both groups living in the municipality. As
for the territorial control and elite collaboration variables, two points are worth noting. First, the
Bosnian Serbs were unable to effectively establish territorial control in the greater Bratunac area.
Other than the city-center itself, many of the surrounding villages were under the control of the
Bosnian Muslims. From the period of April 1992 to February 1993, the Bosnian Serbs not only
lacked the complete control necessary to achieve their goals, but they also failed to establish
dominant control. Second, elite collaboration was mostly present in the case of Bratunac. The
Bosnian Serbs were able to establish a Bratunac Crisis Staff that coordinated participation
between the military, the Bosnian Serb police, and the Bosnian Serb TO units. However, the
presence of paramilitaries had a damaging effect on Bosnian Serb goals. The paramilitaries
engaged in intimidating and terrorizing actions against both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs
well into the spring of 1993.
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Table 5: Dependent and Independent Variables – Bratunac
Non-Genocide (DV)

Territorial Control
(IV)

Exclusivist Ideology
(Scope Condition)

Definition

Large-scale,
organized, group
destructive violence
that targets a specific
social group in a given
territory (Straus, 2012,
345).

The adequate political
space and territorial
bases to mobilize and
escalate violence.

Measurement

Was there evidence of
sustained policies by
states or their agents,
that resulted in the
deaths of a substantial
portion of a communal
or political group?
(“State Failure Task
Force: Phase III
Findings, 2000, p. v)

Do elites have
adequate political
space within a state to
mobilize and escalate
violence?

A totalizing system of
meaning based on
pronounced in-group
and out-group
distinctions permitting
no shared forms of
identification between
groups and premised
on a radical
devaluation of the outgroup (Verdeja, 2012,
315).
Do elites exhibit
rhetoric that excludes
certain groups from
the goals/visions of the
state?
J. “Other”
K. Dehumanizat
ion
L. “Enemy”

Are victimized groups
defined primarily by
their ethno-linguistic
or religious
characteristics?

Do elites have
complete control to
effectively achieve
their genocidal goals?
(Kalyvas, 2006, Ch. 7)

Level of Intensity:
High

Political Control:
Creation of Serbian
Municipality of
Bratunac; Bosnian
Muslims created their
own Crisis Staff

Bratunac

Level of Group
Targeting: Low
Effective Bosnian
Muslims resistance
from mid-1992 to
early 1993 derails
Greater Serbia goals;
lack of deaths to
substantial portion of
Bosnian Muslims

Do elites have a
territorial base(s) to
effectively mobilize
for violence?

Territorial Control:
Bosnian Muslim
control in Bosnian
Serb villages from
June 1992 to March
1993; in Bratunac
from January 1993 to
March 1993; efforts
dedicates to fighting
resistance

Do elites exhibit
rhetoric signaling for
ethnically, racially, or
religiously
homogeneous
societies?
G. “Purity
H. “Utopia”

Beginning in 1991,
offensive slogans were
present referring to
Bosnian Muslims as
“Turks” and reference
to a “Bosnia not
existing” and “This is
Serbia, Greater Serbia”
At the same time,
Bosnian Muslim
spread their own
attacks against
Bosnian Serbs by
telling them Bosnian
belonged to them and
that they should leave
for Serbia

Elite Collaboration
(IV)

The persistent
interaction between
elites at different
levels to achieve
certain goals.

Do local elites and
national elites share
information?
Do local elites and
national elites share
goals?
Do local elites and
national elites share
resources?
Do local elites and
national elites
participate in the
persistent, coherent
pattern of action to
bring about the
destruction of another
group’s existence in
whole or in part?
Political rule of
Bratunac by Crisis
Staff; participation by
Bosnian Serb police,
and Bosnian Serb TO
units in violence;
Bosnian Serb
paramilitaries went
against the command
of the Bosnian Serb
leadership;
paramilitaries
intimidated and
terrorized Bosnian
Serb civilians
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The rest of the chapter will outline the critical events that surfaced in Bratunac beginning
with the development and mobilization phase in the early 1990s, the militarization and takeover
phase from 1991 to 1992, and the successful defensive waged by the Bosnian Muslims beginning
May 1992 and lasting until February 1993.
Development and Mobilization, 1990 – 1992
Coalition Government, Ethnic Tensions, and Propaganda
The formation of nationalist parties occurred in Bratunac beginning on August 8, 1990
with the formation of the SDS. Mirsolav Deronjić, who would later serve as the president of the
Bratunac Crisis Staff, headed the SDS Municipal Board. Likewise, the SDA formed their own
assembly in September 1990.341 After elections were held, the SDA went on to win a majority of
the seats in Bratunac, but the two parties came to an agreement to divide leadership roles
amongst themselves and create a coalition government. Ninjaz Dubišić, a Bosnian Muslim
served as the President of the Municipality, while members of the Executive Board were evenly
divided between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs.342
The creation of nationalist parties coincided with the rise of ethnic tensions in Bratunac in
1991. For instance, SDS members threatened Bosnian Muslims civilians by posting campaign
slogans on street signs and various public and private buildings. The slogans were pejorative and
included messages such as: “Muslims, Balijas, Turks move out, you’re going to be slaughtered,”
“there is no Bosnia anymore,” and “This is Serbia, Greater Serbia,” accompanied by pictures of
Slobodan Milošević and Chetnik Serb soldiers from World War II. The propaganda campaign
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was furthered strengthened by statements of SDS members arguing that peaceful coexistence
was not possible between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs in Bratunac and that Bratunac
was a “Serb municipality.”343 Similar rhetoric came from the Bosnian Muslims, who asserted
that Serbs should go back to Serbia and that Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the
Muslims.344
The rhetoric coming from Bosnian Serbs echoed sentiments being made at the nationallevel at the time. The common language centered around the Variant A/B Instructions and the
strategic goals underlined by top Bosnian Serb leaders, namely Karadžić. These instructions
were also reiterated on May 12, 1992, at the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bratunac was a Variant B instruction, because it was a Serb-minority
municipality that needed to be controlled by the Bosnian Serb authorities as part of the “creation
of a corridor in the Drina Valley thus eliminating the Drina as a border between Serbian
states.”345 Thus, it was clear that Bosnian Serb visions of Greater Serbia included Bratunac, and
Bratunac was included in the strategically important Serbian Arc seeking to connect the Serbian
people of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.
Along with the nationalistic rhetoric, mistrust in the municipality also increased
throughout 1991. Intimidations were common against both Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb
professionals and elected leaders. In one case, for example, Dževad Gušić, the President of the
Bratunac SDA was shot at several times when trying to leave his homes.346 Mistrust also
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resonated within the police force, at the workplace, and on the streets where Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Serb demonstrators clashed several times.347 The SDS, noticing the fraying of the
coalition government due to the inter-ethnic tensions, issued an ultimatum to their SDA
counterparts to establish a 50/50 power-sharing arrangement. The surprising part was that the
SDS made up a minority of the coalition in the first place, but they were able to successfully
convince the SDA to accept the proposal. Moreover, prior to the formation of the coalition
government, the SDS successfully lobbied the SDA into accepting a two-thirds threshold for any
decisions made.348 This crucial result effectively prevented the SDA from passing any decision
without the support of the SDS. Knowing they could not block the decision solely, it seemed as
if the SDA accepted the ultimatum to appease the SDS leadership, while unknowingly setting the
stage for further division within Bratunac.
Militarization of Bratunac
Militarization in Bratunac began even before the multi-party elections. The JNA, similar
to the operations conducted in Prijedor and Zvornik, withdrew weapons from the local TO units
and put them under their control. By August 1991, SDS leaders under the command of Deronjić
and the JNA were arming local Bosnian Serb citizens with weapons.349 By later 1991 and into
early 1992, the JNA had established military formations near Bratunac – especially in the hills of
surrounding villages. Although the Bosnian Muslims faced a significantly lopsided disadvantage
– primarily due to the “ethnicization” of the JNA – they were still able to acquire weapons
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distributed by SDA officials. Additionally, the Bosnian Muslims established their own crisis staff
and the surrounding villages organized local guards.350
While the Bosnian Muslims had armed formations in Bratunac and their own version of a
crisis staff, it was evident that the Bosnian Serbs were coordinating their efforts locally with the
national leadership, namely, Karadžić, Milošević, and the now pro-Serbian JNA. Bosnian Serbs
formed three separate crisis staffs in Bratunac. The first one was called the Serb Population
Crisis Staff, which was established on October 19, 1991, after Karadžić called for a state of
emergency of the SDS. The second one was called the SDS Bratunac Crisis Staff and it was
established on December 31, 1992 until the end of April 1992. This crisis staff was the type
being formed throughout the various municipalities. Lastly, the third one was the transformation
of the SDS Bratunac Crisis Staff into the Wartime Committee, which had virtually the same
duties and was established by Karadžić in preparation for ensuing conflict in Bosnia. Deronjić,
assumed leadership of all three Crisis Staffs, which also included the Commander of Police,
representatives of the military, and members of the Ministry of Defense and other important
community leaders.351
The purpose of the various crisis staffs in Bratunac followed the same pattern as seen
throughout other regions of Bosnia. The main objective – as outlined by Karadžić – was a set of
guidelines that ordered all municipal and local committees of the SDS to work undercover in
preparing local Bosnian Serb communities for the possibility of war. In doing so, the Bratunac
Crisis Staff under the command of Deronjić cooperated with the JNA, the SDS Central
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Committee, the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs, and the national-level elites such as Karadžić,
Krajišnik, and Plavšić.352
As the reality of war was setting in on Bratunac, the SDS discussed the urgency in
initiating the Crisis Staff to take care of war preparations on February 24, 1992. At the same
meeting, it was confirmed that talks were in place about the nature of military activities and the
training of Bosnian Serb civilians.353 Deronjić was on board with the initial preparations by
arguing that “Serbs need to keep their own Serbdom, their own history, their own traditions, their
own culture.”354 Deronjić also noted that he had specific instructions on how to address the issue
of separation from the Bosnian Muslims. He pushed for the division of the police, noting that it
would be the best means for preventing the outbreak of violence and protecting the Bosnian
Muslim population. The SDA agreed to split the police force, which provided for an equal
number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb police officers.355 The next request, to altogether
divide the municipality into two zones, was denied by the SDA representatives. The request was
considered highly unlikely from a practical standpoint. There was a large number of Bosnian
Serb and Bosnian Muslims villages neighboring each other, along with a significant number of
intermixed villages.356 Nevertheless, the failed attempt to divide Bratunac only increased ethnic
tensions, and after the military maneuvers in nearby Bijeljina and Zvornik, it was evident that an
impending takeover of Bratunac was next on the Bosnian Serb agenda.

352

Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić (Indictment) IT-02-61-I (3 July 2002).

353

Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić (Sentencing Judgement) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004), para. 63; Prosecutor v.
Radovan Karadžić (Judgement) IT-95/18-T, (March 14, 2016), paras. 703-704.
354

Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (Judgement) IT-95/18-T, (March 14, 2016), para. 704

355

Ibid., paras. 705-707.

356

Ibid., para. 710.

161
Violence in Bratunac, 1992
Takeover of Bratunac, April 17 – April 29, 1992
There was growing fear that Bratunac would be the next municipality taken over by the
Bosnian Serbs after news broke about the violence in Bijeljina and Zvornik. The SDA and SDS
held a joint conference to discuss the ongoing political and security concerns in Bratunac.
Deronjić told the Bosnian Muslims that even if conflict breaks out all across Bosnia, he would
ensure that Bratunac is the last place that sees any violence. However, this point was misleading
for three reasons: First, when the Bosnian Serb representatives were asked about the formation of
the JNA and the training of Bosnian Serb civilians, they gave unsatisfying responses; essentially,
they could not answer the questions being posed.357 Second, shortly after the joint conference,
the Bratunac Crisis Staff proclaimed a state of emergency and assumed control over the
Assembly and Executive Board. The Crisis Staff then tasked the Bratunac TO and Bosnian Serb
police force with the responsibility of defending the municipality. Third, on April 16, 1992, one
day before the eventual takeover of Bratunac, Karadžić ordered the Crisis Staff to issue a
mobilization of the Bosnian Serb population, which left out the Bosnian Muslim population.358
On April 17, the Bosnian Serb forces entered Bratunac without any resistance from the
Bosnian Muslims. The forces consisted of the JNA troops from Novi Sad and Užice Corps, TO
units, members of the Bosnian Serb police, and local reserves who were later accompanied by
paramilitary groups from Serbia, namely, Šešelj’s White Eagles and Arkan’s Tigers.359 After the
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takeover, the paramilitaries controlled the town at night by plundering Bosnian Muslim property
and property belonging to Bosnian Serb dissidents. Arkan’s Tigers were especially aggressive,
employing similar tactics in Bratunac as witnessed in Zvornik. They roamed through the streets
of Bratunac in their cars blaring sirens to scare the local residents and they would frequently
enter mosques and play old Chetnik war songs through the loudspeaker.360 Around the same
time, most of the Bosnian Muslim leadership had left Bratunac for Srebrenica, and the police
station was placed under the control of the Bosnian Serb leadership. The police force was no
longer ethnically divided, seeing as that the Bosnian Muslim officers were sent home shortly
thereafter.361
A meeting was then scheduled between SDA and SDS representatives to discuss the
contradictory developments. The Bosnian Muslims were assured a few months back by Deronjić
that military units would not attack Bratunac, and they were clearly realizing now that this was
never the case. The meeting quickly turned hostile and the Bosnian Muslims were presented with
an ultimatum: they were to collect all the weapons and turn them over to the Bosnian Serbs by 8
a.m. in Srebrenica. They were told that they could either leave quietly or face the possibility of
being killed. The SDA representatives accepted the ultimatum and by April 19, the Bratunac
Crisis Staff authorized the Bosnian Serb police and TO units to disarm all other Bosnian Muslim
citizens of Bratunac.362 Following the weapons ultimatum, the Bosnian Serb leadership asked the
Bosnian Muslims to return to work and sign loyalty pledges to the new Bosnian Serb authorities
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by April 29. Most decided not to return out of fear, which allowed the Bosnian Serbs to seize
their property. The few who did remain signed the loyalty pledges and continued surrendering
their weapons.363 According to the ICTY Chamber, it was evident that most Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Serbs had fled Bratunac when violence broke out in Bijeljina and Zvornik out of
fear that Bratunac would be attacked next. The second wave of Bosnian Muslim departures
occurred between April 10 and 29 after increased harassments by the paramilitary forces.364
Therefore, while the Bosnian Serb forces were preparing to execute a takeover, the Bosnian
Muslims were anticipating their moves and preparing their own exit strategies.
Attack on Surrounding Villages, May 1 – May 9, 1992
Despite the massive Bosnian Serb military presence in their attempts to ethnically cleanse
Bratunac, the Bosnian Muslims achieved a major moral victory. On May 8, 1992, Bosnian
Muslims who had fled Bratunac and the surrounding areas, executed an ambush of the village of
Potočari, a village that was situated halfway between Bratunac and Srebrenica. During the
ambush, Srebrenica’s SDS president, Goran Zekić was killed by Bosnian Muslims fighters while
traveling from Srebrenica to Bratunac after a funeral.365 The death of Zekić signaled to the
Bosnian Serbs that even one of their top leaders was not untouchable. More importantly, it
signaled that there was legitimate Bosnian Muslim mobilization and these forces were not afraid
to go on the offensive if needed.
Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serb forces achieved their greatest attacks on the villages of
Hranča and Glogova. In Hranča, members of the Bratunac TO attacked the village on May 3 and
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incinerated 43 Bosnian Muslim homes. The village composed of mostly Bosnian Muslim homes
and was already disarmed prior to the attack. Over the next week, the TO units captured nine
villagers and killed four of them.366 In Glogova, Deronjić and members of the Crisis Staff
planned an attack in retaliation for the killing of Zekić. Deronjić informed the Crisis Staff that
the village would be completely encircled and that the civilians were disarmed on April 25.367 On
May 9, the JNA, Bratunac TO units, paramilitary units, and the Bosnian Serb police entered the
village and carried out an attack on the villagers. This day marked the greatest atrocity
committed against Bosnian Muslims in Bratunac, whereby 65 Bosnian Muslims were executed
in a field near a mosque. In addition to the executions, most of the buildings and homes were
torched in the village. Many of the other residents were rounded up and taken to one of the two
concentration camps.368
Concentration Camps
In Bratunac, the number of total concentration camps was far fewer than in places like
Prijedor and Zvornik. Out of the total 677 camps operating within Bosnia and Herzegovina
during the war, 333 were controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, 83 by the Bosnian Muslims and 51 by
the Bosnian Croats. In total, there were three corroborated camps established by the Bosnian
Serbs in Bratunac. Two of these camps were controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, while the other
belonged to an unidentified group. This number – when compared to other municipalities in the
greater Serbian Arc region – was lower. For instance, in Bijeljina, there were 10 corroborated
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camps, in Foča eight, in Prijedor 28, in Vlasenica eight, and in Zvornik 25.
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What is also worth

noting is that there were many more concertation camps listed in the abovementioned
municipalities, but a number of them could not be cross-referenced by multiple sources and were
therefore listed as uncorroborated.
The reason this distinction is important is because the Bosnian Serbs were determined to
carry out the most brutal and inhumane violence in the geographic region of the Serbian Arc. As
highlighted by the UN Commissions report on prison camps in the former Yugoslavia, the
following statement sums up the objectives of the Bosnian Serbs:
For, it is within this region of BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] that the Serbs
required absolute control in order to establish a separate nation with contiguous
borders and an uncompromised geographic link with Serbia and Montenegro.
That control required the subjugation, if not the disappearance of the non-Serb
population of the area. In large part, that subjugation and elimination was
accomplished by wholesale detention of those populations in various places of
detention.370
The wholesale detention of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat population was achieved in
the municipalities of Prijedor and Zvornik. The wholesale detention of the Bosnian Muslim
population was not achieved in Bratunac. Ultimately, the Bosnian Serbs did not exhibit the
absolute control in Bratunac that was necessary in establishing a separate Greater Serbia state as
witnessed in other regions of Bosnia. What occurred instead was the rounding up of the
remaining Bosnian Muslim population – those who did not flee prior to the outbreak of violence
– into two separate detention centers at the Bratunac Football Stadium and the Vuk Karadžić
primary school.
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The Bratunac Football Stadium was used as a temporary detention center where men,
women, and children were separated en route to their next locations. The women and children
were placed on buses and moved to Muslim-controlled territories. Most of the women and
children were transported to Tuzla, a larger metropolitan municipality in northeastern Bosnia,
between May 10 and May 16. The able-bodied men were taken to the nearby Vuk Karadžić
primary school.371 In all, the Bratunac Football Stadium operated primarily as a means to
confiscate valuables from Bosnian Muslim citizens before sending them away to other locations.
It was also reported that close to 5,000 Bosnian Muslims passed through the stadium on their
way out of Bratunac in mid-May, but some estimations have the numbers as high as 6,000 to
7,000. 372 In addition, a UN Commissioned Report found that the Bosnian Serbs forced some of
the Bosnian Muslim detainees to serve as blood donors, which led to some deaths in the process
because of the amount of blood that was withdrawn. These bodies were then reported to have
been burned and thrown into the Drina River.373
At the Vuk Karadžić school it was reported that many of the guards identified themselves
as Arkan’s men. The guards were infamous for beating detainees with steel rods and handles
from shovels, while at the same time forcing the detainees to sing old Chetnik songs and display
the “Serb three-finger sign.” When word broke out that this was occurring, a military commander
with the JNA forced the guards to stop beating the detainees and ordered for food and water to be
given to them. It was also reported that the detainees were told that the Bosnian Serb leadership
was not seeing eye-to-eye with the various paramilitary groups and that they “would soon be
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able to throw them out.” However, at the hearing of Radovan Karadžić, the Chamber found this
narrative to be misleading. Two commanders, Rodoljub Dukanović and Aleksandar Tešić,
argued that the Crisis Staff had been involved in trying to save the lives of the Bosnian Muslim
detainees, and that they were “shocked to hear” about the killings. The Chamber concluded that
it was very unlikely that the Bratunac Crisis Staff tried to distance themselves from the
paramilitaries or that they were unaware of their actions.374 The Bratunac Crisis Staff was
seeking to evade responsibility by blaming the paramilitaries, but it was evident and established,
that a Joint Criminal Enterprise existed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Joint Criminal
Enterprise included the JNA, local police, the Crisis Staffs, SDS, and paramilitary units; making
it unlikely for certain elites to not be aware of the actions of other elites.375
On May 9, between 500 and 600 Bosnian Muslim men were detained at Vuk Karadžić
school. Most of the men at this point were captured during the raid of the Glogova village that
same day. Once they arrived, the detainees were packed into a small gymnasium that could not
hold all of them. The guards reportedly told the men that whoever could not fit into the
gymnasium would be taken out and killed. On the day, between 20 to 30 men were taken outside
and shot. In addition, seven or eight men died from suffocation, and according to various
accounts, around 20 more died as a result of the beatings.376 On May 14, the Bratunac Crisis
Staff transferred around 400 detainees to Pale – a municipality nearby Sarajevo – for the
exchange of Bosnian Serb detainees. During the trial of Radovan Karadžić, the prosecution had
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submitted evidence stating the camp was operational from May 3 to May 14.

While in

operation, the detainees at Vuk Karadžić were subject to cruel beatings and intimidation in the
week they were there.
Bosnian Serb Obstacles, 1992 – 1993
The inability for the Bosnian Serbs to subjugate and eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in
large-scale at the concentration camps was a major reason for their failure to implement their
goals in Bratunac. Additionally, two other factors are also worth noting. The first represents the
actions of the paramilitaries that went against the Bosnian Serb leadership shortly after the
takeover of Bratunac, while the second represents the incomplete territorial control of the
surrounding villages where a large number of Bosnian Muslims were living.
Actions of Paramilitaries
The presence of paramilitary units in Bratunac would ultimately prove to be detrimental
to the Bosnian Serb objectives. They were welcomed initially for purposes of taking over
municipalities in eastern Bosnia, but soon thereafter, the paramilitary units demonstrated
menacing behavior directed at Bosnian Serb civilians and the Bosnian Serb forces. On May 1,
the Bratunac Crisis Staff made the decision to expel any units who refused to take orders from
the chain and command or otherwise face retaliation from the JNA. The paramilitary units
ignored the directive, and when given the opportunity to evacuate on May 6, the paramilitary
units – with the support of some Bosnian Serb citizens – chose to remain in Bratunac.378 Over the
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next month, the Crisis Staff banned the sale of alcohol and implemented measures to combat
looting and smuggling throughout the municipality.379
By June 13, Karadžić ordered a statewide ban on all formations not directly under the
control of the Bosnian Serb Army. This meant that every armed Serb, regardless of their military
or civilian affiliation, had to be under the direct command of the army or else forfeit their
weapons.380 Following his orders, Arkan’s men left Bosnia, while others were either driven out
or integrated into the military. Nonetheless, paramilitary activity continued throughout Bosnia,
which led General Ratko Mladić to once again call for the disarming of all paramilitary groups.
He argued that they were responsible for looting in areas controlled by the Bosnian Serb
government and that they should be placed under the command of the army or be arrested.381 The
Bosnian Serb leadership, both national and local in Bratunac, never fully contained the presence
of paramilitary activity. Even with the calls from Karadžić, Mladić, and the Bratunac Crisis
Staff, various groups remained in Bratunac up until March 1993. By that time, a paramilitary unit
was terrorizing the population of Bratunac and mistreating both civilian and military command –
especially the Bratunac Brigade.382
Therefore, the paramilitaries caused the Bosnian Serbs of Bratunac a major setback for
three crucial reasons. First, the Crisis Staff could not effectively coordinate with the various
groups. This point is interesting because the paramilitary groups played a major role in the initial
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takeover of Bratunac, as well as the greater region of eastern Bosnia. Once the takeover was
achieved, the groups acted on self-interest rather than going along with the goals implemented by
the Crisis Staff and military. Second, and related to the point, numerous paramilitaries never
accepted the command of the military. Whereas the military was seeking to achieve the goals of
Greater Serbia as stressed by Karadžić and the SDS throughout Bosnia, the paramilitaries were
mainly motivated by war profiteering and looting. Moreover, because the groups were from
Serbia and not Bosnia, they never displayed political allegiance to the SDS, instead, they were
allied with opposition parties such as the Serbian Renewal Movement or the Serbian Radical
Party.383 Third, by the time the Bosnian Serb forces moved onto Bratunac (after first attacking
Bijeljina, Višegrad, and Zvornik), there was a mutual agreement among civilian and military
elites at the national and local levels that the paramilitaries had become distractions. With the
Bosnian Serb forces seeking to control Bratunac as part of the greater Serbian Arc, the
paramilitaries sought out their own personal agendas. This ultimately disrupted the objectives of
the Bosnian Serb forces, who were about to face additional resistance from Bosnian Muslim
fighters.
Even with the diverging goals of the paramilitaries, the rest of the elites – both civilian
and military – were coordinating their efforts effectively by pushing out the last remaining
Bosnian Muslims from Bratunac. While the paramilitaries did not follow the command passed
down from the national leadership to the various municipalities, it did not completely prevent the
Bosnian Serbs from coordinating local efforts with the national goal of Greater Serbia. It was
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noted that by June 6, only two Bosnian Muslims had remained in Bratunac.

However, this

claim only referred to Bosnian Muslims living within the town of Bratunac and not those in the
surrounding villages.385 Therefore, where the Bosnian Serbs ultimately failed was establishing
complete territorial control. They expelled the Bosnian Muslims living in Bratunac, but they
failed to target the Bosnian Muslims in the surrounding villages.
Incomplete Territorial Control
In Prijedor and Zvornik, the overtaking of the municipality led to a mass exodus of
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians. Many civilians were ethnically cleansed from the
territory, both within the town itself and the surrounding villages. Others were imprisoned within
a concentration camp. At this stage, the purpose was to execute most of the community leaders
of the municipality, and then move down the line with other Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
men. In Prijedor and Zvornik, this task was achieved rapidly without any effective resistance. In
Bratunac, there were at least two challenges to the Bosnian Serb offensive once they successfully
took over the town. First, the increasing intimidation and rumors that Bosnian Serbs were being
armed by the SDS and JNA impelled many Bosnian Muslims civilians to move out of Bratunac
well before the conflict began. It was clear that full-scale war had broken out across Bosnia and
that strategic territories in Eastern Bosnia were being taken one-by-one by the Bosnian Serbs.
Second, by the time the Bosnian Serbs had entered and assumed power in Bratunac, the
remaining Bosnian Muslims were fleeing the town and the surrounding villages in large
numbers. The third wave of Bosnian Muslim departures happened after Bosnian Serb refugees
from the surrounding areas began to move into Bratunac.
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The question remaining is: if many of the Bosnian Muslims left on their account, why
would this ultimately prove to be detrimental to the Bosnian Serbs? The answer is because they
failed to properly overtake the surrounding villages. The Bosnian Serbs were aggressive in
attacking the surrounding areas in Prijedor and Zvornik, but they stopped short of this in
Bratunac. They had incomplete territorial control and this ultimately proved beneficial for the
Bosnian Muslims, whereby a number of refugees took the necessary steps to mobilize and fight
back against the Bosnian Serb aggression.
Bosnian Muslim Defensive, 1992 – 1993
Formation of Bosnian Muslim Defense, April 1992 – July 1992
In the week leading up to the Bratunac takeover, and on the days following the takeover,
Bosnian Muslims had fled the municipality and hid out in the surrounding woods. By late May
1992, many of the Bosnian Muslims who had fled the municipality started to return to enclaves
in the Bratunac and Srebrenica municipalities. As reported by the Institute for War, Holocaust,
and Genocide Studies (NIOD):
Even though most of the Muslims in the municipalities of Bratunac, Srebrenica
and Vlasenica were on the move, cleansing operations in the area had not
achieved what the Serbs expected. They were now confronted with the threat of
an ever-expanding Muslim enclave, which was joining forces with other pockets
of Muslim resistance in Konjević, Polje, Cerska, Luka, Žepa, and villages to the
south-east of Srebrenica.386
Around the same time, there was a plan to combine the different Bosnian Muslims refugees who
had weapons and were hiding out in the woods under a common Srebrenica TO Staff. At this
time, it was decided that Naser Orić would serve as the commander, Akif Ustić as Deputy
Commander, Bečir Bogilović as temporary commander of the civilian police, while others joined
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Orić played a significant role in the Bosnian Muslim defensive, in addition to

heading the Srebrenica TO Staff, he also headed the Srebrenica War Presidency, and eventually
the Joint Armed Forces of the Sub-Region of Srebrenica, which was composed of the
municipalities of Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica, and Zvornik.388
While the mechanisms were put in place to establish a common Bosnian Muslim military
defensive, the Srebrenica TO Staff and eventually the Joint Armed Forces, lacked a common
hierarchical structure.389 For instance, Orić was the leader of 20 to 30 Bosnian Muslims from the
village of Potočari, who were in charge of defending the front line and resisting Bosnian Serb
attacks that commonly shelled the village. In other instances, Ahmo Tihić led a group of 130
armed Bosnian Muslims who settled in a nearby village southeast of Bratunac and Srebrenica,
while leaders such as Akif Ustić, Zulfo Tursunović, and Hakija Meholjić, regularly led brigades
consisting of 50 to 100 fighters. Finally, the most prominent fighters were under the wing of
Ejub Golić. After the Bosnian Serb attack on the village of Glogova, Golić and his men settled in
a nearby village. When more Bosnian Muslims fled Bratunac, Golić became the leader of three
additional groups, totaling between 300 to 400 fighters in the area of Glogova.390
The Bosnian Muslim defense may have been a geographically dispersed command
structure, but the organization of fighters was significant for three reasons. First, it was evident
that the Bosnian Serbs had attacked Bratunac and successfully assumed control, but they did not
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successfully assume control of the surrounding villages. Aside from the attacks on the villages of
Hranča and Glogova, the Bosnian Serb leadership was overwhelmed with the growing resistance
of displaced Bosnian Muslims from other villages in Bratunac and Srebrenica. Second, the
Bosnian Muslims who had hid in the woods were not disarmed like much of the population
inside the city. This allowed them to wage attacks on the Bosnian Serbs in early May – such as
the killing of Zekić – before finally meeting on May 20 to organize as a common unit. Third,
even with a disorganized command structure, it was unmistakable that the Bosnian Serbs were
outnumbered by the Bosnian Muslims. And, even though the Bosnian Serbs enjoyed the military
superiority, the Bosnian Muslims resorted to successful guerilla tactics.391 This prevented the
military from fighting elsewhere, a largely uncharacteristic setback considering that the Bosnian
Serbs conquered territory previously with little to no resistance.392 The results of the Bosnian
Muslim tactics included the destruction of five Bosnian Serb localities between June and January
8, 1993, four of which were located in Bratunac.
Attacks on Bosnian Serb Villages, June 1992 – January 1993
The first coordinated Bosnian Muslims attack occurred on August 8 in the village of
Ježestica. The Bosnian Muslims involved in the attack came from various groups and were
accompanied by other civilian refugees from nearby villages. The attack lasted about two to
three hours, resulting in the destruction of half of the houses in the village.393 The raid’s sole
purpose was the intention to destroy residential homes since most of the homes were deliberately
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burned down once the Bosnian Muslims entered the village and pushed out the Bosnian Serbs.
Later that day, the Bosnian Serb guards of the village – who were reportedly supported by the
Bosnian Serb Army – launched a counteroffensive and pushed out the Bosnian Muslims out of
the village.394
A few months later, on October 5, the villages of Fakovići and Divovići were attacked
under the command of Orić, after a decision was reached by Srebrenica Joint Armed Forces
Staff. The attack was initially met with Bosnian Serb guards, who were primarily firing from the
top of houses and inside their local guardhouse in the village. Eventually the guardhouse was
destroyed, along with several houses. Later in the afternoon, a counteroffensive was launched
from Serbia whereby a plane dropped explosives on the village of Fakovići, causing most of the
Bosnian Muslims to withdraw at the point. Most of the homes in the village of Fakovići were
burned down, as well as a few homes in Divovići.395
A third attack occurred between December 14 and 19 on the villages of Bjelovac and
Sikirić. Once again, Orić commanded the attack, along with other members of the loosely
formed Joint Armed Forces of the Srebrenica sub-region. In Bjelovac and Sikirić, the two sides
exchanged control over the course of the week, resulting in the large-scale destruction of
property. Moreover, by December 18, the Bosnian Muslims were ultimately able to capture the
villages and burn down the remaining homes.396
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Lastly, the attack the village of Kravica on January 7 and 8, 1993, proved to be the most
devastating defeat for the Bosnian Serbs. Over the course of the summer in 1992, Bosnian Serbs
and Bosnian Muslims engaged in fighting, which eventually intensified in December. On the
morning of January 7, the Orthodox Christmas, the Bosnian Muslims launched an aggressive
attack on Kravica under the command of Orić. The attack was met by little Bosnian Serb
resistance, who mostly fired at the Bosnian Muslims from homes and other buildings. The result
was the large-scale destruction and torching of homes. Additionally, when the Bosnian Serbs
withdrew on January 8, the Bosnian Muslims were able to destroy most of the property.397
When considering the devastating nature of Kravica, two points are especially worth
noting. First, the attack was carried out by several thousand Bosnian Muslims – with some
figures estimating anywhere between 3,000 to 4,000 fighters. In comparison, the Bosnian Serbs
had no more than a couple hundred fighters defending the village. Second, and most importantly,
the attack resulted in the deaths of 46 Bosnian Serbs – 35 soldiers and 11 civilians. It was also
reported that over 500 homes were burned down in the village, a significantly greater amount
when compared to the attack on other Bosnian Serb villages.398 As the NIOD notes,
For the Muslims, the take-over of Kravica was a crucial victory. Orić could now
link up directly with Muslim forces in Konjević Polje and Ceska, which was a
serious blow to Serb war efforts in eastern Bosnia. The enclaves of Srebrenica,
Žepa, Konjević Polje and Cerska were not linked into one huge Muslimcontrolled territory.399
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Therefore, the overwhelming attack on Kravica finally gave the Bosnian Muslims an
advantage in eastern Bosnia – Bratunac included. “Only around ten Serb villages in the
area of Srebrenica and Bratunac had remained in Serb hands. Another thirty Serb villages
and seventy hamlets had fallen under Muslim control.”400
Bosnian Muslims Surround Bratunac, January 1993 – February 1993
By January 1993, the Bosnian Muslims had surrounded Bratunac from three different
directions. It was reported that they had gained control of 92 to 93 percent of the territory in
Bratunac, with the objective of taking over the town itself.401 The journalist, Tim Judah,
described the scene as dire from the Bosnian Serb perspective. For instance, the Bosnian Serb
Army was bringing in back-ups from northwestern Bosnia and Bijeljina. These forces were
stunned by the state of the Bratunac forces and criticized them for the lack of concern they had
for Bosnian Serb civilians.402 As one soldier stated to Judah, “The Serbs aren’t fighting hard
enough because they have got somewhere to run to.”403 The solider was referring to the ability of
the forces to easily cross the Drina River into Serbia proper.
Despite this disdain for “deserters” or “traitors,” local SDS authorities called on Serbs
living in Serbia to return to Bratunac and defend the municipality. Rodoljub Dukanović, the
Chairman of the Executive Board of the Municipality of Bratunac, made an appeal in the local
newspaper, Naša Rijeć. He noted that these Serbs would be recruited as regular army soldiers
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under the command of a regular army.

This point was important because many of the Serb

who fled were concerned with the behavior of the paramilitaries. The paramilitaries were able to
expel Bosnian Muslims from Bratunac, while also plundering the municipality and looting from
both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, the fact that the Bosnian Muslims were
expelled was a secondary concern for many local Bosnian Serbs since their property and
valuables were also disregarded by the paramilitaries. Relatedly, many of the expelled Bosnian
Muslims made up a significant majority of the population in nearby villages and overtime they
used their guerilla tactics and sheer numbers advantage to surround Bratunac.
However, by February and March 1993, the Bosnian Serb Army conducted a series of
attacks in order to overtaken Bosnian Muslim strongholds around Bratunac and Srebrenica. Most
of the villages had fallen under their command in early March, and by early April, they had
established control over most of the territory they had lost between the summer of 1992 to
February 1993.405 The Bosnian Muslims were not able to capture the town of Bratunac, but for
nine months, they were able to put up an effective resistance and even counteroffensive. The
Bosnian Serbs enjoyed an overwhelming victory in other municipalities in eastern and
northwestern Bosnia, but they faced significant setbacks in Bratunac, which only ended once the
Bosnian Serb Army intervened to thwart the efforts of the various Bosnian Muslim fighters.
Analysis
Scope Conditions: Crisis and Exclusivist Ideology
The presence of an ongoing crisis and war was present in Bratunac well before the
Bosnian Serb forces. The Bosnian Muslims were on edge due to the outbreak of conflict in
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nearby Bijeljina and Zvornik. Even though Deronjić promised the Bosnian Muslims that
violence would not reach Bratunac, his actions in the months leading up to the takeover
conflicted with his statements. First, the JNA and SDS leadership armed and trained local
Bosnian Serbs – an operation commonly seen throughout all of the municipalities important to
the Bosnian Serbs for establishing their vision of Greater Serbia. Second, the presence of
military formations and the establishment of the Bratunac Crisis Staff signaled that the Bosnian
Serbs were preparing for the ensuing violence.
Once the Bosnian Muslims agreed to the division of the police, it was only a matter of
time until Bratunac fell to the Bosnian Serbs like the other municipalities around the Drina River
Valley. The Bosnian Serbs deflected questions about the formation of the military and soon
thereafter, the various paramilitaries involved in the takeover of Zvornik made their way to
Bratunac. Bratunac belonged to the geographical Serbian Arc, so it was never a question of if
Bratunac would be attacked, but rather, when and by what means would the Bosnian Serbs take
Bratunac. These plans were established by high-ranking Bosnian Serbs – including Karadžić,
Krajišnik, and Plavšić – on December 19, 1991 as part of the Variant A/B Instructions and takeover of power in Bosnia.406
The exclusivist rhetoric followed along the same lines as seen throughout Bosnia at the
time. The Bosnian Serb Government, namely, Karadžić’s equated Bosnian Muslims as “Islamic
fundamentalists,” and stated that the concept of a Bosnian state was always an arbitrary creation.
Karadžić was notorious for equating the Bosnian Muslims with “oriental despotism,” which was
a common discriminatory tactic used by the Bosnian Serbs when they referred to the Bosnian
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In other cases, prominent leaders such as Plavšić and Krajišnik openly

expressed desires to live separately from the Bosnian Muslims on the basis that a Bosnian Serb
state would be desirable for its “ethnic purity.” 408
Within Bratunac, this rhetoric echoed a similar tone, whereby Bosnian Serbs were using
the terms “Muslim” pejoratively by calling the Bosnian Muslims “Balijas” or “Turks.” The term
“Balija” is another way to refer to Bosnian Muslims in a derogatory manner. The Bosnian Serbs
using this language to stress that Bosnian Muslims were not part of the Christian Europe, but
rather as descendants of the Ottoman Turks – who were negatively portrayed as Muslim
extremists. Additionally, the Bosnian Serbs were sending ethnically symbolic messages by
posting images of Milošević and Chetnik Serbs. These images are exclusionary for two reasons:
First, by this point, it was clear that Milošević represented the Greater Serbia vision better than
any other leader. He was the founder of this ideology and was able to rally Serb grievances
throughout the greater Yugoslav region after the death of Tito. Second, the reference to Chetnik
Serbs alluded to the bravery of the soldiers who fought against the fascist Ustasha Croatians
responsible for the mass killing of many Serbs during World War II.
The Bosnian Serbs were not the only ones to blame for the exclusionary rhetoric. In
Bratunac, unlike Prijedor and Zvornik, the Bosnian Muslims were more openly expressing their
dissatisfaction about living in the same region as the Bosnian Serbs. Although the Bosnian
Muslims expressed these sentiments, two things are worth pointing out. One, the Bosnian
Muslims were largely responding to the rhetoric of the Bosnian Serbs both within Bratunac and
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from the top leadership. It was evident that the Bosnian Serbs did not support the Bosnian
Muslim move to independence and were vocal about the consequences of such a decision. In
other words, it was not the Bosnian Muslims who were advocating for an ethnically pure state,
but rather for an independent state in which they rightfully lived in already. Two, the Bosnian
Muslims were not wrong to assert that Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to them – considering
they made up 43 percent of the population in 1991 and 62 percent of the population in
Bratunac.409 But, unlike its ethnically homogenous neighbors of Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia was
a fundamentally multiethnic state, which would explain the Bosnian Serb reservations for
creating a para-state within the already existing republic. In all, the Bosnian Serb rhetoric was
akin to the messages of the Bosnian Serb Government and it was clear that Bosnian Serb goal to
create a Greater Serbia state included the municipality of Bratunac. As for the Bosnian Muslims,
their rhetoric, although exclusivist by definition, was a response to the increasingly hostile
Bosnian Serb language.
Territorial Control
If the previous second-generation literature were correct, we would expect Bratunac to be
a classic example of a case that led to genocidal violence. A case where one group or the state
executed a blatant campaign of one-sided, large-scale violence against an ethnic, national, or
religious group. However, even with the scope conditions in place, the Bosnian Serbs in
Bratunac lacked the territorial control to successfully apply and execute their goals.
I would contend that, above all else, the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to effectively
establish complete control in the greater Bratunac area was detrimental to their goals of Greater
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Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs sought to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims living in Bratunac, but they
encountered two shortcomings. First, many of the Bosnian Muslims began to flee Bratunac when
they saw the violence unfold in Bijeljina and Zvornik. They feared – and their fears were
confirmed – that Bratunac would be attacked next as part of the campaign on the Drina River
valley. In this case, achieving control of the town of Bratunac occurred relatively swiftly because
many Bosnian Muslim fled before any violence even broke out. Relatedly, the population that
was rounded up in the camps did not encompass a substantial portion of the population that
needed to be eliminated for the Bosnian Serbs to separate and create a parallel Bosnian Serb
state. Would the situation be different if Bratunac was attacked first instead of fourth? Would
citizens of Zvornik evacuate in the same manner if they had witnessed violence in Bratunac? The
case of timing may have been coincidental, but it had an impact on territorial control.
Second, the Bosnian Serbs failed to establish control in the surrounding villages where
many Bosnian Muslims fled to or were living. This should have been the main objective of the
Bosnian Serbs if they wanted to achieve their goals, but, it instead served as a catalyst for
Bosnian Muslim resistance. Now, instead of devoting their resources to the occupation of other
municipalities or completing the takeover in Bratunac, the Bosnian Serbs had to commit their
personnel and resources to fighting Bosnian Muslims combatants for the next nine months. In
sum, the Bosnian Serbs had dominant control of the town, but they were outnumbered in the rest
of the crucial territory.
Elite Collaboration
To a lesser extent, but still crucial, was the lack of elite coordination. The goals of the
legitimate Bosnian Serb leaders such as the Bosnian Serb Government, the JNA, or the Bratunac
SDS, did not accord with the paramilitary groups. Also, even after multiple calls for the
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paramilitaries to disarm, to leave, or to join under the command of the military, little was done to
alleviate the situation completely. Since the presence of the paramilitaries was so vital for the
Bosnian Serb campaign throughout the country, it was interesting that this would prove to be
damaging in the case of Bratunac shortly after takeover stage.
In terms of the bigger picture, it is likely that the paramilitaries made an already difficult
situation for the Bosnian Serbs worse. The Bosnian Serbs did not expect to be outnumbered by
Bosnian Muslims who were able and willing to attack Bosnian Serb villages through mid-1992
into early 1993. Had they secured the surrounding villages, this counteroffensive could have
been checked more easily by the Bosnian Serbs. Now, not only were the facing defeats at the
hands of the Bosnian Muslims, but they were also failing to control paramilitary activity under
the proper command of the military. Some groups left, some were pushed out, but other
remained in the region up until March 1993.
Still, the disorder triggered by the paramilitaries did not cause a complete strain on the
efforts of the Bosnian Serb leadership. It would be improper to label this variable as a cause on
its own for the lack of genocidal violence, but taken with the lack of territorial control, it
undeniably and negatively affected the Bosnian Serb goals.
Genocide
In many ways, Bratunac had the necessary scope conditions witnessed in cases where
genocide occurred. The hostility between the groups was severe, war had broken out, and
mobilization efforts were high. So, what prevented the goals of Greater Serbia in Bratunac? I
argue the absence of complete territorial control and disruptions to elite collaboration. The
paramilitaries, regardless of their renegade behavior, could not impede the efforts of the Bosnian
Serb leadership on their own. However, what they could do, and what they did do successfully,
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was derail the objectives. The Bosnian Serbs were already pitted against a Bosnian Muslim
counter defensive, and the presence of the paramilitaries only made matters worse. This was
especially the case since some of the paramilitaries turned on both the Bosnian Serb residents
and the leadership in pursuit of their self-interested goals.
Additionally, the lack of complete control as outlined in the Opportunity Model indicated
that the Bosnian Serbs fell short of implementing the agenda of Greater Serbia. In the cases of
Prijedor and Zvornik, the Bosnian Serbs attained complete territorial control within weeks of
invading the respective municipalities and this control never faltered as they executed the ethnic
cleansing and mass killing phase. In Bratunac, it took the Bosnian Serbs nearly a whole year to
establish control of the greater area. In the meantime, they faced military defeats across various
Bosnian Serb villages and the loss of prominent territory to the hands of the Bosnian Muslim
resistance.
Consequently, I label Bratunac as a non-genocide case. The level of intensity as proposed
by the Political Violence Framework placed Bratunac beyond the middle point in either quadrant
C or quadrant D. The participation of various military factions resulted in what looked like to be
one-sided violence in favor of the Bosnian Serbs at first. However, the participation of various
Bosnian Muslim fighters quickly turned the nature of the violence in Bratunac into a two-sided
battle. Instead of focusing their efforts on eliminating Bosnian Muslims from the territory, the
Bosnian Serbs now had to reorganize their efforts into fighting Bosnian Muslim forces. And
although the Bosnian Serbs enjoyed the advantage of military prowess and the backing of the
national government, the Bosnian Muslims – who outnumbered the Bosnian Serbs – employed
successful guerilla warfare tactics in response.
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Unlike in Prijedor and Zvornik, the Bosnian Serbs in Bratunac were unable to detain the
greater Bosnian Muslim population in brutal death camps with the primary purpose of executing
prominent Bosnian Muslim men. And, with the exception of one village – Hranča – the Bosnian
Serbs did not achieve large-scale, organized group violence against the Bosnian Muslims. There
were not sustained policies in place that resulted in the deaths of a substantial portion of Bosnian
Muslim civilians. In order to do this, they would have had to effectively attack and destroy the
various Bosnian Muslim villages where civilians had either fled to or were already living. In this
case, the level of group targeting falls below the proper threshold, placing Bratunac in Quadrant
D based on the Political Violence Framework.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION
Goals
My goal with this project was to answer one underlying question: why does genocide
occur in some locations and at some times but not in other locations or at other times? I
envisioned a project that would break through the national-level of analysis and attempt to
understand the dynamic and extraordinary nature of genocide at other levels of the state. A
project that would investigate this rare, but ever so important subject, beyond the realm of policy
and implementation. In other words, it was not enough to understand that genocide was the
preferred policy of the state or a group of actors and that this policy was implemented to achieve
certain goals. What I wanted to know was how such a policy radicalizes in the first place? Is
genocide the policy adopted my leaders at the onset of violence, or could there be other violent
strategies available? Additionally, if leaders choose to implement genocidal violence – whether
at the onset of the violence or later on – what necessary conditions must be present that would
increase the likelihood of such policies being successful? And, lastly, if genocidal violence is
carried out successfully, what explains the variation in duration, timing, and intensity of this
violence across the state?
All these questions suggest that in order to understand the complex, dynamic, an
extraordinary phenomenon of genocide, I would need to introduce methodological and
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theoretical contributions that go beyond the second-generation literature on genocide. With that
said, it would be inappropriate not to credit the second-generation literature with legitimizing the
comparative study of genocide across different social science disciplines. The second-generation
literature introduced novel ways of thinking that extended beyond the classic themes of in-group
and out-group divisions, the presence of authoritarian regimes, and scapegoating and prejudice,
as explanations for the presence of genocide. These themes defined the first-generation literature,
and although their contributions were vital, the second-generation literature introduced two
prominent schools of thought that had major contributions on the study of genocide. From the
strategic perspective, the common themes included: the relationship between war genocide, the
perception of threats and the subsequent responses, and the strategic calculations by elites
seeking to achieve their goals. As for the ideological literature, scholars within this realm
emphasized that in order to understand why genocide occurs, one must understand the thought
process of elites. Leaders exhibiting visions of purity, utopia, and other fanatical ideas of a
homogeneous state or territory, were most likely to commit genocide against groups they deemed
as illegitimate and outsiders to their vision of the state.
Although great scholarly insights were made throughout the early and mid-2000s, the
shortcomings were evident: conceptualization issues, a “small-N” problem, and concerns with
selection bias. Similar cases were being compared to one another because they shared the
common outcome of interest, without any consensus on how to properly define or measure
genocide. How were cases like Armenia, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Rwanda similar? Besides the
fact that each case represented a 20th century genocide, how could we justify comparative
analysis with cases varying in geography, history, and timing of conflict? What made matters
more problematic was the relatively small number of cases that scholars could work with in the
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first place. What was lacking in the second-generation literature, and where my project
ultimately seeks to make a contribution, is by incorporating the micro-comparative lens.
This shift, as employed by other scholars of political violence, namely, Lee Ann Fujii,
Stathis Kalyvas, Scott Straus, and Ashutosh Varshney, seeks to reshape the research agenda by
asking a different type of question. Instead of focusing on country-level comparisons, each
scholar framed their research in a matter that considers variation across localities and regions in
order to explain both positive and negative cases. Whether studying civil war violence, rioting,
or even genocide, the aforementioned scholars approached their research agendas from a microcomparative level, rather than assuming uniformity as seen in previous macro-level studies. Put
simply, civil wars, genocide, and rioting do not occur everywhere and at all times, but rather at
some places and at some times. My study adopts this bourgeoning micro-level framework
present within the political violence literature to push the comparative study of genocide in new
directions. What resulted was a methodological reconfiguration, an innovative theoretical
framework, and the empirical exploration of the understudied dynamics of the Bosnian war.
Implications
Methodological
The methodological implications of my study are threefold: First, I wanted to
conceptualize genocide as part of the multi-dimensional political violence framework. This is
important because when accounting for the dynamic of violence, whether genocide or other less
severe forms, scholars must take into consideration both the intensity of the violence and the
level of group targeting. These two measures suggest that perpetrators may choose to escalate,
deescalate, or keep their level of violence relatively constant. Therefore, what I have created for
my conceptual basis is a multi-dimensional Political Violence Framework that treats genocide as
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a process of violence. On the x-axis, the level of intensity moves from a state of peace or very
low-level violence to a state of full-scale war. On the y-axis, the level of group targeting ranges
from low, in which case we should either see peaceful relations or exclusively combatanttargeted violence, to high, in which civilian groups are either discriminated against through
exclusionary policies or targeted in a large-scale, organized, and group-destructive fashion that
seeks to eliminate them from a given territory. By establishing this framework, I was able to
accurately place Prijedor and Zvornik into Quadrant C since both cases exhibited high-levels of
intensity and group targeting. On the other hand, Bratunac was placed in Quadrant D because
although it exhibited similar levels of intensity, the levels of group targeting were much lower.
Second, by adopting multi-dimensional framework for investigating genocide, I was able
to selected cases following the most-similar systems design method that would represent positive
and negative outcomes of the dependent variable. I wanted to know why, under similar nationallevel conditions, municipalities across Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced different levels of
political violence. More specifically, I wanted to know why there were certain cases were
genocide was a defining feature of the violence and others that looked more like traditional
battles of attrition between competing armies. I find it rather deficient to draw a blanket
statement by referring to what happened in Srebrenica as the Bosnian genocide. Srebrenica is a
quintessential case of genocide, in which Bosnian Muslims were targeted because of their
religious identity for the sole purpose of being exterminated from the territory. The type of
violence witnessed on the European continent during the aggression of Nazi Germany echoes
what was witnessed at Srebrenica in July 1995. However, it is only one piece of the greater story
that explains the complex nature of the “Bosnian genocide.” The Bosnian genocide was
Srebrenica, but it was also Foča, Prijedor, Višegrad, Zvornik, and many others.
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Third, and related to my second point, I was able to focus my unit of analysis on the citylevel. I found this to be especially important because it allowed me to investigate the relationship
between the state and various local elites. What I discovered were patterns at the local level –
primarily a high or low degree of elite collaboration – that explained the absence of presence of
genocide. Additionally, what I discovered was that local elites were not simply an extension of
the national-level elites, but rather entities responsible for information gathering, resource
allocation, and goal-seeking. At times, the interests of the local elites were in line with the
national elites, but other times they demonstrated flexibility and independence in their actions.
By narrowing my focus on the city-level, I was able to investigate with greater depth factors that
were otherwise overlooked with previous studies. These idiosyncrasies could simply not have
been captured without adopting a micro-comparative approach.
Theoretical
Theoretically, I wanted to capture the conditions of agency and structure in ways that the
second-generation literature failed to do so. What the previous literature illustrated was a debate
along the lines of the ideological and strategic paradigm. Both schools of thought brought in
novel ways of thinking about genocide, specifically, the relationship between war and genocide,
genocide as a tool for leaders’ goals, and the importance of leaders’ ideologies in the context of
violence. However, the ideological and strategic paradigms demonstrated two significant
shortcomings: it was insufficient for either paradigm to explain the occurrence of genocide on its
own, and both the ideological and strategic paradigms were more accurately scope conditions
rather than explanatory variables.
As a scope condition, the presence of war and crises increases the likelihood that
genocide could occur. But since genocide is a rare event, and since most wars do not lead to
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genocide, what else needs to be present in this equation? I argue that exclusivist ideology helps
us compartmentalize which conflicts have a greater likelihood to experience genocidal violence.
But, we cannot explain the occurrence of genocide by simply looking at leaders who display
exclusionary rhetoric and fanatical visions. Instead, what we have are the scope conditions in the
pre-genocide. This is especially the case when we shift our analysis to the micro-level because it
becomes evident that violence is not uniform in its duration, intensity, or timing across a state.
War may be the narrative at the national level – as witnessed in Bosnia and Rwanda most
recently – but research suggests that local-level violence varied greatly in different communes or
municipalities. Relatedly, rhetoric that signals certain out-groups does not necessarily translate to
uniform violence across different localities. Thus, the strategic and ideological paradigms do a
better job of explaining national-level factors where scholars can accept a degree of uniformity
across the state in hopes of explaining their outcomes of interest. But a national-level analysis
misses the breadth of detail associated with the local-level that simply cannot be ignored. What it
also misses are important explanatory variables that help explain variation in violence. Put
simply, agency and structure can explain the absence or presence of genocide at the local-level,
but only if we consider two additional variables that are not properly captured in previous
research.
The first is territorial control. Since variation at the local-level is at the heart of my
research, it is essential to consider which villages, communes, and in my case, municipalities,
were under complete territorial control by the perpetrators. By establishing complete control per
Kalisz’s categorization, elites have adequate political space and territorial bases, while the
counterparts lack any ability to suppress this. In genocide, perpetrators are seeking to commit
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large-scale, group-destructive violence, and this can only be achieved when the violence is
clearly one-sided and uncontested.
In Prijedor, the local Bosnian Serbian elites formed the Bosnian Serb Assembly of
Prijedor, while the national elites declared a Bosnian Serb Republic in response to Bosnian
independence. Together, the Bosnian Serbs effectively formed the Prijedor Crisis Staff, which
carried out the instructions relayed to it by Karadžić by coordinating within the municipality and
the regional military headquarters in Banja Luka. In Zvornik, similar political institutions were in
place with the creation of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik and the Zvornik Crisis Staff. As
for territorial bases, the Bosnian Serbs effectively positioned a military presence across the
border that allowed them to attack Zvornik from several directions. The significance is twofold:
First, the Bosnian Muslims never stood a chance – the overwhelming political and territorial
presence resulted in one-sided violence with swift results. Second, in comparison to Bratunac, it
was evident that the Bosnian Serbs lacked complete control that resulted in a two-sided battle
against an impressive Bosnian Muslim resistance. By dedicating their efforts to fighting forces,
the Bosnian Serbs’ goal of Greater Serbia was disrupted. Territorial control is important,
especially complete control, and the cases under investigation demonstrated how the degree of
violence and group targeting varies across localities.
The second is elite collaboration. Since it is evident that territorial control can vary
municipality to municipality, so can the cooperation among national and local elites. One of the
greatest shortcomings of the previous literature was a neglect of the local dynamics, namely, the
role of the local elites. Local elites matter for several reasons: they can help identity target
groups, they can take part in the violence, and they can either carry out directives or deviate by
pursuing their own self-interests. In Prijedor and Zvornik, the national-level elites’ visions of
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Greater Serbia were accomplished by the participation of local elites in two ways. First, by
establishing the Crisis Staffs, the local elites were following the instructions of the Bosnian Serb
state by organizing pre-war mobilization efforts, coordinating with the militaries and
paramilitaries during the takeovers, and establishing and effectively running the concentration
camps. Second, by sharing goals, information, and resources, the JNA, paramilitaries, police, and
Crisis Staff achieved one-sided violence by expelling a substantial portion of the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croat population through means of cleansing and mass killing. In
Bratunac, the actions of the paramilitaries were in direct conflict with the goals of the Bosnian
Serb state and local Bosnian Serb leaders. With an already increasingly difficult territorial
struggle, the paramilitaries only made matters worse.
Taken together, the presence of territorial control and elite collaboration account for the
Opportunity Model that explains genocide at the subnational level. This two-step approach
accounts for the scope conditions of war/crises and exclusivist ideology as outlined in previous
national-level studies, but also pushes the research one step further by identifying the
explanatory variables to account for local-level variation. My hopes for future studies, whether it
be Bosnia or other relevant 20th century genocides, is that scholars can apply the model to
increase the universe of possible cases by investigating understudied or altogether neglected
genocides. Additionally, the model allows for identifying cases with similar conditions that
resulted in differing outcomes. If comparative genocide studies seek to make greater strides
within the political violence literature, then scholars must seek new avenues of research. Our
understanding of Armenia, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Rwanda is empirically and theoretically rich,
but only from the perspective of the state. But so much more is left to be said by looking within,
and to do so, the Opportunity Model can be a helpful framework.
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Policy
At the onset of this project my goal had been to offer insight into why individuals resort
to commit horrific acts of violence against large segments of society. Why propels the state or a
certain group within the state to escalate and radicalize violence to the degree of genocide? Why,
after establishing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
and advocating for “never again,” has genocide occurred over and over again since the
Holocaust? My analysis could not possible offer all the policy prescriptions needed to end
genocide. After all, this is just one local-level investigation, and some may argue that my
findings here are inapplicable for other cases. I think that being aware of context, geography, and
timing is important, but I also think that I have offered a theoretical framework that can be
applied across local-level studies more broadly. If scholars and policymakers buy into my notion
that genocide needs to be examined as part of the Political Violence Framework from a more
intimate level of analysis, then the tools I have presented here can be used to evaluate historical
and present cases.
For instance, by identifying a context where a war has broken out or an internal crisis is
rampant, policymakers should already have a good idea of why this hostility broke out, the actors
involved, and whether any real end is in sight. Furthermore, if policymakers determine there are
elites professing exclusivist rhetoric – the type of rhetoric seeking to divide groups within the
state – then this should become alarming to them. Intervention strategies at this level can take
effect in several ways. First, the international community should be more vocal in condemning
acts of aggression and warfare. This is especially true for dominant powers such as the members
of the Security Council, NATO, and the United States and European Union. Second, these
powerful states should make specific condemnations against nationalistic rhetoric early on. This
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type of rhetoric, when present in warring states, can become dangerous quickly. The
international community must understand learn from the faults of history and act quicker before
exclusionary rhetoric and armed conflict escalates and radicalizes into more grotesque violence.
I have illustrated here how this developed in the case of Bosnia. Initially, this rhetoric
was a tool for Milošević to rally supporters during his speeches, but this hyper-nationalism was
quickly accompanied by separatist language. What was obvious since at least 1986, but
definitely before, too was that visions for Greater Serbia were always about separating from the
Bosnian Muslims and Croats and establishing a Bosnian Serb state. Once the language turned
separatist, the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs put these visions into action. If Greater Serbia was going
to exist and thrive, then other groups, who were often labeled enemies and threats, needed to be
eliminated from territory. By eliminating groups standing in the way of an “ethnic utopia”, the
Bosnian Serbs could then also establish control over actual borders by redrawing the map in their
favor. Thus, policymakers must be aware of similar language in other cases experiencing internal
crisis or ongoing violence. In many cases, this violence may never reach the kind witnessed in
Prijedor and Zvornik, but if it does, the policy community will look back at the rhetoric as a
defining moment.
What I have illustrated above are the scope conditions that should alarm policymakers
when their assessing conflicts. In a similar fashion, this already exists to some degree with The
Global Conflict Risk Index. The GCRI is an “early warning system designed to give
policymakers a global risk assessment based on macro-economic factors.”410 What I am
proposing is an early warning system for policymakers based on national-level factors. By
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identifying the preconditions, policymakers can narrow in and assess whether genocidal violence
is possible throughout different localities.
Policymakers can begin assessing the possibility of genocide by adopting the Opportunity
Model, which allows them to identify whether groups have a stronghold on certain territories.
For example, does it seem like the state (if not the perpetrator already) is having difficulties in
suppressing the territorial ambitions of the perpetrators? Are these perpetrators seeking to
establish political institutions and territorial bases that seek to rival the state? And more
importantly, are these political institutions and territorial bases part of a greater objective to
achieve goals of separation? If so, the international community should be more willing to
implement arms embargoes or sanctions against prominent members who are seeking to commit
genocidal violence. If this coercive action is ignored, the international community must be
willing to enact the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, whereby the primary responsibility to
protect citizens is not met by the State, and therefore, responsibility must be assumed by the
broader international community.
In the case of Prijedor and Zvornik, it would have been incredibly difficult for the
Bosnian Serbs to achieve their ethnic cleansing and mass killings without the complete control of
the municipalities and surrounding villages. War had already broken, exclusivist language was
proliferating through the country, and now the Bosnian Serbs were making actual strides by their
overwhelming and uncontested control of strategic land. If observed in other cases, these types of
actions should be warning light to the policy community that more atrocious acts of violence are
about to occur.
When assessing the degree of goal, information, and resource sharing between elites,
policymakers may have more difficulty determining what constitutes successful collaboration.
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However, identifying the sophistication of these operations is possible. Again, looking at the case
of Bosnia, if the policy community had paid attention to events occurring across the country,
they would have seen a highly coordinated effort between national and local elites in conquering
areas under the important geographic Serbian arc. This was territorial vision of Greater Serbia
whereby lands stretching from Serbia proper would be linked to areas in eastern Bosnia,
northwestern Bosnia, and parts of Croatia. The international community did have the former
Yugoslavia and especially Bosnia on its radar. But rather than recognizing the ethnic cleansing
campaign being carried out in different municipalities, the international community was fixated
on the siege of Sarajevo.
This could make sense for several reasons: Sarajevo was the capital and was often
referred to as a cosmopolitan hub of Europe. More precisely, the “Jerusalem of Europe.”
Sarajevo also hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics, so to see violence break out not even a decade
later was horrifying for many observers. Sarajevo was also covered by the international news
media and represented a modern-day powder keg of Europe where ethnic groups once again were
fighting. It is no surprise that the term Balkanization has become synonymous with processes of
fragmentation and division of a region into smaller regions. This was exactly what was occurring
in 1992. Whereas most of Eastern Europe had embarked on the democratization process, the
former Yugoslavia was spiraling into chaos. For these reasons, it made sense that the
international community was obsessed with the events that unfolded in Sarajevo, but it was this
obsession that allowed the Bosnian Serbs to commit more horrific acts in other places. Had
policymakers actually paid attention to the Bosnia, they would have quickly realized that a
collaborative campaign to eliminate Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was underway across
eastern and northwestern Bosnia.
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In sum, if policymakers can identify the necessary conditions I have outlined in this
project, then future cases of conflict could be spared from the atrocities seen in Armenia, Bosnia,
Cambodia, and Rwanda. Had policymakers recognized what was unfolding in the spring of 1992
in Prijedor and Zvornik, the ambitions of the Bosnian Serbs could have been thwarted and the
lives of innocent Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats could have been saved. Of course, all of
this is dependent on whether policymakers and the international community actually want to
intervene. Whether policymakers actually believe that the Responsibility to Protect is a moral
norm that must guide the behavior of powerful countries. I recognize that this is difficult, and I
recognize that the international community is largely a bystander today as genocidal violence
plagues Myanmar and Syria. But I also recognize that the international community made a
commitment in 1948 to “never again” let this happen. If policymakers are serious about this, I
am offering a prescription that can be used to detect early warnings, assess ongoing events, and
hopefully be put into action to prevent perpetrators from achieving their ultimate objective of
genocide.
Final Remarks
As I reflect on my findings, two things are especially worth noting. First, there is much
more to learn about this dynamic and extraordinary form of political violence. I hope that I have
laid the methodological and theoretical groundwork for future scholars as they embark on
studying genocides across other places and times. I hope that I have emphasized the importance
of this violence to policymakers seeking to alleviate and prevent future acts of genocidal
violence. And, I hope that I have offered a fresh and interesting analysis for those individuals
who happen to be interested in political violence, genocide, and/or the case of Bosnia.
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Second, my study cannot possibly generalize across space and time. For quantitatively
sophisticated practitioners, this may be unsatisfying. I focused my analysis on single country and
examined three cities to explain the absence or presence of genocide. However, I was able to
remedy this with in-depth analysis that explored events, interactions, ideologies, and actors at an
intimidate level. This type of analysis allowed me to uncover crucial insights lacking in previous
“small-N” and “large-N” literature. My findings may be empirically limited, but the theoretical
model I have offered can be used in other countries and regions for scholars seeking to
understand genocide at a micro-level.
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